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SUMMARY
This thesis presents original and significant research on the 
foundations of dynamic disequilibrium macroeconomics and on the 
implications of such a modelling strategy. It represents a continuation 
of current research to provide an acceptable alternative to New 
Classical macroeconomics. Disequilibrium economics, contrary to New 
Classical economics, does not assume markets continually clear, and is 
concerned, in principle, with the dynamic response of an economy to 
disequilibrium by way of both price and quantity adjustments. It is 
only recently, however, that the early static disequilibrium models have 
been extended to include dynamics via price adjustment and other 
intertemporal linkages. This thesis furthers this line of research.
Initial chapters concentrate on developing a rational basis 
for quantity constrained models, while subsequent chapters develop and 
analyse specific open and closed economy dynamic disequilibrium models. 
Chapters 2-4 critically assess New Classical economics; show that 
imperfect price adjustment can be derived from rational economic behaviour, 
given the presence of imperfect information and learning, incomprehensively 
indexed contracts, and small-menu costs; and discuss various disequilibrium 
modelling strategies. Chapters 5-6 employ the chosen modelling strategy 
(based on Sneessens, 1981) to develop dynamic disequilibrium models. 
Intertemporal linkages are established via wage, price and inventory 
adjustment. These models are used to test ‘the robustness of previously 
derived results and provide new results. Significant insights are 
gained into the possibility of long-run non-Walrasian equilibria, the 
existence of limit cycles, the importance of wage and price adjustment, 
and the behaviour of exchange rates within regime switching models.
Further these models aid our understanding of trade and inventory cycles. 
Finally we analyse the effectiveness of government policy in the various 
disequilibrium models. Not all the New Classical policy conclusions 
remain valid when imperfect price adjustment is modelled consistently.
3ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am most grateful to my supervisors Ken Wallis and 
Mark Salmon for their help, guidance and encouragement. My thanks 
also go to Norman Ireland and Neil Rankin who read various Chapters 
and made constructive comments.
Special thanks go to my wife Jacky for her continual love 
and patience shown to me during the writing of this thesis.
The financial support of the E.S.R.C. is gratefully 
acknowledged.
Finally my praise and thanks go to God, who is always 
faithful and without whom nothing is possible.
Page
1. INTRODUCTION 7
2. RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND NEW CLASSICAL ECONOMICS 13
2.1 The rational expectations hypothesis 13
2.2 New Classical macroeconomics 23
2.3 The importance of price adjustment 33
i Contract based models 33
ii McCallum's reply 36
2.4 Conclusions 41
3. PRICE ADJUSTMENT AND DISEQUILIBRIUM 42
3.1 Perfectly flexible prices 43
3.2 Price adjustment in response to disequilibrium 45
3.3 Disequilibrium due to imperfect price adjustment 49
i Imperfect learning and information 49
ii Contract theory 53
iii "Small-menu" costs 61
3.4 Aggregate Wage and price dynamics 73
i Imperfect learning and information 73
ii Contract theory 75
iii "Small-menu" costs 76
3.5 Conclusions 81
4. SINGLE PERIOD QUANTITY RATIONING MODELS 83
4.1 The dual decision hypothesis 85
4.2 Quantity rationing models 92
i Bénassy equilibrium 93
ii Dr^ze equilibrium 96
iii Indeterminacy 98
iv A disequilibrium rationing model 111
4.3 Open economy quantity constrained models 116
4.4 Conclusions 120
CONTENTS
Page
1215. DISEQUILIBRIUM DYNAMICS WITH INVENTORIES AND WAGE 
AND PRICE ADJUSTMENT IN A CLOSED ECONOMY
5.1 Critical appraisal of recent theoretical 122
developments in dynamic macro-disequilibrium 
modelling
5.2 The model (Model 5.1) 129
5.3 Short-run and long-run equilibrium 140
5.4 Regime switching and stability 144
5.5 Alternative wage and price adjustment (Model 5.2) 162
5.6 Conclusions 171
6. DISEQUILIBRIUM OPEN ECONOMY MODELS WITH INVENTORIES
AND PRICE ADJUSTMENT 174
6.1 Price adjustment and the exchange rate 177
i Sticky domestic prices and overshooting 178
ii Inventories and exchange rates 188
6.2 The model (Model 6.1) 191
i Introduction 191
ii Mathematical specification 191
iii Equilibrium and dynamics 198
6.3 An alternative demand for money equation (Model 6.2) 203
6.4 An alternative demand for labour equation 212
(Model 6.3)
6.5 Conclusions 221
7. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY 222
7.1 Long-run consequences of government policy 224
7.2 Dynamic consequences of government policy 227
i Fiscal policy 227
ii Monetary policy 239
7.3 Alternative wage and price adjustment 249
7.4 Conclusions 256
8. CONCLUSIONS 259
8.1 i Summary of preceeding chapters 260
ii A final assessment 268
8.2 Suggestions for future research 271
- 5 -

- 7 -
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The microeconomic foundation of macroeconomics has two 
fairly well articulated paradigms. The New Classical paradigm is 
"equilibrium economics", a theoretical model concerned with proving 
that the economic system has an inherent tendency toward a full- 
employment equilibrium. As Patinkin (1965) summarized it,
"Equilibrium means full employment, or, equivalently, unemployment 
means disequilibrium". The two basic assumptions of this synthesis 
are (1) expectations about the future of economic variables are formed 
rationally, in the sense that they embody all currently available 
information about the structure and past behaviour of the economy in 
a (statistically) optimal way, and (2) all prices are perfectly 
flexible, adjusting to equate supply and demand in their respective 
markets. If equilibrium is perturbed by an exogenous shock, 
there will be unemployment, but merely as a transient and temporary 
phenomenon lasting only as long as it takes the economy to settle 
down again to its full employment state. The New Classical 
analysis, equipped with a methodology unsuitable for the study of 
disequilibrium situations, gives very limited insight into what happens 
during this "transitional phase". The analysis of the dynamic 
responses to disequilibrium is carried out only in terms of price 
adjustment, completely ignoring any quantity adjustments,
The Keynesian paradigm on the contrary is concerned, in 
principle, with the dynamic response of an economy to disequilibrium 
by way of both price and quantity adjustments. What has come to 
be known as "disequilibrium economics" began with Clower's (1965) 
paper on the Keynesian counter-revolution, and was an application of
the Hicksian fix-price method. This methodology has subsequently 
been developed by Barro and Grossman (1971, 1976), Benassy (1974), 
Dreze (1975), Malinvaud (1977) and others. The first generation 
disequilibrium models were static, prices assumed to be fixed and 
other intemporal linkages, such as inventories and expectations, 
ignored. Such models have been very successful at generating 
traditional Keynesian results and do so in a way that is completely 
rigorous, once we accept the assumption that prices are fixed. One 
of the major issues in disequilibrium theory, however, is whether the 
states described by Clower and his successors can be validally 
described as equilibrium states or are they only transitory once 
price adjustment and other dynamics are introduced. Only recently 
have authors began to develop dynamic disequilibrium models to answer 
this and other questions.
The postulate that prices adjust imperfectly and do not 
necessarily equate demand and supply involves the introduction of 
concepts that have no equivalent in Walrasian models. The postulate 
implies, for example, that all trade offers will not usually be 
satisfied so that the quantity transacted by an agent may not 
coincide with his demand or supply. The quantity he will eventually 
be able to exchange will remain unknown until we specify how the 
prevailing rationing scheme allocates available resources among 
agents. Additional concepts will also be required with respect 
to the individual agent himself. We now have to specify the way 
he will react to the occurance of quantity rationing. The 
rationing prevailing on a given market will generally affect the 
behavior of agents on the other markets as well. These spillover 
effects mean that traditional demand functions become useless.
One now has to distinguish Walrasian (or notional) demands, which are
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valid provided only there is no rationing, and effective demands, which 
explicitly account for the effects of quantity constraints.
Finally as prices can no longer be defined as those equating demand 
and supply more theory is also needed about price formation. In 
this thesis we present original and significant research on the 
foundations of dynamic disequilibrium macroeconomics and also on the 
implications of such a modelling strategy for closed and open 
economy models. Thus it represents a continuation of current 
research attempting to provide an acceptable alternative to New 
Classical macroeconomics.
In Chapter 2 we critically examine the rational expectations 
hypothesis and its conjunction with the continuous market clearing 
assumption. Contrary to the analysis of some previous studies we 
conclude that New Classical results are crucially dependent upon this 
second assumption. Imperfect price adjustment, via resulting 
disequilibrium, gives rise to quantity adjustments and these need 
to be taken into consideration if disequilibrium is to be modelled 
consistently. This implies that we cannot merely appended the 
assumption of imperfect price adjustment on to an otherwise market 
clearing model. Before presuming, however, that a disequilibrium 
framework with quantity adjustments is appropriate, it is first 
necessary to determine if, and why, prices are less than perfectly 
flexible. This issue of price adjustment is considered in Chapter 3. 
Here a broad approach to wage and price adjustment is adopted and 
various theories are critically assessed and extended. Initially 
we examine the theory that prices do adjust perfectly so as to 
continuously equate supply and demand. This is argued to be
unsatisfactory, it not being derived from maximizing behaviour, nor 
does it indicate how the economy moves from one equilibrium to another.
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Subsequently we analyse two competiting theories of imperfect wage 
and price adjustment. The firht is that prices respond to 
disequilibrium, equilibrium, assuming stability, being the limit of 
this process. This is found to be ad hoc and incompacible with 
full rationality of agents. The second theory of imperfect wage 
and price adjustment is that there are explicit reasons for why 
prices do not adjust instantaneously. Three such reasons are 
analysed; imperfect information and the learning process, multi­
period wage and price contracts with incomprehensive indexation, 
and the presence of costs associated with changing individual prices 
("small-menu" costs). Each of these considerations is sufficient 
to explain individual wage and price stickiness and the consequent 
disequilibrium and quantity adjustment. It is further shown that, 
given plausible assumptions, such imperfect price adjustment and 
disequilibrium persists over aggregation. It is concluded that 
rational economic behaviour is capable of providing an adequate 
basis for disequilibrium theory.
Having demonstrated that disequilibrium theory is an 
appropriate area for economic research Chapter 4 critically examines 
early attempts to model such disequilibrium. This is done in order 
to lay a proper basis for the development of the subsequent dynamic 
macroeconomic models. Initially work by Clower (1965) is discussed, 
both his critique of classical economics and his proposed modelling 
strategy for disequilibrium economic, the "dual decision hypothesis". 
It is argued that though Clower's critique of classical economics is 
valid the dual decision hypothesis is unsatisfactory for a number of 
reasons. Similarly more rigorous attempts to model "temporary 
equilibrium with quantity adjustment" associated with Benassy (1975,
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1976) and Dreze (1975) are argued to have major shortcomings. It 
is concluded that what is needed is a complete respecification of 
the way disequilibrium is modelled. It is here that the work by 
Sneessens (1981) is presented, which attempts such a 
respecification. It is argued that many of the previous problems 
are overcome. For this reason Sneessens's modelling strategy and 
basic underlying assumptions are employed in the subsequent 
chapters. Finally in Chapter 4 we examine the consequences of 
introducing international trade into a disequilibrium framework. 
Results derived here are made use of in Chapter 6.
In Chapter 5 we develop and analyse two rational closed 
economy dynamic disequilibrium models. Intertemporal links are 
established via wage, price and inventory adjustments. These models 
are used to assess the robustness of results derived from fix-price 
models. Insights are gained into the nature of possible short- 
run equilibria, the nature and stability of long-run equilibria, 
the possibility of limit cycles and the importance of alternative 
wage and price adjustment mechanisms.
Chapter 6 extends the main closed economy model of Chapter 
5 by introducing international trade. Three alternative open 
economy models are developed. Again the robustness of previous 
results is analysed, and in particular further insight into exchange 
rate determination and dynamics is gained. Because of the complexity 
of some of these models computer simulation techniques are employed 
to analyse the dynamic properties of two of these open economy models.
In Chapter 7 we incorporate the public sector into the 
previously de"'»1 oped disequilibrium framework. This is done with the
aim of analysing the effectiveness of government policy. Not all the
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New Classical policy conclusions remain valid. In particular it is 
shown that, in general, both systematic fiscal and monetary policy 
can influence the dynamic path of real variables. This result is 
not dependant on the government having superior information, nor on 
the formation of non-rational expectations, nor on the necessity of 
the government misleading other agents, but rather is the consequence 
of modelling quantity adjustments in a consistent way in response 
to imperfect wage and price adjustment.
In the final Chapter we summarise the argument of 
preceeding Chapters, offer a final assessment of the research presented 
in this thesis and suggest areas for further study.
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND NEW CLASSICAL ECONOMICS
In this Chapter we critically assess both the rational 
expectations hypothesis and its conjunction with the continuous market 
clearing assumption - New Classical economics. In Section 2.1 we 
analyse the assumption of rational expectations, and in Section 2.2 
a simple model illustrating New Classical results is presented and 
discussed. In Section 2.3 it is argued that New Classical results 
are crucially dependant upon the assumption of perfect price flexibility. 
This is discussed with reference to contract based macroeconomic models 
and also Mccallum's (1977, 1978) argument that price level stickiness 
does not in and of itself negate New Classical results. Section 2.3 
concludes that the assumption of imperfect price adjustment cannot be 
merely appended on to an otherwise market clearing model. Imperfect 
price adjustment, via. resulting disequilibrium will give rise to 
quantity adjustments and these need to be explicitly taken into account 
if disequilibrium is to be modelled consistently. Final conclusions 
to the Chapter are given in Section 2.4.
2.1 The Rational Expectations Hypothesis
In rational expectation models, as originally defined by 
Muth (1961) , expectations are true mathematical expectations of future 
variables conditional on all variables in the model which are known to 
an agent at time t. Thus the rational expectation hypothesis 
assumes that "expectations, since they are informed predictions of 
future events, are essentially the same as the predictions of relevant 
economic theory", and hence depend "specifically on the structure of the
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relevant system describing the economy" (Muth, 1961). In its simplest 
form rational expectations is the assumption that individuals do not 
make systematic forecasting errors. This does not imply that 
individuals invariably forecast accurately in a world in which some 
randan movements are inevitable, rather it asserts that estimates 
about the future must be correct on average if individuals are to 
remain satisfied with their mechanism of expectation formulation.
Let denote the information set available at time t.
This information set has three components: knowledge of the 
structure of the model; knowledge of government policies in operation; 
and knowledge of the past values of economic variables. We may write 
E(yt+kJlt> as the expectation of variable y for time period t+k 
conditional on the information set It available at time t. As the 
rational expectation is the crue mathematical expectation implied by 
the model conditional on available information the following four 
properties will be true.
Property I: E{ [e (yt+i+j|It+i>] I It) = E(yt+i+j lrt>
The right hand side is the best estimate of individuals at 
time t about the value of y at time t+i+j. The left hand side is the 
rational expectation of the best estimate for the same variable 
yt+i+j at some intermediate date t+i, conditional on information 
available at time t. If individuals knew at time t they would have 
changed their minds by time t+i, they would be knowably mistaken at 
time t. Property I asserts that individuals have no basis for 
predicting how they will change their expectation about future 
variables such as yt+^+j*
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Property II: E{[yt+i - E <yt+iIIfc>]|sfc> = 0
Let Sfc be some subset at time t of the full information set 
It actually used by individuals at that date. Ex post, actual 
forecasting errors are given by yt+j-E(y ^|!t) . Property II states that 
this forecasting error is uncorrelated with each and every component 
St of the information set It. This property asserts that no information 
available at the date expectations are formed may be used systematically 
to improve forecasting errors if expectations are rational. Since 
one kind of information available is data on previous forecasting 
errors, a special case of Property II is
Property III: { yt+± - E <Yt+ilIt)) ; U  1 is serially 
uncorrelated with zero mean at lag i or greater. Although there 
is autocorrelation up to i-1 this cannot be used to improve the 
forecast at time t.
A final property that may be stated follows from Property I 
but here relates only to linear models.
Property IV: rational expectations satisfy the Chain Rule of 
Forecasting.
This is best described by means of an example. Suppose it 
is known that:
■ ayt-i + °t
where a is a constant positive fraction and is a random disturbance 
which is serially uncorrelated with mean zero. Ifc comprises past 
values of and of yfc, but the former are of no use in predicting 
current and future values of Ut> At the beginning of time t, before 
Ut is known, the rational expectation of yfc is given by:
E <yt l I t - i>  -  E(a* t - i  + ut l I t - i ) -  ayt - i
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At the same date the rational expectation of Yt+1 may be formed thus:
E O i t - i>  *  E (a y t  + " w i ' t - i 1 -  -"‘» t i w  ■ “ 2y t - i
In general it can be seen that:
E (y t +i l I t - i>  = a l+ ly t - i
Thus we may use the Chain Rule of Forecasting to build up expressions 
for expectations at time t for all future values of y. In every case, 
the solutions must be expressed only in terms of variables already 
known at time t.
Reasons for employing the rational expectations hypothesis
Rational expectations has its uses in theoretical work 
and there are several reasons for its adoption. One important reason 
for using the hypothesis is that it accords with the economist's usual 
practise of assuming that people behave in their own best interests. 
This is not to deny that some people are irrational and neurotic, but 
we have no reason to believe that these irrationalities cause 
systematic and predictable deviations from rational behaviour. In 
this regard it should be noted that the rational expectations 
hypothesis does not require that people's expectations equal the 
realized values of variables, only that they equal the conditional 
mathematical expectation. Thus expectations will 'deviate from 
realized values by what may be a large random error term (random with 
respect to conditional information). Each alternative expectational
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hypothesis, in general, explicitly or implicitly posits the existence
of seme particular pattern of systematic expectation error.
Moreover the rational expectations hypothesis seems especially
appropriate for analysis concerned with macroeconomic stabilization
policy, for policy is inherently forward looking. Thus the relevant
question is, what pattern of expectations will be found in the
examination of data to be generated in the future? It is, for example,
hard to believe that any policymaker would want to base his actions
on the presumption that some particular error pattern will obtain in
the future. In this respect Currie (1985) argues that:
"In assessing policies under consistent expectations, 
one is testing then under conditions where their effects 
are understood. I submit that a good performance under 
these conditions is a necessary condition for a satisfactory 
policy. For if a policy performs badly under these 
circumstances, but well under different ones, it can only be 
because it works through systematic forecasting errors by 
the private sector. But since there will be an incentive 
for the private sector (or its forecasting agents) to alter 
its forecasting method if it generates systematic error, this 
is a rather weak and vulnerable basis for policy. A policy 
that performs badly when its effects are understood must be 
unsatisfactory."
Furthermore, it is not clear that policy actions designed to 
exploit a "known" error pattern would enhance social welfare. Barro 
(1976) in considering the role of monetary policy in a rational 
expectations framework, proposed, as a criterion for evaluating policy, 
the minimization of the expected squared gap between actual and full 
information output in each market. The basic idea for this measure 
is that it should serve as an approximation to the expected loss of 
consumer surplus. (Ideally the criterion would have been based 
directly on the behaviour of individuals expected utilities, but his 
model was not set up to handle this.) Given this welfare measure and
his model of the economy, Barro is able to show that monetary policy is
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best when it is most predictable. In particular he shows that an 
increase in money variance is non-neutral and leads to an increased 
variance of output about its full information position, hence a welfare 
loss, because money variance clouds the real picture in the sense of 
making current information about prices a less accurate signal for 
market participants. Barro concludes that to the extent that the 
variance of money can be controlled, the smallest possible value 
would be optimal. (If there are significant money control type 
costs associated with reducing money variance, then these costs would 
have to be weighted against the benefits from a lower variance. This 
sort of trade off would lead to the choice of a positive value for 
money variance.)
A second reason for employing the rational expectations 
hypothesis is that it is consistent with the finding that large parts 
of macroeconometric models typically fail tests for structural change 
( essentially versions of the Chow test) . If expectations are 
rational and properly take into account the way policy instruments 
and other exogenous variables evolve, the coefficients in certain 
representations of the model (e.g. reduced forms) will change whenever 
the processes governing those policy instruments and exogenous variables 
change. A major impetus to work on rational expectations is thus that 
it offers one reason, but probably not the only reason, why macroeconomic 
models fail tests for structural change. Lucas (1976) has used such 
an argument to provide a forceful critique of econometric policy 
evaluation. Lucas argued that the kind of short run policy analysis 
that is usually undertaken with macroeconometric models is incapable 
of giving reliable results. The conventional approach to the
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quantitative evaluation of alternative economic policies is to take an 
estimated macroeconomic model and examine the implied behaviour of 
the endogenous variables under alternative specifications of future 
values of policy instruments. Lucas criticises such comparisons of 
alternative policy rules on the grounds that the "structure" of 
econometric models is not invariant to changes in policy. The elements 
of such models are behavioural relationships derived from optimal 
decision rules of economic agents, based in part upon expectational 
variables. Changes in the nature of these movements cause changes 
in the optimal decision rules, thus "any change in policy will 
systematically alter the structure of the econometric models" (Lucas, 
1976). Some have misinterpreted Lucas's critique to mean that 
econometric policy evaluation is impossible. What the criticism 
instead implies is only that it is impossible to evaluate policy 
without taking into account the effects of a policy rule on the 
expectations mechanism.
A third reason for using the rational expectations hypothesis 
is that in estimating econometric models it is a source of identifying 
restrictions. The usual method of modelling expectations in macro- 
econometric models - via a distributed lag on the own variable - leaves 
it impossible to sort out the scalar multiplying the public's 
expectations fran the magnitude of the weights in the distributed lag. 
Therefore, the coefficients on expectations are generally under­
identified econometrically. The way out of this has usually been to 
impose a unit sum on the distributed lag whereby expectations are 
formed. The problem with this is that it is in general imcompatible 
with the formation of rational expectations. The use of the rational 
expectations hypothesis can supply alternative identifying restrictions.
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A final reason for adopting the hypothesis of rational 
expectations, related to those already given is the value of the 
questions it forces us to face. We must specify exactly the horizon 
over which the expectations are cast and what variables people are 
assumed to observe and when. This leads rational expectation models 
to be, in general, more explicit and less ad hoc about the assumptions 
being made than many other macroeconomic models.
Objections to the rational expectations hypothesis
Despite these important reasons supporting the adoption of 
the rational expectations hypothesis, it should not be supposed that 
the hypothesis is without any shortcomings, where further improvement 
is needed.
The question of how agents learn about their economic 
environment is rarely addressed in rational expectations research.
Rational expectations is justified by the argument that agents will 
learn the exact nature of the world in which they live. However at 
present this argument is ill-founded in theory for it must be shown 
that agents could learn. This except for examples has not been 
demonstrated. An important issue here is that of identification, whether 
in principle it is possible to disentangle from the data separate 
estimates of all relevant theoretical parameters of the model. This 
is not a trival problem; expectations based on an incorrect view of 
the model will affect behaviour and hence the data to be used in the 
empirical work which seeks to quantify the model itself. Given a 
sufficiently complicated dynamic structure identification will be 
impossible. This problem is further considered with reference to 
price setting behaviour in section 3.3.
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Another problem with rational expectations is related to 
the non-uniqueness of rational expectation equilibria. Because of 
the self-fulfilling feature of rational expectations there is 
generally a continuum of solutions to rational expectation models.
One method of obtaining uniqueness is to assume stability (i.e. no 
speculative bubbles) of the paths of expectations of variables. In 
a wide range of models this does ensure uniqueness. However, if 
the steady state is "too stable" an infinite number of convergent paths, 
or non-explosive self-fulfilling expectations exist. Alternatively if 
the steady state is "insufficiently stable" all paths will explode.
Because of this problem of non-uniqueness Burmeister (1980) has 
argued that the practical usefulness of the rational expectations hypothesis 
is severely constrained. When faced with the problem of an infinite 
number of stable solutions, researchers have often imposed other 
restrictions on the model ensuring a unique sdlution. These 
restrictions are usually in the form of transversality conditions.
It is important to realise that these conditions are only relevant 
in an optimizing context. Hahn (1982) has criticized the use of 
transversality conditions by New Classical economists seeking to 
demonstrate the efficiency of the market mechanism, stating that 
"their explanation is implicitly that the economy must behave as 
if someone performed an infinite optimization exercise on it. But 
that is precisely the issue at hand - indeed it is at the very heart 
of Keynes".
A third problem with the rational expectation approach is 
that it implicitly assumes that agents expect that other agents 
have the same view of the economic environment as they do. In 
cases where events are recurrent, such as the business cycle 
phenomena this assumption seems reasonable. But for unusual events 
it may be questioned. For a detailed discussion of these problems
- 22 -
See Frydman and Phelps (1983).
Conclusions
Although the objections to the rational expectations hypothesis 
discussed above are important and whilst further research needs to be 
directed to resolving them we do not believe they demand the complete 
rejection of the rational expectation approach. Economic theory 
necessarily involves some simplification. The rational expectations 
hypothesis is useful in theoretical work in that it allows us to examine 
economies free from expectational disturbances and isolates other 
sources of ill behaviour. It also allows us to sidestep an issue 
which is enveloped in ignorance, namely how expectations are actually 
formed. Furthermore, models with rational expectations produce 
such striking results that they deserve extensive theoretical study 
and empirical testing. For these reasons the rational expectations 
hypothesis is employed in subsequent chapters of this thesis. This 
has the further advantage that when it is incorporated into 
disequilibrium models we can clearly see the consequences of 
abandoning the assumption of infinite price flexibility used in New
Classical economics.
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2.2 New Classical Macroeconomics
A basic tenet of classical economics is that real economic 
behaviour depends only on relative prices. A change in the general 
price level accompanied by an equiproportional change in all prices 
should not change the real equilibrium of the economy because real 
behaviour responds to relative prices rather than to absolute prices.
An immediate corollary is that a doubling of the quantity of money, 
which doubles all prices and therefore also the general price level, 
does not affect the equilibrium values of real economic variables.
Money is neutral in the sense that it affects the absolute price 
level but not relative prices or other real variables that are independent 
of the quantity of money. In more technical terms, the economy is 
dichotomized; real variables, including the real quantity of money 
are determined independently of the nominal quantity of money, which 
affects only the general price level. A classic description of such 
a model of the economy appears in Patinkin (1965).
The existence of a Phillips curve, expressing a relation 
between the rate of inflation and the rate of unemployment is a 
clear violation of the netrality of money, because it involves a systematic 
relationship between the rates of change of nominal variables (inflation) 
and a real variable (unemployment). In a series of very influential 
papers, Lucas (1972a, 1972b, 1973), Sargent (1973), Sargent and Wallace 
(1975) and Barro (1976) attempted to reconcile the netrality of money 
with the existence of a Phillips curve by combining two distinct 
hypotheses: (i) that expectations are rational, and (ii) that the
aggregate supply curve is inelastic with respect to expected 
changes - or rates of change - in the aggregate price level. Condition 
(ii), which suggests that shifts in aggregate demand will affect output
only when the resulting price level differs from the expected, is a 
standard neoclassical notion. Thus it is assumed that the positive 
relationship between aggregate prices and output is due to movement 
along the producers supply curve. For this reason, the version of 
the Phillips curve which has emerged fran this research has come to be 
called the Lucas supply curve. As movements along the aggregate supply 
curve can only occur if there is an increase in the relative price it 
is necessary to impose informational constraints on suppliers. These 
constraints give rise to a perception of a relative price increase when 
in reality there is none. Firm's are assumed to have difficulty 
obtaining information about what is going on outside their own 
markets. These assumptions lead to results that are controversial 
and dramatic. The reasoning is as follows. An implication of 
the rational expectations assumption is that monetary and fiscal 
policy cannot systematically induce expectational errors on the part 
of producers. Thus, given condition (ii), there is no way for the 
government to design policies to have systematic effects on output or 
employment. Indeed it is not only impossible for them to keep output 
permanently high, it is also impossible to reduce the magnitude of 
output fluctuations around the "natural rate of unemployment". While 
a one-period output inflation "trade off" exists because of informational 
constraints and random, unexpected shocks, policy makers cannot exploit 
this trade off in any useful way. This result has been termed the "Lucas 
Sargent Proposition" (LSP) and provides support for Milton Friendman's 
(1968, 1969) well known proposal that the monetary (and fiscal) 
authorities abandon attempts to pursue activist counter-cyclical
policies.
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As the main purpose of this Chapter is to offer an assessment
of these developments a simple macroeconomic model highlighting these 
results is now presented.
quantity supplied by each firm is the product of a normal or secular 
component and a cyclical component. Letting i index firms and using
The cyclical component of supply is assumed to depend positively 
on the expected relative price, while the secular component is 
assumed, for simplicity, to be constant over time. Equation (2.1) 
is thus rewritten as:
firms expectation of the general price level in period t, pfc, conditional 
on information available to that firm at the end of the previous period, 
Iit-1' and c is a parameter. Equation (2.2) states that a firm will 
produce more if the price of its product is expected to rise relative 
to the generalprice level. According to (2.2) a general price rise, 
which is fully perceived by all firms, will not affect production, because 
p^t and E |1 ¿t:— would move together.
An information based model
The economy is composed of a large number of firms. The
n cyit and yifc , respectively, to denote the logs of these components, 
the supply of firm i is:
(2.1)
(2.2)
where pifc is the i-th firms price in period t, E(pfc|l^t_^) is theV  it-1
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In order to explain the Phillips curve New Classical 
macroeconomists have concentrated upon the confusion on the part of 
producers about what is happening to prices outside the particular 
market they operate in. It is assumed that individuals temporarily 
confuse aggregate and relative price movements. The argument is as 
follows. Typically individuals have more timely information on 
the price of the goods they sell than on the general price level.
Knowing that their price partially reflects movements in the general 
price level, they use it to improve their estimate of the current 
price level. This in turn affects their views about the relative 
price of the goods they sell and the supply of that good. When an 
unexpected increase in the money supply pushes up the general price 
level, suppliers of different goods partially interpret the increase 
in the prices of their respective products as relative price increases 
and react by producing more. It is this that creates a temporary 
positive relationship between unexpected increases in the money supply 
and the level of employment and output even though money is neutral 
in the absence of this aggregate -relative confusion.
Due to the information constraint the firm faces an elementary 
signal extraction problem and its behaviour can be formalized by 
assuming that the firm extracts the signal optimally. This can be 
derived most easily using a bivariate normal model. The algebraic 
representation of the individual firm's price pit relative to the general 
price level pfc is written as:
pit “ p t + Eit <2-3)
where eit is an additive relative price shift. With prices treated as
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a random variable with a normal distribution the best estimate of 
the aggregate price level, given the information constraint, from the 
viewpoint of firm i is the conditional expectation of p^ given P^t*
That is E(pfc|Iit_1> ■ E(pt|pifc). If pfc and p±t are jointly normal 
distributed, then this expectation can be easily derived from well
known properties of the normal distribution. Define the mean and
a 2variance of pfc and as Epfc = pfc, Varpfc = a^, Eeit = and VarEit =
2 . Since e^t represents relative price fluctuations it is appropriate 
to assume that these average out to zero for each firm and are 
uncorrelated with the general price level. That is = 0 and Cov 
(pfc, eifc) = 0. In order to calculate E(pt|p^fc) we need to calculate 
the mean and variance of p^fc and the covariance between p^fc and pfc.
From Equation (2.3) the mean of p^t is given by:
(2.4)
and the variance of p ^  is:
Var Pit “ Varpt + Var E it (2.5)
2o ae
The covariance between p^fc and is then computed as :
■ E(pt + e±t ' pt> (Pt-pt>
Cov (Plt Pt)
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Varpt + Cov (pt,Eit)
( 2 . 6 )
These variables pfc and are viewed as jointly normally distributed 
with these means, variances and covariances. From the properties 
of the normal distribution the conditional expectation of pfc given 
Pit can be computed from the formula.
Cov(p1 p j
E(Pt|pit>- E(pt) + va-r-p-^ -- <Plt * EPit> (2‘7)
Substituting in the means and variances gives
E(pt|pit) - Pt
~ 2 2  (pitT Pt> 
0 + 0  P e
( 2 . 8 )
Substituting (2.8) into (2.2) yields:
yit - + cll-hXp^-Pt» (2.9)
where b ±2 , 2  
o + o  p e
The behaviour of output for the economy as a whole can now 
be obtained by aggregating over all the producers
s n - .
yt -  y + y (pt - Pt> ( 2 . 10)
where Y c(l - b)m.
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This is the Lucas supply function. To complete the specification of 
the model we need to add an equation for aggregate demand, and equations 
describing policy rules. However the remarkable implication of 
equation (2.10) is that under rational expectations no matter how we 
define the rest of the model, and no matter which systematic parts of the 
policy rules are changed, there will be no effect on the path of output. 
Suppose we write down a particular model, including the equations which 
describe policy. By Property II of Section 2.1, if a unique rational 
expectation solution exists, it must have the property that:
available at t-1, including E(pfc|lt_^). The rational expectations 
forecasting errors arise because of unforeseeable deviations of random 
disturbances at t from their mean values of zero. These disturbances 
come fran structural equations and from any non-systematic component of 
policy equations. Equation (2.11) asserts that individuals do not 
make mistakes which are knowable at time t-1 when expectations are 
formed.
Substituting (2.11) into (2.10) yields
only because of random shocks which are not foreseeable at the date 
expectations are formed. The policy implications also follow from 
(2.12). If monetary policy is perfectly anticipated then output does
(2. 11)
where nfc has mean zero and is uncorrelated with all information
( 2. 12)
Under rational expectations output deviates from the natural rate, yn,
not deviate from normal levels, except for when there are structural
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disturbances. Anticipated changes in policy do not affect output; 
they only affect the price level. Put differently ohly unanticipated 
policy changes affect output. This is the central policy 
ineffectiveness result established by Sargent and Wallace (1975). 
Announced (and believed) policy changes can only affect prices (and 
therefore inflation) with no real output effects. This result 
depends crucially on the Lucas aggregate supply equation in which 
only forecasting errors for the price level matter. Under rational 
expectations the consequences of a policy change for pfc are completely 
discounted in E<E>tl I-j-—1> an<* so forecastin9 errors are unaffected.
To the extent that a policy change is not immediately recognized by 
individuals in the economy, expectations may not immediately discount 
the full effects on pfc. A systematic policy change will then be able 
to affect y® until individuals have fully recognized the change in 
policy. While it would be difficult to maintain that all systematic 
policy changes are immediately understood by the private sector, the 
spirit of analysis is that demand management can, at best, have only 
temporary effects. Individuals,•by observing data on government 
behaviour and by taking account of government statements concerning 
policy intentions, can quickly infer the policy rule in operation.
What are the consequences of purely stochastic changes in 
policy? Suppose the government increases the variability of policy 
by making it less predictable. Since this has no affect on the mean 
of nfc, nor on its rational expectation E(nt|lt_^)r the form of equations 
(2.11) and (2.12) remains the same, but the forecasting error will now 
deviate more in both directions from its mean of zero. Thus more 
random policies increase the exrpost variation of output around its 
mean level. Sargent and Wallace (1975) used this analysis to argue
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that policy rules should be as predictable as possible. Since 
systematic policy has no effects on real output and random policies 
merely increases the variability of output, this analysis can be 
used to justify the prescription of Friedman (1959) that the monetary 
authority should adopt a constant rate of money growth. Attempts to 
maintain full employment by fine tuning should be abandoned.
As has already been noted the policy implications of New 
Classical macroeconomics are crucially dependent on the Lucas aggregate 
supply function and on the rational expectations hypothesis. In turn 
the Lucas supply function is justified by assuming that prices are 
perfectly flexible in the sense of adjusting so as to equate aggregate 
supply and demand in each period. Critics of this New Classical 
macroeconomics fall into two groups: those who reject rational 
expectations as a plausible model of actual behaviour, and those who 
find the hypothesis attractive but nevertheless are troubled by the 
results it generates when applied within the market clearing models.
It is both possible and important to distinguish between the assumption 
about expectation formation and the assumption about the structure of 
the underlying model in which the expectations assumption is embedded. 
Critics within the second group cited above have gradually realized 
that it is the structure of the underlying model, and in particular 
the assumption of market clearning under flexible prices, to which 
they really wish to object. It is argued that in actual economies 
prices are too sticky (adjust to sluggishly) to effect a period by 
period equalization of supply and demand. The Lucas market clearing 
type model has not been the only rational expectation model developed. 
However the task of reassessing the role of rational expectations, and 
the New Classical policy conclusions, in models which do not assume
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continuous market clearing has only just begun.
An alternative rational expectation approach has been 
developed based on contracts. Rather than describing price movements 
using market clearing assumptions, these models contain explicit 
mechanisms to describe how prices (or wages) are determined. The 
rigidities in these models are contract based in that there is a finite 
period of time over which a nominal wage or price is fixed and 
transactions are assumed to take place at that price. The 
terminology does not mean that formal contracts are involved; wage 
setting customs are sufficient. These models give rise to a quite 
different mechanism for price and output fluctuations than those 
developed by New Classical economists, and their properties and policy 
implications are very different. In particular in these less than 
perfect price adjustment models anticipated and perceived changes in 
government policy can affect output and employment. In order to 
highlight the importance of price flexibility these contract based
models are discussed next.
2.3 The Importance of Price Adjustment
2.3i Contract based models
The crucial difference between the models of aggregate 
supply in this section and the information based New Classical 
models is that prices are sticky. Prices do not instantaneously 
adjust to clear all markets. One approach used in the literature 
to model price stickiness is to assume that prices are set at least 
one period in advance of when they will apply. This assumption has 
been used by Fischer (1977), Gray (1976) and Phelps and Taylor (1977). 
One can think of this as a contract in that the price is set in advance, 
but there is no presumption that actual contracts are written. The 
distinguishing feature of this approach is that prices or wages are 
assumed to be set as if they were expected to clear markets during the 
period in which they will apply. Economic agents are assumed to make 
conditional rational forecasts of supply and demand conditions. Actual 
supply and demand will differ from these forecasts because of unexpected 
events, such as productivity or policy shocks. Because of these 
unforeseen shocks, actual demand will not equate actual supply, as 
prices are fixed at the wrong level. The usual assumption made has 
been that the demand side rules the market. This assumption, of 
course, implies that there are always sufficient stocks and enough 
excess productive capacity so that the required supply is feasible.
As these models are stochastic the advantage of using the "demand is 
determining" rule is that it preserves linearity, unlike the "min" 
condition, which states that the realized transaction in a market is 
equal to the minimum of demand and supply.
This general approach has been applied in a number of ways.
Phelps and Taylor (1977) assume that the aggregate price level is set
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so that expected total aggregate demand is equal to expected total 
aggregate supply. Aggregate demand depends negatively on the price 
level through the usual real balance effect: a higher price level 
reduces real money supply and raises real interest rates; expected 
aggregate supply is assumed to always equal the unconditional average 
or normal level of supply. Although interest rate determination 
as well as the dynamics of inventory behaviour are modelled 
explicitly, the basic mechanism can be explained using the following 
simple aggregate demand equation:
where is the logarithm of the money supply and other notation 
is as in the previous section.
from (2.14) the price level which is expected to clear markets in any 
period is given by:
The prefix t-1 on the price term pfc indicates that it is set at the 
start of the previous period. E(Mt |it ^) is the expectation of the 
money supply to prevail in period t based on information available when the 
price level is set. Equation (2.15) states in a very simple way how 
the price setting is anticipatory, and is essential to the predictions of 
the model. Substituting (2.15) into (2.14) yields:
d (2.14)
If normal or capacity output is equal to the constant yn then
(2.15)
(2.16)
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As (2.16) indicates, output deviates frcm full capacity output by the 
amount that the money supply differs fran what was expected at the 
start of the previous period. Hence an increase in the money supply 
which is announced and perceived at the start of the current period 
(after prices have been set) will affect output. It is in this 
sense that anticipated changes in the money supply can affect output - 
as long as they are not anticipated for a period longer than the time 
that prices are fixed. Monetary policy has effect in this model 
because by assumption the monetary authorities have a shorter lead 
time in their money supply decisions than do firms in their pricing 
decisions. In the flexible price, market clearing models this lead 
time is ruled out by assumption.
The rational expectations models by Fischer (1977) and Gray 
(1976) assume that wages are sticky, while other prices are perfectly 
flexible. Changes in the real wage rate are the source of output 
fluctuations. Wage determination in these models is analogous to 
the price determination in the Phelps-Taylor model. Fischer also 
assumes that wage setting is staggered over time, but thid does not 
affect the conclusions of his analysis. Again anticipated monetary 
policy can affect real variables if the monetary authorities can act 
with less lead time than wage setters.
It should be noted that a feature of these models is that 
monetary policy is neutral in the long run. In fact output returns 
to normal after only one period in the model described by equations 
(2*14) to (2.16). This corresponds to the single period price 
setting assumption. Serial correlation of output (more specifically 
the autocorrelation function) cannot be longer them the length of the 
longest contract in these models, unless other sources of persistence 
are added. However in the short run monetary policy is effective and
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the LSP is not valid. Further because the government is able to 
respond to present period structural disturbances it is able to 
stabilize output and employment at their natural rates by employing 
a suitable feedback rule offsetting any rational expectation errors.
The success of such a policy depends crucially on the ability of 
the government to make quick and accurate inferences about the precise 
nature of the current shocks.
In conclusion these contract based models seem to indicate 
that once imperfect price adjustment is introduced into a rational 
expectations model the New Classicial policy prescriptions in general 
and the LSP in particular are no longer valid. In a series of papers 
McCallum has disputed this conclusion. His argument is now considered.
2.3ii McCallum's reply
In response to the development of contract based models 
McCallum (1977) introduced price level stickiness into a model similar 
to the one used by Sargent and Wallace (1975) . He argued that 
"recognition of price level stickiness does not, in and of itself, 
negate the Lucas Sargent Proposition". Similarly in McCallum (1978) 
he "attempted to establish the basic compatibility of sluggish price 
adjustments and the LSP". It is clear that these conclusions need to 
be reconciled with the earlier contrary conclusions of Fischer and Phelps 
and Taylor.
The essence of the argument in McCallum (1977 and 1978) is that 
a model can be built incorporating a Lucas supply function, a quantity 
theory of money demand equation and an imperfect price adjustment 
equation so that output depends only on the unexpected component of 
the money stock - the LSP. In order to understand this argument 
a simplified version of a model used by McCallum (1978) is presented.
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The model is as follows:
Yt = “l + °2 P^t " E lPt ^ r l 13 + Ut (2-17)
= B(Mt  -  Pt > + vt  (2.18)
Pt  - P^J  ^ = X (p* -  Pt_x) I o < X < 1 (2.19)
*
where is the logarithm of the market clearing price in period t,
Ufc and are serially uncorrelated disturbance terms with zero
means, a^, c^, 8 are positive constants, and other notation is the
*
same as used previously. Since we define pfc as that pfc which equates
s d *yfc to yfc we can solve (2.17) and (2.18) for pfc. Using this result
for pt in (2.19) yields:
Pt  -  (1 -  X)pt _1  -  + « if* ,. + «1«2B<PtJI t - l ) + 4 1 (V V  (2 ‘ 20)
where 6^ = \/ (a^ +8)
Assuming monetary policy is non-stochastic, with rational expectation 
E(Mt|lt_i) = and using (2.20) to solve for E(pt|lfc_^) we obtain:
pt ’ S2Pt-l * S3 “l + 436 "t + 41 (Vt - V (2’21)
where «2 = (l-))/(H »2) and «3 = ^/(l-i^). Using (2.21) in (2.17) 
gives:
y* °1 + a26l(Vt • V  + Ut ( 2 . 22)
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McCallum concluded that (2.22) "illustrates vividly" the LSP in 
that systematic changes in monetary policy have no affect on output, 
even in the short run. Output is only away from its natural rate, 
here a^, when the economy is disturbed by randan shocks. The validity 
of this argument does seem to have been widely accepted. For example 
Blinder and Fischer (1978) state that McCallum has demonstrated in his 
(1977) paper that "seme types of non market clearing still do not 
permit any role for monetary policy in affecting output". However, 
Gordon (1977) has argued that the Lucas supply function is 
incompatible with imperfect price adjustment. Frydman (1981) has 
developed a formal statement of the same criticism of McCallum“s 
argument and has shown that when a more reasonable output determination 
equation is adopted McCallum's conclusion concerning "the basic 
compatibility of sluggish price adjustments and the LSP" is not valid.
The problem with McCallum's model is that it does not take into 
account the quantity adjustments resulting from sluggish price 
adjustment. Due to imperfect price adjustment there will be 
disequilibrium and thus producers will generally experience a 
discrepancy between aggregate demand and supply. This disequilibrium 
will result in either inventory accumulation or deoamulation. The 
inventory changes are the necessary outcome of sluggish price 
adjustment. The Lucas supply function implies absurdly irrational 
behaviour on the part of producers given imperfect price adjustment 
by implicitly assuming that producers do not respond to inventory 
changes. The Lucas supply function cannot be combined with an imperfect 
price adjustment equation.
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Frydman (1981) shows that if a more reasonable output
determination equation replaces the Lucas supply function when 
there is imperfect price adjustment then the LSP does not hold. 
Frydman modifies equation (2.17) in the following way:
Now output supplied is negatively related to the difference between 
the stock of inventory at the end of the previous period, and
the optimal stock of inventory, N*. For simplicity Frydman assumes 
N* to be a constant in the short run. To close the model it is 
assumed that the quantity sold in each period is equal to demand, that 
is < ^t + Nt lf and inventories adjust passively according to:
Repeating the analysis of McCallum's model this modified model implies 
that real output is given by:
yt = “l + a2[pt ' E<pt lIt)] ' W l  ' N*)+Ut (2.23)
(2.24)
s (2.25)
and demand is given by:
(2.26)
dFrom (2.26) it is clear that aggregate demand yfc depends on the
parameters of the monetary rule. With imperfect price adjustment
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aggregate demand differs from aggregate supply in the short run and so 
fran (2.24) the time path of inventories depends also on the parameters 
of the monetary rule. Finally this implies from (2.25) that output 
depends on systematic monetary policy. With a more reasonable 
output determination equation than the Lucas supply function, in a 
model with imperfect price adjustment, the LSP is not valid.
Instead of just dismissing McCallum's arguments it is 
important that we learn from his mistakes. Firstly, it highlights 
that we cannot casually use the Lucas supply function in conjunction 
with imperfect price adjustment. The Lucas supply function is not 
a universal statement about the behaviour of optimizing agents, but is 
in fact a reduced form equation derived by Lucas (1972a) on the basis 
of a restrictive set of assumptions, and it loses its validity if 
those assumptions - particularly instantaneous markets clearing by 
price adjustment - are violated. Secondly, and relatedly, when 
there is imperfect price adjustment then the resulting disequilibrium 
situation will cause quantitites to be constrained rather than chosen 
voluntarily. These quantity constraints and quantity adjustments need 
to be incorporated in the model if disequilibrium is to be modelled 
consistently. This conclusion has been known for sometime but seems 
to be ignored by some New Classical economists. The body of analysis 
pioneered by Patinkin (1965) and Clower (1965) and developed by 
Leijouhufvud (1968), Barro and Grossman (1976) and Malinvaud (1977), 
now termed disequilibrium economics, was all directed to showing that 
if prices are slow, relative to quantities, to respond to shifts in 
demand, then querntities rather than prices play the role of 
equilibrating factors in the markets.
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2.4 Conclusions
This Chapter has critically assessed the rational expectations 
hypothesis and its conjunction with the market clearing assumption - 
New Classical economics. Although the rational expectations 
hypothesis was shown to have important shortcomings, where further 
research is needed, it was argued that the hypothesis is nevertheless 
useful in theoretical work. The main conclusions, however, relate 
to New Classicial macroeconomics. New Classical results are 
crucially dependent on the assumption of perfect price flexibility, 
and the assumption of imperfect price flexibility cannot merely be 
appended on to an otherwise market clearing model. Imperfect
price adjustment, via resulting disequilibrium will give rise to 
quantity adjustments and these need to be explicitly taken into 
consideration if disequilibrium is to be modelled consistently.
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CHAi-rER 3
PRICE ADJUSTMENT AND DISEQUILIBRIUM
The analysis of the previous Chapter forced us to conclude 
that the assumption of imperfect price flexibility cannot be merely 
appended on to an otherwise market clearing model as some researchers 
have tried to do. Imperfect price adjustment, via resulting 
disequilibrium, gives rise to quantity constraints and adjustments, 
these need to be explicitly taken into account if disequilibrium is to 
be modelled consistently. However before presuming that a 
disequilibrium framework with quantity rationing is appropriate it 
is necessary to determine whether prices are less than perfectly 
flexible, and if so why. This issue is considered in this Chapter 
by critically assessing and extending recent work on price and wage 
adjustment.
In the first section the assumption of perfectly flexible 
prices ensuring continual equilibrium is discussed, with the 
conclusion that this approach is unsatisfactory. What is needed is 
a theory of how prices are formulated by agents and how these plans 
are revised in the light of new information. There are two 
alternative theories of imperfect price adjustment. The first 
states that prices respond to disequilibrium, with equilibrium being 
the limit of this process, assuming stability. The other is 
conversely that disequilibrium occurs because prices for some 
reason (s) do not instanteously adjust to their equilibrium values.
The theory that prices respond to disequilibrium is 
considered in Section 3.2. This process is found to be ad hoc
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and incomptabile with full rationality of agents. In order to develop 
a satisfactory theory of price adjustment explicit reasons why prices 
do not instantaneously adjust to their equilibrium values need to be 
examined. Within Section 3.3 three broad reasons for imperfect 
price and wage adjustment are analysed: imperfect information and the
learning procedure, contract theory and the presence of costs of 
changing individual prices ("small-menu” costs). It is shown that 
each of these three considerations is sufficient to explain 
individual price stickiness, giving rise to disequilibrium and the 
consequent quantity adjustments.
In Section 3.4 we aggregate over individual prices taking 
separately into account each of the three reasons for imperfect 
price adjustment considered in Section 3.3, in order to derive the 
implications for aggregate price adjustment and disequilibrium. Actual 
price or wage dynamics depend on the reason why prices and wages 
are inflexible in that particular market. There is no - one price 
adjustment mechanism. However for each of the reasons considered 
disequilibrium persists, given plausible assumptions, over 
aggregation. Finally, in Section 3.5, the main conclusions to the 
Chapter are stated.
3.1 Perfectly flexible prices
Barro argues that the appealing feature about the market 
clearing assumption is that "the equation of supply to demand 
implies that the market transactions have proceeded to the point where 
perceived mutually advantageous trades have been exhausted... the 
"disequilibrium" literature postulates arbitrary dynamic processes 
for price formulation and arbitrary rules for determining quantities in
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non-market clearing situations. This modelling implies easily 
correctable ways in which private markets malfunction" (1979, pp. 28-29).
Yet the "law of supply and demand" cannot be so easily 
accepted. Following Arrow (1959) we first write demand and supply 
functions respectively for competitive consumers and producers:
D = f(P) ; S = g (P) (3.1)
where D is the demand for the commodity, S its supply, and P its price. 
Since (3.1) is incomplete, with two equations in three unknowns, the 
model is usually completed by adding the condition of equality between 
supply and demand.
D = S (3.2)
Equilibrium protogonists regard the sin qua non of an acceptable theory 
to be not only the absence of unrealized gains, but also the grounding 
of all decisions in "choice-theoretic foundations". The problem with 
(3.2), however, is that it is not derived from maximizing behaviour, 
instead it is assumed to be self evident. Further, nothing is 
included in (3.2) that can tell us how a market may move from one 
equilibrium to another. What is needed is a theory of how plans are 
formed by various agents in the market and how plans cure revised in 
the light of new information.
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3.2 Price adjustment in response to disequilibrium
The usual defence made for (3.2) is that it is the limit of 
a trial-and-error process in which price adjusts by the following rule 
whenever (3.2) does not hold
dP/dt = h (S-D) (3.3)
where h' < O; h(0) = 0 (h' being the rate of change of the function h 
with respect to an increase in the excess supply).
This equation, describing a market diseqilibrium, states 
that the change in price is a function of the difference between supply 
and demand. A market clearing equilibrium occurs, with no unrealized 
gains fran trade, only in the limit of a dynamic process in which (if 
it is stable) there is no pressure for any of the three endogenous variables 
to change. Again, however, the mechanics of price change are essentially 
ad hoc. Such devices as an auctioneer and recontracting have been 
introduced to rationalize this type of mechanism, but it seemingly 
reflects no one's maximizing behaviour. Thus Arrow (1959) writes 
"it is not explained whose decision it is to change price in accordance 
with [equation (3.3)]".
It has been argued that the distinctive feature of this 
type of model is that variations in price are generated by the workings 
of the "market", and are therefore separate from the actions of 
individual market participants. However from the contributions of 
Goldman (1972), Black (1972, 1974) and Mussa (1981), it is known 
that serious theoretical difficulties are encountered in models that 
combine the notion that prices respond to excess demand over time, 
and the notion that agents have rational expectations. In order to 
highlight the theoretical difficulties encountered when rational
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expectations are imposed on excess demand models we follow Mussa 
(1981) and examine a model initially developed by Cagan (1956) .
It is assumed that prices respond to excess demand 
according to:
dP/dt = «(excess demand) (3.4)
Suppose that the demand for money is given by: 
dm = k + p -
where md is the log of nominal money balances, p the log of the 
price level, it the expected rate of inflation, k represents all 
other factors affecting real money demand other than n , and H > 0 is 
the semi-elasticity of demand for money with respect to
Given the log of the nominal money supply, m , the price 
level which yields equilibrium in the money market is:
p = m - k + hit
Assuming that the only alternative to holding money is spending on 
goods and that the pressure of excess demand in the goods market is 
proportional to m-md, with a factor of proportionality of 8, the 
rule (3.4) becomes:
dP/dt = a8 (m - md) = aB (p - p) (3.5)
Under certainty rational expectations requires that the expected rate 
of inflation, n, equal the actual rate of inflation, dp/dt. Imposing
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this requirement on (3.5) yields the following differential equation:
dp/dt = y(Z - p) (3.6)
where Z = m - k and Y = aB/(l - aB^). The solution of (3.6) is
p(t) - p(o) exp(-yt) + ^SrZisJexptyis -t) ]ds (3.7)
where p(o) is the initial value of p that is fixed by past history under 
the assumption that prices are sticky.
This solution for p(t) is not a satisfactory description of 
the path of the price level under rational expectations. If y < 0, then 
(3.7) is unstable, and we have the highly unsatisfactory situation that 
p(t) diverges to infinity, as determined by p(o)exp(-yt) , regardless 
of the behaviour of Z(s). Indeed as the speed of adjustment to 
disequilibrium becomes large, the parameter tends to minus 
infinity. Thus according to (3.7) when a is large, the rational 
path for the price level is necessarily unstable.
If y > 0 then (3.7) is stable, but it is still not satisfactory. 
The basic problem now is that eventhough expectations of the future 
inflation rate are rational and affect the price level through their 
effect on money demand, the known future behaviour of Z(s) for s 3» t 
has no effect on p(t). One manifestation of this basic problem is 
p(t) does not, in general, converge to its equilibrium value, p(t), 
even in the long run. For example, if Z grows at a constant rate y, 
then the inflation rate, dP/dt, converges to its appropriate long run 
value, dP/dt ■ y, but p(t) does not converge to p(t) = Z(t) + yl.
Instead a permanent divergence between p(t) and p(t) is required to 
sustain the long run inflation rate at dP/dt * aB(p - p) = y.
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Another manifestation of this basic problem is that, contrary to the 
fundamental spirit of rational expectations, p(t) does not react to 
perfectly foreseen changes in the rate of monetary expansion until the 
change actually occurs. In particular, suppose Z(s) = m(s) - k(s) 
is constant up to some time T, and then grows at a constant rate 
dZ/dt = vi,for s > T. According to (3.7) the path of p(t) up to T is 
independent of the value of p to t > T.
From this model we can see that there are serious theoretical 
difficulties in combining rational expectations with the assumption 
that prices respond to excess demand. The fundamental reason for 
these problems occuring is that the theory of price adjustment in 
response to disequilibrium is incompatible with full rationality of 
agents. Rationality implies anticipating future events and, in 
general, responding to them. The problem with equations such as 
(3.3) is that prices are assumed to respond to current variables 
(disequilibrium) ignoring possible future events. In order to 
develop a price adjustment rule that circumvents these difficulties 
it is necessary to examine how prices would be set if there were 
explicit reasons why prices should not instaneously adjust to their 
expected market clearing levels. Prices here do not rise in response 
to excess demand, but there is excess demand (or excess supply) because 
prices do not fully adjust to their equilibrium values. This 
interpretation actually goes to the root of the question why
disequilibrium exists.
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3.3 Disequilibrium due to imperfect price adjustment
Within this section we analyse three broad reasons for 
why prices may not adjust instaneously to their equilibrium values.
First the role of imperfect information and learning is examined.
Second, the reasons why exchange contracts, that exhibit imperfect 
price adjustment may be developed are explored. Finally the affects 
of costs of changing individual prices ("small menu" costs) are 
analysed. Each of these considerations is able to explain why 
disequilibrium exists. These theories should not be considered 
as competitive but rather as complementary and taken together 
possible of explaining price stickiness for a broad range of 
markets.
3.3i Imperfect Information and learning
An obvious reason for why agents may not set prices at 
their equilibrium levels is because they do not know what these values 
are due to imperfect information. This is not to say that economic 
agents are irrational, but it does imply that the assumption of "rational 
expectations" as proposed by Muth (1961) is inappropriate for analysis 
of the short-run. Rational expectations, by Muth's definition, yield 
predictions of future events which differ from the corresponding 
eventual outcomes only by errors which are themselves indeoendert of the 
variables used to generate the predictions. However, as was noted 
in Section 2,1, what is typically missing in "rational expectations" 
macroeconomics is a clear outline of the way individuals derive the 
knowledge which they use to formulate expectations meeting this requirement. 
A distinction is needed between (a) the general assumption that economic 
agents use efficiently whatever information is available and (b) a specific
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assumption identifying the available set of information. For 
expectations to exhibit the error orthogonality property, enabling 
agents to set, on average, equilibrium prices agents need to have 
"correct" information on the values of economic variables as well as 
the structure of the economy, including both its functional form and 
parameter values. These are strong informational requirements.
As related in Section 2.2 New Classical economics has 
concentrated on the ability of agents to observe certain economic 
variables, especially policy variables. Thus in New Classical 
macroeconomics agents fail to set equilibrium prices because of a 
specific information constraint giving rise to aggregate-relative 
price confusion. However given the frequent publication of 
economic statistics. New Classical economists argue that this 
confusion is likely to be short lived and that the resulting 
disequilibrium is insignificant and need not be modelled. It is 
argqed here that there are alternative, more important, information 
constraints that give rise to significant and persistent 
disequilibrium.
As already noted in order for agents to hold expectations 
that exhibit the error orthogonality property they need to know the 
structure of the economy. If individuals have imperfect information 
concerning either the structural specification of the economy or some 
parameter value then a learning procedure is required. However, 
accepting the need for a learning procedure does not imply that the 
revised expectations are rational, nor even that multiple revisions 
will eventually lead to rational expectations. The difficulty is that 
in many models with rational expectations the objective distribution 
of variables depends upon the agents' subjective beliefs about the
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distribution. Outside a rational expectations equilibrium the 
objective distribution of variables differ both from agents’ 
subjective belief, and from the objective distribution which would 
prevail in a rational expectations equilibrium. Agents may learn 
about the relationship between variables, given their current beliefs. 
However, when they modify their beliefs in the light of what they have 
learnt, the relationship changes. As Lucas (1976) pointed out so 
forcefully in his critique of econometric policy evaluation, the 
reduced form of an econometric model is not stationary if people 
change the way in which they form expectations. Because of this 
endogenity the adjustment of expectations is a complex problem. The 
work on this problem involves an examination of the stability of the 
expectations that agents need if a rational expectations equilibrium 
is to result. Although there have been numerous approaches to this 
problem there are two broad frameworks that characterize most of the 
literature.
In one framework agents are learning about parameters of 
a distribution using a correctly specified likelihood function. This 
framework includes papers by Arrow and Green (1973). Blume and 
Easley (1981), Bray and Kreps (1981), Cyert and De Groot (1974), 
Friedman (1979), Frydman (1981), Kihlstrom and Mirman (1975), Taylor 
(1975) and Townsend (1978, 1981). For example Taylor (1975) used 
a continuous time model, in which agents already knew all aspects 
of the economic system except the value of a single parameter in the 
(correctly specified) equation describing the behaviour of the monetary 
policy authority, to investigate what happens as they gradually discover 
it. His results showed that agents beliefs about this parameter value
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will eventually converge to the true value, so that their 
expectations will eventually become "rational”; until convergence is 
complete, however, agents will not form their expectations "rationally", 
and systematic monetary policy is able to influence real economic 
variables. Models set in this framework show that rational expectations 
are a long run rather than a short run phenomenon.
In the other framework agents are not assumed to have correctly 
specified likelihood functions. This approach includes papers by 
Blume and Easley (1982), Blanchard (1976), Bray (1982), Cyert and 
DeGroot (1974), DeCanio (1979) and Radner (1982) . From these 
papers it has been shown that in some cases learning based on 
standard statistical techniques generct e rational expectations in 
the limit, but in other cases such learning does not generate rational 
expectations. In these models stability depends upon the specific 
learning procedure, parameter values and priors, but as yet there is 
no general theory about what distinguishes these cases. It should 
be noted here that these models have been criticised in that they 
do not employ a fully rational learning procedure, as they do not 
allow for hypothesis testing and model revision. Thus Bray and 
Kreps (1981) argue that in general the Martingale convergence theorem 
implies that Bayesian posteriors must converge and that, given further 
assumptions (in particular, continuity) , this convergence generates 
rational expectations in the limit. While it is true that if agents 
follow a correct Bayesian learning procedure convergence to a 
stationary rational expectations equilibrium is ensured, it may be 
argued that applying this assumption to the very complicated situations 
that can be generated, even by rather simple models with learning, is 
pushing the general presumption of optimizing behaviour to the point where 
it loses many of its attractions. Further even with fully rational
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learning procedures it is clear that rational expectations are a long 
run phenomenon.
Given these results it is clear that information constraints 
relating to the structure of the economy can lead to individuals 
holding incorrect expectations for prolonged, even infinite, periods. 
With incorrect expectations agents will not set wages and prices at 
their equilibrium values leading to persistent, rather than short-lived 
disequilibrium.
3.3ii Contract theory
There have recently been attempts to explain price and 
wage contracts, that exhibit sluggish price adjustment, as the result 
of microeconomic optimizing behaviour. The proponents of the 
contractual view do not claim that contracts are universal, but 
rather analyse factors which cause scxne product and labour markets to 
be governed by contracts and slow price adjustment.
Contracts may be either explicit or implicit. This 
distinction, however, can be exaggerated: long term contracts have 
an implicit element in the sense that they specify only a limited 
number of contingencies to which wages and prices will be adjusted. 
Moreover, the implicit contracting branch of the literature has 
pushed in the direction of implying that explicit contracts observed, 
for example in the union sector of the labour market, may be 
formalizations of common informal arrangements in the non-union 
sector, so that differences between the sectors in the behaviour of 
wages, prices and quantity adjustment may be more apparent than 
real.
Three general explanations for why agents may have 
incentives to develop contracts have emerged in the literature. These
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are usually regarded as complementary rather than competing theories.
The first approach, arising from the "contracting" literature 
(for example see Klein et al., 1978 and Wachter and Williamson, 1978) 
highlights the role of costly information and worker-job-product 
heterogeneity. Thus in the presence of idiosyncratic exchange 
contractual arrangements are developed in order to economize on 
transaction costs. Broadly speaking transaction costs refer to the 
"cost of running the economic system" (Arrow, 1970), and include the 
cost of planning, adopting and monitoring task completion.
Idiosyncratic exchange refers not to superficial variants of a 
standardized product but instead to that which entails non-trival 
investments in item specific human and physical capital. As a 
consequence, short term exchange is not feasible for such items, 
since short term exchange does not offer sufficient incentives to 
invest in specific capital. Spot markets for such non-standard 
items thus do not exist. The relevant contracts to be considered 
here, are strictly long term.
For clarity, we consider how such an argument may be 
applied to the labour market. Here the central hypothesis of the 
theory of idiosyncratic exchange holds that an important part of the 
product of a worker is the return to specific human capital. A worker 
produces more in his present job than he would as an inexperienced 
employee of another firm. Under competition there is a "zone of 
indeterminacy" (Okun's words) within which the wage can vary: a 
worker will quit if paid less than the wage of inexperienced workers 
elsewhere, but the current employer should be willing to pay up to the 
worker's marginal product if necessary. To avoid costly bargaining 
with individual workers over the division of the return to specific
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capital, institutions have evolved for treating workers equitably 
and in a way that is well understood from the beginning of their 
employment. Unexpected wate changes would be a violation of these 
rules. Wages continue on a smooth trajectory, with labour getting 
a larger share of the return to specific capital when the market 
is slack and employers the larger share when demand is strong. This 
theory thus explains both upward and downward rigidity of wages to 
market pressure. A similar argument can be made for non-standard 
intermediate products.
In short, it is argued that obligational market contracting, 
whether explicit or implicit, is the only feasible mode of 
exchange for non-standard items. This reflects the mutual interests 
of the parties in continuing the exchange and the desire to economize 
on transaction costs.
The second approach to explain the presence of long term 
contracts follows from the simultaneously written and independent 
contributions of Azariadis (1975), Baily (1974) and Gorden (1974).
This approach emphasises the efficient risk bearing aspects of 
contractual arrangements. Most of the work on efficient risk sharing 
contracts has been set within the context of the labour market. This 
is called the "implicit contract" theory of wages, and argues that workers 
are more risk averse than firms and that therefore firms will find it 
less costly to hire labour if they provide sane degree of incane 
insurance against fluctuations in demand, which would otherwise lead 
to fluctuations in the demand for labour. Thus risk averse workers 
deal with risk neutral entrepreneurs whose firms consist of three 
departments: a production department, that purchases labour services 
and credits each worker with his marginal revenue product (MRP) ; an
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insurance department, that sells actuarilly fair policies, and depending 
on the state of nature, credits the worker with a net insurance idemnity 
(Nil) or debits him with a net insurance premium; and an accounting 
department, that pays each employed worker a wage with the property 
that W = MRP + Nil in every state of nature. Favourable states of 
nature are associated with high values of MRP; in these the net 
indemnity is negative, and wages fall short of the MRP. Adverse 
states of nature correspond to low values of MRP, to positive net 
insurance indemnities, and to wages in excess of MRP. A contract 
is then a description, made before the state of nature becomes known, 
of the labour services to be rendered to the firm in each state of 
nature and the corresponding payments to be delivered to the workers.
An immediate consequence of this framework is that, again, 
wages are disengaged from the marginal revenue product of labour.
Wages will be less flexible than in the Walrasian model, and in the 
extreme will be rigid. Such analysis has recently been extended to 
consider intermediate product exchange. For example Azariadis and 
Cooper (1985) demonstrate that the efficient sharing of social risks 
may lead to contracts being developed and trades occuring at a 
price that does not respond to realizations of random events.
The third approach explaining the development of contracts 
is related to the efficiency-wage literature. According to the 
efficiency wage hypothesis labour productivity depends upon the real 
wage paid by the firm. This theory has been developed to explain 
involuntary unemployment in an equilibrium context. It attempts to 
answer the question: Why don't firms cut wages in the face of 
involuntary unemployment thereby increasing profits? The efficiency
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wage theory argues that firms may be reluctant to lower wages because 
to do so might lower productivity more than proportionately, resulting 
in increased labour costs. Within this framework competitive 
equilibrium is consistent with a situation of excess supply of 
labour. The efficiency wage theory thus provides an explanation for 
a natural rate of involuntary unemployment. However as they stand 
these models have no wage or price stickiness, as wages and prices 
respond instantaneously to new information. Although there is a 
natural unemployment rate there is no disequilibrium adjustment.
These simple models may, however, be extended to give a theory as 
to why firms may desire to develop wage contracts.
In most jobs, workers have some discretion concerning their 
performance. Lazear (1981) has shown that an implicit contract 
relating to seniority wages provides workers with the incentive to 
work rather than shirk. The gap between a wage and marginal product 
here reflects a performance incentive. Workers are paid a wage less 
than their marginal product when they are first employed with a promise 
that their earnings will increase over time and eventually exceed 
their marginal product. Again unexpected wage changes would be a 
violation of this contract.
So far we have examined three alternative theories for why 
agents may develop contractual exchange arrangements, that lead to 
either wage or price stickiness, relating to idiosyncratic exchange, 
efficient risk sharing, and efficiency wage arguments. We now need to 
consider whether such contracting produces disequilibrium quantity 
adjustments. This issue was first raised by Barro (1977). Barro 
pointed out that both parties to exchange have an incentive to devise 
complex contracts which maximize the "size of the pie". Such
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contracts will stipulate optimal adaptations to real shocks as well 
as neutralize the effects of purely monetary disturbances.
Comprehensive indexing is an attractive theoretical abstraction which, 
were it feasible, would alleviate the need for quantity adjustments 
to carry the burden of contractual flexibility.
Thus although disequilibrium quantity adjustments have often 
been attributed to wage and price contracts, these contracts by 
themselves may not be sufficient to generate disequilibrium. It is 
necessary to identify the circumstances under which contracts will give 
rise to quantity adjustments. In particular we consider the implications 
of three sources of restrictions on the set of feasible contracts.
(i) Observability and verification
Implicit contracts can only be "written" on the basis of 
information which is available or can be inferred by both parties to 
the exchange; explicit contracts require, in addition, that any 
contingency provision be observable to an outside party. This leads 
to the distinction between verifiability and observability. This 
implies two kinds of difficulties -in maintaining complex contracts.
First one would have to disclose the state of nature at each delivery 
date, and as Meade (1971) notes, contingent claims contracts 
are infeasible when it is impossible on the contract execution to 
ascertain unambiguously and without contradiction the true state of 
the world (e^) . Second, even if no problem of this kind arose there 
is still the matters of monitoring delivery: was item or activity x_^
supplied under environmental condition e^ as agreed, or was variant 
Xj offerred instead?
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(ii) Enforcement
Implicit contracts differ from explicit contracts in that 
there is no legal mechanism for enforcement. Two alternative mechanisms 
are available: reputation and self-enforcement. For example in the 
labour market bad behaviour by firms may be either punished by 
increasing costs of recruitment and/or by the withdrawal of effort 
by current workers. Both mechanisms require long lived agents. For 
the enforcement mechanisms to be effective in prohibiting contract 
breaking the punishment costs must be greater them the benefits of 
breaking the contract, and also it must be in the interest of the 
injured party to punish the offender. These problems apply not 
only to implicit contracts. With explicit contracts it is costly 
to use the legal system and thus if the damages done by the breach of 
contract are small, it will not be employed. Such problems of 
enforcement again place restrictions on the set of feasible contracts.
(iii) Transaction costs
Contracts are cheaper to evaluate and imp lenient when they are 
defined by a few simple numbers rather than by functions of variables. 
Transaction costs of writ ing and securing agreement to the complex 
contract may be excessive. For example bounded rationality makes it 
very costly, or even impossible, to identify all relevant future 
contingencies and to specify, ex ante, appropriate adaption to than. 
Further even supposing that exhaustive complex contracts could be 
written at reasonable expense a problem incomprehensibility, due 
to bounded rationality, may arise and impede reaching an agreement.
If one of the parties is unable to assess meaningfully the implications 
of the contract to which he is being asked to accede, the contract may 
fail to go through, or to have its intended effect. By bounded 
rationality we mean that economic agents are "intendedly rational, but 
only limitedly so" (Simon 1961). Such limited rationality should not be
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confused with irrationality, which is a psychological term reserved for 
an "impulsive response to affective mechanisms without an adequate 
intervention of thought" (Simon, 1976). Rather bounded rationality 
refers to cognitive limits of human agents in relation to the complexity 
of the problems with which they are confronted. Considering this 
issue Wachter and Williamson (1978) write "The prohibitive cost and/or 
infeasibility of complex contingent claims contracting is mainly 
attributable to bounded rationality. Incomplete contracting, in which 
terms of the contract are sometimes vague and many contingencies are 
ignored, and non market modes of organization are institutional responses 
to this condition".
Having considered these three sources of restriction on the 
set of feasible contracts, restrictions on information, enforcement and 
complexity, what are their implications?
The accepted contract is the best contract, subject to the 
constraint that it is feasible and in the best interests of both parties 
to carry out the terms of the contract. Neither party will accede to 
a contract which the other has an incentive to breach. Contract 
formulation should be modelled as perfect equilibria of repeated games.
In a recent paper Newbery and Stiglitz (1985) examine the consequences 
for involuntary unemployment of the above three restrictions on the 
feasible set of contracts, within the context of a simple general 
equilibrium model. They first show that in the absence of problems of 
observability, enforcement, and complexity, contract theory though 
explaining wage rigidity does not give rise to disequilibrium quantity 
adjustment.
Secondly, they show, that natural restrictions on enforceability 
alone or on the degree of complexity alone do not lead to unemployment,
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but that limited observability may lead to unemployment, though, as 
Newbery and Stiglitz state, in their model only under conditions that 
do not seem very convincing. What does give rise to unemployment, 
however, is the failure of two or more of these assumptions to be 
satisfied, and in particular, they demonstrate that restrictions on the 
complexity of a contract and its enforceability may lead to periodic 
unemployment.
In reality all of the above mentioned limitations are present 
at the same time. Thus though comprehensive indexing would alleviate 
the need for disequilibrium quantity adjustments, it is merely a 
theoretical abstraction, ignoring many realistic limitations on the 
set of feasible contracts. Contract theory, therefore, either 
derived frcm idiosyncratic exchange theory, efficient risk sharing 
considerations, or efficiency wage arguments, is capable of explaining 
both wage and price inertia in certain markets, as well as disequilibrium 
quantity adjustments.
3.3iii "Small-menu" costs
Another approach in the literature to explain imperfect price 
adjustment has been to consider the affects of small menu costs. The 
essential assumption is that there are costs associated with changing 
individual prices. These costs range from the cost of changing tags 
and printing new catalogues to gathering the information needed to 
choose the new prices, informing customers of these prices and so on.
The question is whether these costs, which cannot be very large, can
have important macroeconomic effects. It may be noted here that
thife work is related to the analysis of Akerlof and Yellen (1985a, 1985b)
who have emphasised the potential macroeconomic effects of "near rationality".
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Decision makers are said to be "near rational" if they react to changes 
in the environment only if not reacting would entail a first order loss.
As Akerlof and Yellen point out, however, near rationality can be 
described as full rationality subject to second-order costs of taking 
decisions, so that their analysis is directly relevant to this section.
Given the presence of "small menu" costs, it is optimal to 
adjust individual prices only at discrete intervals and by finite 
amounts, and to permit disequilibrium during the intervals between 
price changes. The optimal frequency of price change balances the 
marginal gains from reducing the losses due to disequilibrium (by changing 
prices more often) with the marginal cost of changing prices more frequently.
Recent Work
Mussa (1981) derives a price adjustment rule from a microeconomic 
model in which there is an explicit cost to changing individual prices.
Mussa assumes that the frequency of individual price adjustment is fixed 
in advance. Analytically this makes his model similar to the Tobin- 
Baumol model of the transactions demand for cash. From an economic 
view there are a number of unsatisfactory features with Mussa's approach.
First Mussa assumes perfect competition even when firms face 
disequilibrium. Arrow (1959) has pointed out that the existence of 
disequilibrium (excess supply or demand) is inconsistent with certain 
assumptions of the perfectly competitive model. For example, the 
firms assumption that it is confronted with a perfectly elastic demand 
curve must be discarded in disequilibrium if the firm is ever to 
change price. Further if price decisions are taken neither continuously 
nor in perfect synchronization, as in Mussa's model, then the process of 
adjustment of all prices to a new nominal level will imply temporary
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movements in relative prices. It might then well be that, to avoid incurring 
costs associated with these movements in relative prices each price setter 
will want to move his own price slowly. The result will be slow 
movement of all prices to their new nominal level, and greater price 
level inertia than Mussa's paper suggests. Thus the response of 
prices to disequilibrium is essentially a temporary monopolistic 
phenomenon even if the individual units perform as perfect competitors 
in equilibrium. Therefore it seems clear that a theory of monopolistic 
price adjustment is a prerequisite to a general theory of price adjustment.
The second assumption that is unsatisfactory in Mussa's 
analysis is that of a fixed interval between price changes. An 
alternative approach could be based on the Millor-Or model of the 
transactions demand for cash. Here price setters follow a strategy 
of changing prices when the divergence from equilibrium becomes 
sufficiently large to justify the cost of making the change. The 
firm adopts a policy of "(s/S)” form. Scarf (1959) presents an optimality 
proof for the (s,S) policy rule in a similar context. More recently 
Sheshinski and Weiss (1983), Danziger (1984) and Caplin and Sheshinski 
(1986) consider the conditions for optimality of (s/S) policy in a 
stochastic setting. In accordance with this type of policy, the firm 
selects ceiling and floor values for its own price, relative to the 
equilibrium or desired price, at which price adjustment occurs. That 
is each firm changes its nominal price whenever its relative price 
(relative to the equilibrium price) falls below some predetermined 
level, s , or exceeds a similarly predetermined level, S. The 
duration of the period with fixed nominal price is thus randan 
given there are random shocks affecting the equilibrium price. With
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firms following the (s,S) policy rule, the resulting general price 
adjustment path is quite different to that derived from Mussa's analysis 
(see Section 3.4).
Blanchard (1982, 1983, 1985) in a series of papers has 
considered the first criticism made of Mussa's approach, that it, 
does not take into account changes in relative prices and the 
resulting market power of firms whilst the general price level 
adjusts towards the market clearing level. In these papers Blanchard 
shows that, even if all price decisions are taken frequently, if the 
number of price decisions is large, asynchronization will lead to 
substantial price level inertia. This suggests that asynchronization 
may indeed help to explain price level inertia and thus generate 
macroeconomic fluctuations, with all prices moving slowly towards their 
equilibrium values.
Although Blanchard meets the first criticism levied at 
Mussa's approach, he still assumes that the interval of price change 
is fixed, that is the pricing rule is time rather than state dependent.
As yet there has been no incorporation of the optimal (s,S) policy 
rule for firms into a monopolistic competition model with asynchronization 
of price decisions. Having stated this however, Sheshinski and Weiss 
(1977, 1979, 1983) have analysed the (s,S) policy rule for price 
adjustment in order to examine the real effects of inflation. Their 
analysis may be extended to determine the effects of (s,S) policy 
rule for individual price setting on the aggregate price level.
Initially within this section we analyse the (s,S) policy rule for 
the individual firm, while aggregation over firms is examined in
Section 3.4.
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Basic model of the firm
In the following model two basic assumptions are made.
First apart from the costs of production the firm is assumed to incur 
only two other costs. One relates to the changing of the firms price 
for an individual commodity (the small menu cost). If there were no 
such cost there would be no reason for prices ever to diverge from 
their equilibrium levels. The other cost the firm incurs results 
from allowing price to diverge from the equilibrium level, further 
this loss is assumed to be an increasing function of the magnitude 
of the divergence from equilibrium. This loss provides the incentive 
for the adjustment of price. This first assumption rules out the 
firm taking into consideration the prices set by other firms in the 
market when setting its own prices. The only cost it incurs with 
respect to its price level is related to the equilibrium value, not 
its price relative to others. By this assumption we highlight the 
role of the (s,S) policy rule in price setting, ignoring the first 
criticism made against Mussa's analysis. The second assumption is 
that the equilibrium price level increases at a constant rate of 
inflation, with random jumps to the level caused by exogenous shocks 
to the market. Thus the firms rational expectation is that its own 
relative price (relative to the equilibrium price) will fall constantly 
over the period its price is held fixed.
Notation:
g = expected rate of change of the equilibrium price.
= e^ *" = expected equilibrium price at time t»
formulated at t » by normalization P * 1.o o
zt - V P t  - expected relative price at time t,
- 66 -
formulated at to
q fc = f(Z^) 88 expected quantity demanded.
cqfc = expected cost of production 
F(Z^_) » [zfc - cf(Zt)]f(Zfc) = expected real profit
6 = real cost of nominal price adjustment, (6 >0)
r = real rate of interest
Vq = present discounted value of real profits at time tQ .
Suppose at tQ the firm plans to adjust its nominal price at the points 
of time
Denote the nominally fixed price in the interval [t0, t0+1] by P0>
Accordingly, expected total real profits of the firm during this 
period, including the cost of price adjustment at time tQ+ ,^ discounting 
to tQ, are given by:
where the initial price, P0, is assumed to be given and tQ ■ 0.
The objective of the firm is to choose the sequence (t0) and
-qtThen P^e is the expected relative price at t in this period,
to n
(3.8)
t,o
Summing over o in (3.8) yields
Vo (3.9)
{P0>, 0 = 1,2 that maximizes VQ. It is assumed that F(.) is
differentiable, strictly quaisi-concave, that there exists a number S > 0,
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and that any Z for which F'(Z) exists:
> >
F' (Z) < 0 as Z < S* (3.10)
Thus F (Z) attains a unique maximum at S*. Further assumptions are
required in order to insure that V  - O at the optimum, specificallyo
the adjustment cost B should be small relative to F(S*).
Assuming that an interior maximum exists the first order 
conditions are:
unique optimal price P*, such that f' (P*) = O which holds for all °. 
Consequently, 3 V 0 > 0 for any ° • which means that it is never 
optimal to change price in the absence of shocks to the economy.
It can similarly be seen that if 3 = O the nominal price will change 
continuously so as to keep price at its equilibrium level. The 
subsequent analysis will focus on the non-trival case of g ^ O and 
B >0.
Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) show in their appendix that 
for any initial price Pq a solution to the system (3.11)-(3.12) must
3V / 3t = [- F(P e'gt) + F(P ,e"gt) + Br]e~rt = 0 (3.11)o a o a -l
o (3.12)
o
a
From (3.12) it can be seen that when g = O, there will be a
have an expected periodic (or recursive) form:
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P
o
:gE and t , = t + e ; o =o-ri o 1,2 (3.13)
where e > O and is constant.
This property follows directly from the independence of the 
real optimal policy evaluated at any o , of initial conditions. Due 
to the recusive nature of the solution, the relative price in each 
period is expected to move between two fixed values (s,S) where 
S = segC . Changing variables by the transformation Z = Pfce gt 
conditions (3.11)-(3.12) can be expressed in terms of relative 
price (Z^ _) instead of time.
Conditions (3.11') and (3.12') are two equations to determine the 
bounds (s,S) on the relative price movement.
The value of the expected discounted real profit at 
the time of the first price change, V^, is given by:
Differentiating (3.15) partially with respect to S and s, and equating
F(s) - F(S) + rB = 0 (3.11')
f  S F’(Z) Zr/9dZ = O s J (3.12’)
V,
1 - e
(3.14)
o
Using the same transformation as above (3.14) becomes:
1 [ I  S F(Z) .Z<r/9)_1dZ-BgSr/9 ] (3.15)
to zero, we obtain the first order conditions:
Br = O (3.16)F (S)
- zV1 + F (s) » O (3.17)
which are equivalent to (3.11') and (3.3? • ) r as can be seen by 
integrating the latter by parts. We also find that any points (s,S) 
which satisfies conditions (3.16)-(3.17) ;
s^j/as2 f ' ( s ) s (r/g>~1
g ( s r / 9  - s r / 9)
a ^ / a s 2 F 1 (S)S
(r/g)-l
g(S:r/9 -
where by (3.10) and (3.12')» F'(S) < 0 and F' (s) > 0. Thus at any 
stationary point the second order conditions'are satisfied. This 
implies that the solution to (3.16)-(3.17) is unique. Note also 
that if there exists a solution to (3.16)-(3.17) with F(s) > 0  then 
in view of (3.17) > O at the optimum. Conversely, any solution
to (3.16)-(3.17) which entails F(s) < 0  canndt be globally optimal.
The interpretation of these equations and the properties of the 
optimal plan are straightforward. The firms price is expected to be 
held fixed over an interval e . The relative price drifts continuously 
(if there are no shocks to the market) from the initial level S to the 
level S at the end of the period, at which point a jump occurs and the 
relative price is again ¡set at S. The gains from postponing a price 
change are the profits just prior to the change, F(s) , and the 
interest saved on the adjustment cost, rB. The losses from such a 
postponement are the profits just after the change, F(S) . Condition 
(3.11') states that at the optimum these gains and losses should be
- 70 -
equal. Equation (3.12') states that the nominal price should be 
set at such a level that the marginal profits due to the change in 
relative prices will average to zero. In view of (3.11) we have 
from (3.12) that s < S* < S, i.e. the firm operates initially with 
negative marginal profits and with positive marginal profits towards 
the end of the period.
The firms expected path for its relative price, which is 
realized if there are no shocks to the equilibrium price is 
illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1
Firm's
expected
relative
price
The presence of "small menu" costs is thus seen to be able 
to provide an explanation of why firms do not set prices continually 
equal to the equilibrium, market clearing level. With relative 
price alternating around the equilibrium price the individual firm 
experiences alternating disequilibrium regimes of excess supply and 
excess demand .
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What are the consequences of introducing shocks to the 
market equilibrium price? Whether a firm changes its nominal 
price in response to a shock depends upon the firms relative price 
at the time of the shock, and the size of the shock itself. In 
Figure 3.2 there is illustrated the effect on the firms relative price 
due to a shock to the market that increases the equilibrium price at 
time t^. Due to this positive shock to the equilibrium price.
Figure 3.2
Firm's
relative
price
the firm's relative price instantaneously falls at t^. As sh°wn 
in Figure 3.2 however the shock is not large enough to reduce the 
firms relative price below s, thus the firm does not immediately 
change its nominal price, but instead waits until its relative price 
falls further to s before again setting relative price equal to S.
If the firms relative price had been close to s at t^, or the shock 
was larger, then the shock may have caused the firm to immediately 
increase its relative price to S. This case is seen in Figure
3.3.
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Similar results can be shown for negative shocks to the 
market equilibrium price. In this case the firm will observe that 
its relative price increases at the time of the shock. If the shock 
is great enough the firms relative price may jump above S. Here the 
firm will either reduce their nominal price, so that their relative 
price equals S, or they will allow the relative price to fall 
gradually towards s, depending upon the relative costs.
The affect, therefore, of shocks to the market equilibrium 
price on the firm's nominal price path, is to make both the duration for 
which it is held constant and the level to which it is adjusted 
random variables. Further the individual firm will, in general, 
experience alternating excess supply and excess demand. Whether this 
result continues to hold across firms is explored in the next section.
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3.4 Aggregate wage and price dynamics
In the previous Section we considered three broad reasons 
for why individual agents may not set the price of their good at the 
equilibrium level. Here we examine the consequences of these 
theories for aggregate wage and price dynamics, and aggregate 
disequilibrium
3.4i Imperfect information and learning
in Section 3.3i imperfect information related to individuals 
having incorrect knowledge about either the values of economic 
variables, or the structure of the economy, including both specification 
and parameter values. Due to the frequent publication of official 
statistics imperfect knowledge concerning variables was argued to be 
short lived and insignificant, we therefore confine our attention 
to the consequences of imperfect information concerning the structure 
of the economy.
With incorrect knowledge about the structure of the economy 
individual's expectations will not exhibit the error orthogonality 
property, thus giving agents the incentive to improve their forecasting 
ability. Agents will only change their believed model if the new 
model produces improved forecasting, and, if there are no costs 
involved in learning, they will continually change their views about 
the economy until the believed model converges upon the "true" model. 
However, as related in Section 3.3i if agents are not assumed to have 
correctly specified likelihood functions, and learning is based upon 
standard statistical techniques, then convergence to rational expectations 
is not assured, with stability dependant on the specific learning 
procedure , parameters and priors.
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What does this imply about aggregate disequilibrium and price 
level adjustment? Agents set prices on the basis of their 
expectations. Given incorrect expectations, individual prices will 
not be set at their equilibrium values. However, will it not be the 
case that these forecasting errors will tend to cancel each other out 
as we aggregate over individuals, implying that on average prices are 
at their equilibrium levels, and consequently there is no aggregate 
disequilibrium? It is argued that, in general, this will not be 
the case. Suppose that individuals initially know the structure of 
the economy, which is in a rational expectations equilibrium. Now 
consider that some aspects of the economy undergoes a structural 
change, which agents cannot directly observe, either a parameter 
change or an equation is re-specified. Because of this unforeseen 
change all individuals will make forecasting errors that are 
qualitatively the same. Thus following this change there will 
be aggregate disequilibrium, with all prices being either above or 
below their market clearing value. As expectations improve so prices 
will adjust though typically in a complex way, but in general aggregate 
disequilibrium will persist. For example, Friedman (1979) shows that 
for the model he developes (a discrete time model where agents know 
the correct structural specification of the economy but need to learn 
the value of the parameters using standard least squares estimation 
procedures) the adjustment of expectations resembles the adaptive 
expectations mechanism. In this case aggregate prices are seen to move 
toward their equilibrium values over time, reducing the extent of 
disequilibrium, which nonetheless persists.
In conclusion, imperfect information and the problems of 
learning the structure of an economy, is able to explain the presence 
of aggregate disequilibrium and why this may persist, even indefinitely.
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3.4ii Contract theory
As shown in Section 3.3ii agents have various incentives 
to develop exchange contracts. Further there are limitations on 
the set of feasible contractual arrangements, causing contracts 
to be incomprehensively indexed to contingencies. This results in 
wages and prices in certain markets, being inflexible for sustained 
periods of time, giving rise to disequilibrium subsequent to a 
shock to that market.
In order to examine the consequences for aggregate wage 
and price dynamics a number of simplifying assumptions are made.
We thus assume that all contracts relating to a particular market, 
have the same frequency of revision, f; that revision of contracts 
is asynchronized; and that the rates of change of equilibrium prices 
are the same, following a shock. This framework is identical to 
Mussa (1981), except that he justifies, incorrectly, his assumption 
on fixed contract length by reference to "small menu" costs, 
instead of contract theory. Mussa (1981) shows that the rate of 
change of the general price level- is given by:
.1 <hP/3t * "(t) + 6 (P(t) - P(t)) (3.18)
where 6 = 2/T; T = 1/f is the length of the interval for which the 
price is held constant. P is the equilibrium price level. The 
first term in the adjustment rule for the general price level, 11 (t) , 
is the expected rate of change of the equilibrium price level. The 
term keeps the price level diverging further from its equilibrium level. 
The second term, (P(t) - P(t)), drives the price level toward the 
equilibrium if it is not already there. The average lag in reaching 
the equilibrium is 1/6 =  T/2; that is, the average lag is equal to 
the time it takes for the prices of one half of the individual
commodities" to adjust to their equilibrium levels.
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It is apparent that there is an important qualitative 
difference between adjustment of individual prices and adjustment of 
the aggregate price level. Individual prices are held constant over a 
finite interval, and then adjusted by discrete amounts to their 
expected (average) equilibrium levels for the subsequent interval.
In contrast, the general price level moves continuously and adjusts 
gradually toward its equilibrium level following a shock. This 
behaviour of the aggregate price level reflects the fact that it is an 
average of prices which are revised at different points in time. The 
price adjustment mechanism derived fran contract theory shows that the 
aggregate price level will eventually converge upon the equilibrium 
level. Again we are able to explain why aggregate prices (and wages) 
may only move slowly toward their market clearing values, and also 
why aggregate disequilibrium persists.
3.4iii "Small-menu” costs
In Section 3.3iii we demonstrated that, if in response to cost 
of changing prices, firms adopt the (s,S) pricing rule, then individual 
prices will remain fixed for prolonged periods. Thus as with 
imperfect information and contracts these rules appear to have the 
potential to explain aggregate price level inertia. However, in a 
recent paper Caplin and Spulber (1986) have shown that this is not 
necessarily the case. This has led Blanchard (1987) to write of "the 
failure of individual nominal rigidities to generate aggregate price 
inertia under simple (s,S) rules”.
In their paper. Caplin and Spulber derive the aggregate
behaviour of prices and output in response to changes in nominal money 
when there is a continuum of identical price setters following the (s,S) 
rule. To develop their model they make three basic assumptions. First
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they assume that the money supply process is increasing over time 
and does not make discrete jumps. That is they assume monotonicity 
and continuity for the money supply process. Second the aggregate 
price index is assumed to depend only on the frequency distribution 
over nominal prices, and satisfy homogeneity; when nominal prices 
double, so does the index. Third firms' initial real prices are 
assumed to be uniformly distributed over the range (s,S) . This 
implies that price changes are uniformily staggered over time. Given 
these assumptions Caplin and Spulber show that real balances and 
aggregate output are invariant to monetary shocks. Price stickiness 
disappears in the aggregate.
This neutrality result may be understood by observing that the 
(s,S) policy moves real prices around a circle. The method of proof 
is easily illustrated using Figure 3.4 (which corresponds to Figure 2 in 
Caplin and Spulber). Points on the circle represent the range of the
Figure 3.4
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firm's real prices. At the apex of the circle, the outer limits of the
range are adjacent. At time t^, Pi/p(t^) is firm i real price.
Inflation occuring between time t^ and t2 reduces the real price to 
Pi/p(t2) as indicated by the counter clockwise motion. Between time 
t2 and t^ inflation drives the real price down to s, the price is 
then readjusted to S and further inflation drives the real price to 
Pi/p(t^). It is critical to note that, given a continuous money 
supply process, a change in monetary policy only causes the firms real 
price to rotate around this circle faster. The initial distribution 
of real prices is preserved and the aggregate nominal price index 
exactly reflects any nominal money shock. The aggregate price level 
remains at its equilibrium level, and there is consequently no 
aggregate disequilibrium. As can be seen, and as Caplin and Spulber 
note, this result is only valid under the restrictive assumption that 
monetary policy does not cause the money supply, and hence the 
equilibrium price level to change by discrete amounts. We now examine 
the consequences when this assumption is relaxed. As do Caplin and 
Spulber we assume that price adjustments are initially uniformly 
distributed over time. Given this assumption any initial shock to the 
market equilibrium causes the aggregate price index to jump above the 
new equilibrium level, given a continuum of firms. To see why this 
is so we first consider the example of an upward jump in the equilibrium 
price. If the shock is sufficiently large then all firms increase their 
nominal and relative price instantaneously, so that their new relative 
price equals S, above the new equilibrium value, and price adjustments 
are now synchronized. Obviously here the general price level jumps 
above the new equilibrium level. Alternatively if the shock is 
infinitely small then the aggregate price remains equal to its equilibrium
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value. With the number of firms increasing their price being 
uniquely and linearly related to the size of shock any positive shock 
to the equilibrium price causes the general price index to jump above 
the new equilibrium level.
The argument is similar for a negative shock to the 
equilibrium price level. In this case a proportion of firms observe 
that their relative price has increased above S. Here the firm either 
reduces its nominal price, so that its relative price equals S, or they 
allow the relative price to fall gradually due to the increasing 
equilibrium price, depending upon relative costs. However, whatever 
the firm decides its relative price will have, in general, increased, 
and therefore the aggregate price index will now be above its 
equilibrium level.
Therefore, with a uniform distribution of price adjustment, 
any shock causes the aggregate price to jump above the new equilibrium 
price. This result is due to the fact that now the degree of 
synchronization increases whenever there is a shock, and because firms 
always adjust their nominal price to a level above the market clearing 
value. It is noted, therefore, that the assumption of uniform 
distribution of price adjustment is less plausible given the presence 
of continuing shocks. Indeed with random shocks price adjustments 
will become perfectly synchronized over time. As price adjustments 
become synchronized so the qualitative difference between aggregate 
and individual prices is reduced, and in the limit, i.e. when price 
adjustment is perfectly synchronized, they are identical. Thus with 
continuing shocks the aggregate price path approaches a step function. 
However if firms pursue slightly distinct (s,S) policies or randomize 
on their choice of s, as in Benabou (1985) , then in the absence of
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shocks price adjustment again tends towards asynchronization over 
time and the aggregate price path becanes continuous. Despite 
this any shock will tend to increase synchronization of price adjustment 
and, in general, cause the aggregate price level to be away from its 
market clearing level. Typically the aggregate price path will be 
complicated leading to alternating periods of excess demand and 
supply. Monetary policy is now effective.
In conclusion "small-menu" costs, by explaining why firms 
may adopt an (s,S) policy rule, in conjunction with discrete changes 
in equilibrium values, is able to explain why aggregate prices may not 
be at their market clearing levels, and thus why we may observe 
aggregate disequilibrium.
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3.5 Conclusions
This Chapter has critically assessed and extended recent 
work on wage and price adjustment and shown that rational economic 
behaviour can provide an adequate basis for disequilibrium theory.
The first theory examined was that prices respond so as to ensure 
continual equilibrium. This was found to be unsatisfactory with 
agent's decisions not based on "choice theoretic foundations". What 
is needed is a theory of how plans are formulated by agents and how 
these plans are revised in the light of new information. There are 
two alternative theories of imperfect price adjustment. The first 
states that prices respond to disequilibrium, with equilibrium being 
the limit of this process, assuming stability. This theory was 
found to be ad hoc and incompatible with the assumption of full 
rationality of agents. The other theory j.s that disequilibrium 
occurs because prices for some reason do not instantaneously adjust 
to their equilibrium values. This interpretation actually goes to 
the root of the question why disequilibrium exists. In order to 
develop this theory we analysed three broad reasons which have been 
proposed in the literature to explain why individual prices may not be 
set at their market clearing values; imperfect information and 
learning, contracts, and the presence of "small-menu" costs. It was 
shown that each of these considerations gave rise to imperfect price 
adjustment, and to disequilibrium at the individual agent level. It 
was further demonstrated that such disequilibrium persists, given 
plausible assumptions over aggregation. Actual wage and price 
dynamics depend upon the reasons for why individual wages and prices 
are inflexible.
One of the main innovations of this Chapter has been its 
broad approach to wage and price adjustment, and disequilibrium.
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Instead of concentrating on one particular theory, to the exclusion 
of others, we critically examined each of the main theories recently 
advanced, clearly stating where theories are mutually exclusive and 
where they may complement each other. As well as providing a general 
overview of wage and price adjustment, the Chapter has developed and 
extended previous theories. The main contribution here is with 
respect to recent work on the effects of "small menu" costs. By 
relaxing restrictive assumptions it was shown that previously held 
results are not robust. For example by incorporating the (s,S) 
policy rule for price adjustment into a model where there are 
discrete shocks it was shown that disequilibrium persists in the 
aggregate and that monetary policy is non-neutral.
- 83 -
CHAF¿ER 4
SINGLE PERIOD QUANTITY RATIONING MODELS
Having argued in Chapter 3 that disequilibrium theory is an 
appropriate area for economic research, we now critically examine some 
of the first generation quantity constrained models, and develop the 
basis for modelling disequilibrium dynamics in subsequent chapters.
As stated in Chapter 2 the assumption of imperfect price 
adjustment cannot merely be appended on to an otherwise market 
clearing model. This is because limited price adjustment, via 
resulting disequilibrium, gives rise to quantity adjustments which need 
to be explicitly taken into account if disequilibrium is to be modelled 
consistently. Temporary equilibrium models with rationing (sometimes 
termed "disequilibrium models") have been proposed to examine the 
consequences of imperfect price adjustment. . Most of these models have 
been single period or static models, in the sense that prices are 
assumed to be fixed with equilibrium being established solely via quantity 
adjustments. This Chapter surveys and evaluates some of these static 
models.
Clower (1965) argued that classical economics was unable to 
provide useful insights into disequilibrium states. Wage and price 
rigidity might lead to conditions of unemployment, yet the general 
paradigm gives a general theory only of equilibrium states. It can 
yield no information about the magnitude of realised, as opposed to 
planned, transactions under disequilibrium conditions. To obtain 
these spillover effects between markets one has to do away with the 
"strong assumption of instantaneous price adjustment". If trading 
should be occuring at false prices, all desired transactions may not
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not take place. Transactors who fall to realise their desired sales 
may then curtail their effective demand in other markets. Clowers 
attack on classical economics is presented in Section 4.1 within 
the context of Walrasian equilibrium. Clower's proposed modelling 
strategy for studying disequilibrium the "dual decision hypothesis" 
is also presented and critically assessed. It is argued that whilst 
Clowers critique of classical economics is valid the dual decision 
hypothesis is an unsatisfactory basis for disequilibrium economics.
Section 4.2 examines more rigorous attempts to model temporary 
equilibrium with quantity adjustment. The two main formulations of 
effective demand and equilibrium employed in the literature, associated 
with Benassy (1975, 1976) and Dreze (1975), are considered. It is 
shown that both formulations have major shortcomings specific to each. 
However a more fundamental criticism is the- fact that there is a 
multiplicity of effective trade offer definitions leading to the 
problem of indeterminacy and arbitrariness. Due to this problem it 
seems that a complete respecification of the way disequilibrium is 
modelled is needed. At the end of Section 4.2 work by Sneessens 
(1981) is reported which attempts to provide a proper basis for a 
disequilibrium model. It is this basic modelling strategy that is 
used in subsequent Chapters of this thesis.
Finally in Section 4.3 we examine the consequences of 
introducing international trade into a disequilibrium model. This 
section along with Section 4.2 provides the basis for Chapter 6 where 
various open economy disequilibrium models are developed. Conclusions 
to the Chapter are presented in Section 4.4.
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4.1 The dual decision hypothesis
In 1965 Robert Clower published a paper attacking the 
classical features that had crept back into the Keynesian paradigm. 
Clower's main criticism of classical economics was that it made the 
incorrect assumption that the model of consumer behaviour which is 
appropriate in equilibrium is also appropriate in disequilibrium.
Clower presented this criticism by attacking the most precise and 
elegant representation of classical theory, Walrasian equilibrium, and 
in particular the validity of Walras's law. To illustrate these 
criticisms we use a model of pure exchange, that is an economy in which 
the economic agents are all consumers who exchange and consume the 
existing stock of commodities but do not engage in production.
There are assumed to be n consumers, indexed i = 1, ..... n
and £ + 1 commodities, indexed h = l ,  .... . £, with the (£ + 1) th
being a distinguished commodity which may be thought of as"money". The
i-th consumer initially holds £ 0 units of commodity, h = 1, .... . £
and mi > 0 units of "money" so his initial endowment can be
represented by the ordered pair -(e*, m*) where e* = (e*, .... . e*) .
His preferences are represented by a utility function u*. If he
consumes x* > 0 units of commodity h = 1, .... ,£ and units of
money and Fh is the price of good h, then the consumer's utility is
ui(xi, m 1, p) where x1 = (x*, .... . xj) and p = (p1# .... . p^). The
appearance of prices in the utility function is explained by the 
fact that it is only real balances that matter to the consumer.
The consumer observes the prevailing prices and chooses to 
make those trades in money and commodities which will maximize his 
utility subject to the usual budget constraint. That is for each 
i ■ 1, .... . n it is assumed that:
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(x^, m^) maximizes ui(xi/ m*, p) subject to the 
budget constraint (4.1)
The decision problem described in (4.1) always has a solution if 
u* is continuous in (x*, ra*) and the price of each good is positive.
If u* is strictly quasi-concave in (x^, m*) then the solution is unique. 
Making these assumptions let p be any vector of strictly positive 
prices and let f*(p) (respectively f*(p)) denote the optimal excess
demand (x* - ejS for commodity h = 1, ....,£ (respectively the optimal
excess demand (m* - m*) for "money"). Let f*(p) = (f*(p),.... , f^(p))
and f*(p) = (f*(p), fi (p)). A Walrasian equilibrium is defined to 
be a price vector p* at which each market clears. Demand equals 
supply in each market if and only if the sum of individual consumers' 
excess demands are zero, that is:
^(p*) = 0 (4.2)
Condition (4.2) may therefore be treated as a definition of equilibrium.
The object of Clower's attack on the classical system was 
not the definition of equilibrium but what it implied about the 
behaviour of the economy in disequilibrium. If a consumer is not 
satiated, then he will spend all his income. Precisely, if his utility 
function is monotonic then:
at an optimum. This equation can be written more compactly in vector
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notation as p x* + m* = pe* + It is easy to see that this is
equivalent to writing pfi (p) + f*(p) = O, since f* (p) = x* - e1 and
f*(p) = m1 - m*. Using the notation f(p) * f(p) and fQ (p) -
E” . f i(p), we have i=i o
¡ ^ [ p f ^ p )  + £o<P>] -  0
£l(P> + Ei-lfo(P» * 0
.*. pf ( p)  + f  (p) = oo
The relation pf(p) + £o (p) = O is known as Walras's law. It holds 
for any value of p, not just in equilibrium. In other words, it 
says the values of aggregate excess demands, summed over all markets, 
is zero. It implies that if there is aggregate excess supply in 
one market there must be aggregate excess demand in another. For if
fh (p) < 0 for all h - 1 , .... . i and fh (p) £ 0 for some h then
pf(p) + fQ(p) < 0 since p > O. But this condition contradics 
Walras's law and so establishes the claim.
The importance of Walras's law in the context of Keynesian 
economics is that it apparently rules out the possibility of a general 
glut of commodities. For every excess supply there must be an equal 
(value of) excess demand somewhere in the system. Corresponding to an 
excess supply of labour there must be an excess demand for goods.
The former will drive down the level of money wages while the latter 
raises money prices. The resulting fall in the real wage will 
increase the demand for labour and lead the economy back to full
employment.
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The fallacy in this argument, that Clower noted, is that 
it assumes that the model of consumer behaviour which is appropriate 
in equilibrium is also appropriate in disequilibrium. In the 
decision problem (4.1), the consumer is assumed to choose (x*, m*) 
subject only to the budget constraint imposed by his wealth. In 
other words, he makes the usual competitive assumption that he can trade 
as much as he likes at the prevailing prices. But if p is not an equili­
brium price i.e. f(p) i O, then consumer's plans are inconsistent.
They cannot all trade as much as they would like to. Once they 
recognize this fact, their behaviour will change. Then (4.1) is 
no longer an appropriate description of their behaviour. It is 
clear that the argument used to prove Walras's law is flawed. The 
Walrasian theory of equilibrium does not provide a satisfactory 
account of how agents will behave in disequilibrium. But what 
is to replace (4.1)? In an attempt to answer this question Clower 
introduced the dual decision hypothesis (DDH). The simplest way 
to understand the DDH is to see it as an extension to the Walrasian 
tâtonnement. In the classical tâtonnement the fictional auctioneer 
calls out a vector of prices, the consumers respond by expressing 
their (Walrasian) excess demands and the auctioneer then adjusts 
prices. If the aggregate excess demand is positive then he raises 
the price, if it is negative he lowers the price. Walras's law 
ensures that there are always some prices rising and some falling in 
disequilibrium. Furthermore because consumers always express 
excess demand derived from (4.1) the only possible resting point of 
this process is the Walrasian equilibrium defined by (4.2) .
Clower introduced the following innovation. After the 
auctioneer calls out the price p and consumers have responded with
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excess demands, f^(p), the auctioneer notes the goods markets on
which there is excess supply. If fjj(p)< 0 for some h = lf .... . 1 ,
he rations the consumers on the long side of the market. The 
auctioneer informs each consumer of the value of the ration he has 
assigned and the consumer is then allowed to revise his excess demands. 
In effect there is the added constraint that the consumer must choose 
an excess demand to his ration, if he would have been unable to sell 
as much as he wished in the first round. These excess demands 
Clower calls effective excess demands because in deriving them he has 
taken account of the fact the consumer would have been unable to sell 
as much as he wanted to in the first round. In general the 
effective demands will differ from the first round Walrasian (or 
notional) demands. It is clear that rationing adds another level 
of complexity to our modelling. It is necessary to include income 
effects that are ignored in general equilibrium theory, being 
determined by prices and quantities. Thus while classical economists 
may have recognized that with wage rigidity unemployment is possible, 
their restriction to considering only notional supplies and demands 
means they have no way of determining what will happen when full 
employment is indeed not reached - effective demands are outside 
their purview. Classicial economics then becomes a special case of 
the Keynesian alternative, relevant only when notional demands 
equal effective demands, when no markets are out of equilibrium.
It should be noted here that Arrow and Hahn (1971) in their 
definitive work on classical general equilibrium theory suggests 
that one of its main uses is to show the strength of the necessary 
assumptions involved in its results and deter those who see it as 
a final answer, rather than a beginning, even if an elegant one.
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The next stage in Clowers tâtonnement is to adjust the 
prices. Here it is assumed that the auctioneer changes prices in 
response to effective, rather than notional, excess demands. The 
relevance of this assumption to Keynesian economics is clear. If 
consumers find in the first round that they could sell less than they 
had planned, then they will be forced, in the second round, to buy less 
than they had planned. Clower presented, but did not make precise, 
the argument that it is possible that excess demand fail to appear 
anywhere in the system, implying that prices will not move to clear 
markets.
Although Clower has introduced the distinction between 
effective and notional demands, essential for any satisfactory 
theory of disequilibrium there are a number of criticisms to be made 
of the way he does so. First there is no reason to suppose that 
consumer's plans will be consistent after the second round. If not 
there may be further rationing, leading to further revisions of 
effective demands. This process may continue indefinitely. Second 
there is no obvious reason for rationing excess supplies and not 
excess demands. Third Clower assumed that rationed consumers must 
always offer to sell exactly the amount they were able to sell in the 
first round, this seems unduly restrictive. In any case the 
contraint is quite arbitrary and may even be inconsistent with 
rational behaviour. Other criticisms of Clower's tâtonnement 
process are that the effective excess demand is not necessarily less 
than the Walrasian excess demand for every commodity and also the DDH 
has nothing to say about what is considered to be an equilibrium of
the system.
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Clowers initial criticisms of classical theory are valid, 
but because of these reasons the DDH is no longer considered a serious 
part of disequilibrium theory. What is needed is a satisfactory 
theory of effective demand.
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4.2 Quantity rationing models
Many of the existing disequilibrium models follow the work 
done by Barro-Grossman (1971), Benassy (1975) and Malinvaud (1977).
They embody very similar assumptions which can be summarised as 
follows:
Al: the rationing schemes in force satisfy:
(a) voluntary exchange
(b) feasibility
(c) market by market efficiency (i.e. only one side 
of the market is rationed) .
A2: rationing schemes are perceived as non-manipulable and 
deterministic. (By non-manipulable it is meant that the trade 
a single agent realizes if he is rationed is independent, except via 
aggregates, of the effective demand he expresses. While deterministic 
means that the rationing scheme is a known function of individual 
and aggregate excess demands.)
A3: trading does not take place out of equilibrium.
By assumption Al aggregate realized transactions will always 
be the minimum of aggregate (effective) demand and aggregate 
(effective) supply. By assumption A2 agents believe that they are 
facing exogenous quantity constraints. Expectations about these 
constraints are held with certainty. From A3 we know that these 
expectations will not be invalidated by realized transactions; 
an individual who expected to be rationed is actually rationed by the 
amount he expected and vice-versa. Each agent will thus believe that 
his perception of the economic environment is correct and, ceteris 
paribus, he has no incentive to revise his trade offer. An 
equilibrium will prevail. Assumption A3 is equivalent to assuming 
that prices are held constant until quantities have fully adjusted.
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Only then are prices allowed to adjust. This is Hicks' fixed price 
assumption. Looked at in this light the DDH is the first step in a 
tâtonnement of quantities while prices are held constant. The 
trouble with the DDH has been supposed to be that it does not allow the 
tâtonnement to go far enough. There is no reason to expect the 
effective excess demands generated at the second round to be the ones 
actually observed in equilibrium. Thus it seemed natural for 
economists to examine the consequence of holding prices constant until 
quantities have fully adjusted to the fact of disequilibrium and are 
consistent with one another.
Although many of the existing disequilibrium models make use 
of the assumptions A1-A3 there is a difference in the way they determine 
the constrained optimization of the utility function. Indeed, because 
of this there are two basic models of effective demand and equilibrium 
that have been employed, one associated with Benassy (1975, 1976) the 
other with Dreze (1975) . We examine each of these in turn.
4.2i Benassy equilibrium
The Benassy equilibrium was the result of the first really 
rigorous attempt to model an equilibrium of the quantity adjustment 
process with fixed prices. We again make use of the pure exchange 
economy introduced in the previous section. Although there are 
l + 1 commodities there are assumed to be only £ distinct markets,
one for each commodity, h = 1, .... . l. "Money", instead of being
traded in a market of its own is traded against each of the other 
commodities in their respective markets. Let z* denote the number 
of units of the h-th commodity that the i-th consumer offers to 
trade. By convention, positive numbers represent demands and 
negative numbers supplies. Let z* = (z|, .... . z*) be the
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vector consisting of the i-th consumer's offer to trade commodities 
h ■ 1» .... , A. Let z « (z1, .... , zn) be an array of these
trade offers, one for each consumer i = 1, .... , n.
The final net trades of each consumer are determined by a
rationing scheme For each consumer i = 1, .... . n, F*
is a function which assigns a final net trade, z* = F*(z), to the i-th
consumer, for each array of trade offers z. The rationing scheme
represents the disequilibrium allocation process of the market.
Consumers observe prices, make offers to trade and then
observe the actual trades they could have been able to make. From
this experience, i.e. from the comparison of z* and z~ and perhaps
from observing the experience of other consumers, they form an
impression of the trading possibilities in the market at that time.
Since final net trades are functions of z, the constraints perceived
by the consumer must be a function of z also. For each commodity,
h ■ 1, .... . A, the i-th consumer perceives that his net supply is
bounded below by z^ < 0 and his net demand is bounded above by
zt > 0. These constraints are determined by the equations z* = h -n
G*(z) and z* = G*(z). The functions { (G*, G*) } are part of the -h h h -h h
description of the economy or, equivalently, part of the agent's 
characteristics. Benassy assumed that in any market agents can send 
offers violating their constraints. That is, effective demand for 
commodity h is based on constraints perceived on other markets, but 
ignoring the constraints on commodity h. The trade offer for each 
commodity is determined independently. The trade offer z~ is the
result of these uncoordinated decisions. For each h = 1, .... . A,,
look at the h-th component of the vector zi such that
i . . i , i A i i i . z maximises u (e + z , m - pz , p)
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subject to the constraints z£ ^ z* £ z* for all k ^ h.
In order to choose this optimum the agent needs to know the 
quantity constraints which will be imposed in disequilibrium, with the 
constraints being jointly determined by the trade offers of all 
consumers. Hence in equilibrium the trade offers must simultaneously 
maximize utility subject to the perceived constraints and generate the 
perceived constraints via the rationing scheme. One should note that 
in a Benassy equilibrium one does not require the actual trades to be 
equal to effective demands only that effective demands "reproduce" 
themselves.
The main problem with this theory of disequilibrium is that the 
consumer solves a different decision problem to arrive at his trade offer 
for each commodity h. This may be visualized as follows. The consumer 
goes from market to market expressing offers to trade various commodities. 
When he arrives at the h-th market he forgets about the possible constraint 
on that market and offers to trade the quantity which would maximise his 
utility, if he were subject to perceived constraints on all markets but 
this one. When we combine these offers derived in these separate 
maximization problems there is no reason to think it represents the 
behaviour of a rational consumer. There is no coherent decision 
problem behind the consumers derivation of his trade offers. It 
does not necessarily maximize the consumer's utility within the available 
set of trades. And the final net trade resulting from the offers may not 
even be feasible for the consumer.
Since the trade offer may not be feasible for the consumer one 
needs to be careful in using them in order to gain a measure of excess 
demand. In general the agents trade offers generated in Benassy 
equilibrium are unrealiable as a measure of underlying disequilibrium.
For example, suppose that there are two goods which are perfect substitutes.
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If excess demand is constrained on both markets, the effect is simply 
to cause consumers to increase their demands on the other market.
Indeed the effective trade offers for each commodity may even be greater 
than the sum of the individual Walrasian excess demands for them. The 
degree of disequilibrium implied by these effective trade offers is 
greater than that suggested by the initial Walrasian excess demands.
This is obviously a serious problem of one wishes to introduce price 
adjustment in response to effective excess demands.
Despite these shortcomings there have been several applications 
of the fixed price method using Benassy effective demands, including 
Glustoff (1968), Benassy (1978) and Malinvaud (1977).
4.2ii Dreze equilibrium
The alternative Dreze formulation allows the agent when 
forming his excess demand for each commodity to consider the quantity 
constraints on all markets, including the commodity in question.
Thus the i-th consumer is assumed to choose a final net trade
z* to maximize u^'(ei + z*, mi - pz*, p)
subject to the constraints z* < z* < 2* h h h
for all h =  1, .... . £.
An equilibrium is here defined as a set of perceived constraints and 
actual trades such that each market clears, only one side of the market 
is constrained, and only voluntary exchange takes place. This concept 
of equilibrium does provide a coherent description of a disequilibrium
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state. Each agent is behaving rationally with respect to his 
preferences for final net trades and the plans of all agents are 
consistent.
A basic problem with the Dreze equilibrium, however, is that 
since agents are assumed to express demands satisfying perceived 
constraints, it does not generate an exchange of information concerning 
the magnitude of disequilibrium that agents face. Since each agent 
regards the quantity- constraints as parameters no-one attempts to 
break them. Agents are constrained in the messages they can send.
In economic terms this means, for example, that a man who does not 
receive a job does not offer to work. His behaviour is quite rational 
in this context, but it does not provide a good description of how 
markets with rationing work. The cause of unemployment is not 
that unemployed workers are not allowed to search for jobs. Certainly 
with the Dreze formulation the final net trades cannot be interpreted 
as effective excess demands if the effective excess demands are supposed 
to be the appropriate signals for price adjustment. Since final 
net trades sum to zero, aggregate excess demands would be zero so there 
would be no sign of disequilibrium. This is unacceptable on both 
theoretical and practical grounds.
Another problem with the basic Dreze model is that it does 
not specify the actual rationing scheme. Many equilibria are possible 
depending on the specific rationing scheme. This problem of specification 
can be viewed in two ways. First one may argue that we are concerned 
with the aggregate constraint, it being of secondary importance which 
specific agents face rationing. One's concern is then limited to 
ensuring that the actual rationing schemes be internally consistent. 
Alternatively, one could say that the existence of equilibrium with
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aggregate constraints depends crucially on the specific rationing 
scheme. How job shortages are allocated is crucial in determining 
whether an unemployment equilibrium is a viable or even sensible 
concept. Under this view, failure to consider actually observed 
methods of rationing is a serious drawback of some quantity constrained 
models.
4.2iii Indeterminancy
It has been seen that both the Benassy and the Dreze 
formulations of effective demand and equilibrium have major shortcomings 
specific to each model. However a more fundamental criticism of these 
approaches relates to the basic fact that there is a multiplicity of 
effective trade offer definitions each producing a quantity rationing 
model exhibiting unique properties. This difficulty was first 
pointed out by Benassy (1977) who nevertheless concluded that the 
Benassy concept of effective demand seemed to be the most natural one. 
This conclusion was thereafter challenged by Svensson (1980). According 
to Svensson, an assumption like A2, that the rationing schemes on 
markets are perceived as non-manipulable and deterministic, make 
indeterminacy unavoidable and leaves no a priori reason to prefer 
one concept to the other.
In order to highlight this problem of indeterminacy we shall 
examine a simple two market model for goods and labour. Aggregation 
problems will not be considered and only two types of agents will be 
distinguished: producers and consumers. Producers buy labour from the 
consumers and sell their output to consumers. Their behaviour is purely 
atemporal, which implies the absence of inventories and investments.
It also means that labour is seen as a freely variable input. The 
goal is profit maximization subject to the technical constraint:
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where yfc is the quantity of goods produced and is the quantity 
of labour used in the production process. We assume that F is 
concave and strictly increasing in each argument.
Given this model and the three assumptions A1-A3 we are 
able to distinguish four possible regimes. Each regime is identified 
by the relative magnitude of the effective demand and supply on 
each market as is shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1
Goods d s d s
Labour yt ' yt yt > yt
td < is Keynesian ClassicalUnemployment Unemployment
< < Underconsumption
Repressed
Inflation
d syt# yt are the effective demand and supply on the goods market, 
d sand are the effective demand and supply on the labour
market.
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In keeping with the now well established terminology we shall
call them respectively Keynesian Unemployment (KU), Classical Unemployment 
(CU), Repressed Inflation (RI) and Underconsumption (U).
the specification of effective trade offers and of expectations. The 
equilibrium assumption introduces the link between expected constraints 
and realized transactions. For the unconstrained agent it means that 
the anticipated constraint was larger than or equal to his actual trade. 
As assumption A1 implies that all constrained agents are on the same side 
of the market, one also has the following aggregate relation:
aggregate quantity constraints perceived on the labour market. (The 
perceived aggregate constraints are defined as the sum of the 
individual constraints.)
The assumptionA1-A3 also contain some information about
K  * yt if
s
(4.3)
where yfc and are the transacted quantities on the goods and labour 
d smarket respectively, yfc, yt are the aggregate quantity constraints 
perceived on demand and supply on the goods market, and 1^, 1^, are th«e
If equilibrium is given a stronger content, meaning also that
on a seller's (buyer's) market, *»ach buyer (seller) is aware that he
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could not exchange more, the following identities also hold:
-u syt - yt if yt - yt
?t - yt if yt = yt
*t 1 *t if *t =l l
(4.4)
At = *t if *t * *t
Putting together the definitions of Table (4.1) and restrictions 
(4.3)-(4.4) leads to the following regime characteristics.
KU-equilibrium
. = £d*t
-d£ > £ 
t t-
CU-equilibrium
r3 >t - t
RI-equilibrium
yt - y“ -dy- * y*.
£d = £ t t
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U-equilibrium
It
s
t lt t > *t
It is noteworthy that the fourth regime is in fact irrelevant in the 
context of our assumptions. By definition the Underconsumption 
regime appears when producers are constrained on both markets
respectively. The latter quantities, however, are also related to 
and yfc respectively through the production function. - It follows 
that an underconsumption equilibrium could only appear for
These are obviously two contradictory statements. Intuitively, 
it means that "with full employment of labour, output is 
practically determined in the shortrun by the labour supply? since 
demand for labour by firms is rationed, they cannot have a higher 
output than the one they sell, hence they cannot be considered as 
rationed sellers" Malinvaud (1977).
A meaningful underconsumption regime could still be obtained
s dsimultaneously, that is when yfc and are smaller than yfc and
yt < y® “ r(tt) and (4.5)
(4.6)
in a more detailed model. Weddepohl (1980) has shown that a fourth 
regime reappears as soon as aggregation problems are explicity 
considered. It is then possible for some firms to be constrained in the
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goods market while others would be constrained on the labour market, 
due to the fact that the rationing of goods leads to another 
allocation among firms than the rationing of labour. An Under­
consumption regime would also arise in a model with inventories. A 
firm could then find it more advantageous to produce more than the 
required amount this period to sell next period and might be 
constrained simultaneously on the goods and labour markets (see for 
example Muellbauer and Portes, 1978). These complications are not 
introduced here. Instead we follow Gourieroux, Laffont and 
Monfort (1980) (henceforth GLM) and ito (1980) and simply proceed 
as if the four regimes were all relevant. From a purely technical 
point of view, this choice can be rationalized either by assuming 
that money enters as a second factor in the production function 
(as in GLM) or by noticing that hiring and firing costs may well 
force producers to be off their production function (as in Ito, 1980). 
In both these cases restrictions (4.5) and (4.6) no longer hold.
possible regimes it appears that not all the perceived constraints 
and effective demands are defined. When, for instance, consumers 
are constrained on the labour market, but not on the goods market, 
then obviously their optimal demand for consumption goods is uniquely
perceived on the other market. Assuming a linear relationship we 
write:
Studying the preceding characterization of the four
defined and is of the Benassy type as it only depends on the constraint
d wd
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where the upper script w denotes a Walrasian (or notional) trade 
offer and is the spillover coefficient. Yet their optimal
supply of labour is not defined. As consumers believe no trade 
offer could allow them to sell more than £t# their supply may be 
any quantity larger or equal to that amount. A similar reasoning 
applies to the other cases as well# so that the general form of the 
linear relationship model induced by assumptions A1-A3 is:
kU-equilibrium:
wd
yt “ yt + aiftt - *t >
yt >
_d wd0 = £ t t
. ws.
a2 yt - yt >
£ > lt ~ t
CU-equi librium
d
y- z y«.
«d „wd£ = l
t t
*t i »t
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U-equilibrium :
2 *t
s ws
Rl-equilibrium:
s ws . . .wd
yt = yt + ßi<*t - *t >
d
lt * *t
0 s oWS , o / wd\
lt ■ *t + ß2(yt - yt 1
where a^, a^, 3j_# 32 are the spillover coefficients. Any specification 
of the undefined perceived constraints and effective demands will be 
acceptable provided only it satisfies the required inequalities. In 
order to complete the model subsequent restrictions need to be imposed. 
Portes (1978) has reviewed three possible formulations over the goods 
and labour markets, those by GLM (1980), I to (1980) and one presented
by Portes himself.
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Both GLM and Ito choose to specify all the effective 
trade offers as Benassy ones. The effective demand and supply on a
given market is thus a function of the constraint perceived on the 
other market only. The model reads:
it = t®)
where the definitions of the perceived constraints have to satisfy 
(4.3) and (4.4).
GLM and Ito, however, use different definitions for the 
undefined perceived constraints. GLM consider that the (passive)
d wd
= y^d + ct^ (ij - otherwise
s ws
otherwise
wd -s ws. .. .
= ¿t + a2'yt ~ yt otherwise
otherwise
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constraint a buyer (seller) perceives on a buyer's (seller's) market 
is always larger than the Walrasian trade offer. This amounts to 
strengthening (4.3) to:
This choice satisfies the restrictions imposed on the perceived 
rationing scheme by Benassy (1975) and Malinvaud (1977) . The model 
is now completely (though arbitrarily) defined and can be written as
wd if l.t t
wd + <*i (fct “ *t Î otherwise
s if £t
= yt + 31 (£t - £fc ) otherwise
. . d s yt = min(yt, yfc)
S
0 2(yt - yfc ) otherwise
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. s nws 
\  ■ *t if yt
wd
£t + ^2^yt “ yt * otherwise
it = minü*, f®>
Alternatively Ito, following Quandt (1978), assumes that perceived 
constraints are always equal to actual transactions.
-d
y-
îd = V*t xt
In this way the model simplifies to:
d wd . „ nws.
yt = yt + “i<lt * lt >
ws „ ,„ „wd, 
yt + »i“ t - lt >
rt  = min(yd. yt>
d „wd
“2(yt
ws,
t = *t + - yt
s „ws
B2(yt
wd,
•t ■ *t + - yt :
!t = minU^,
Finally Portes' specification relies upon the same definition of 
perceived constraints as I to but not the same concept of effective
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demand. It entails that the trade offer made on a given market 
is a function of the perceived constraints on both markets. This 
model may be written as:
wd
yt + °i“ t - V
s ws
yt + 6 ^ - v
yt ■ min(y^. y : >
d „ wd
°2<yt
S ,
t ■ *t + - yt:
s ws
62(yt
d,
■  + - ytl
*t ■ m i n U t' ‘t’
The affect of this may be seen more clearly by substituting 
for in the demand function for goods. The effective demand is 
now of the form:
d wd . wd. , -ws.
yt “ yt + °ll(yt - yt > + a12(tt * *t >
“11 “ " “l ^ * 1 " “lB21
°12 “ 01 (1 - “lB2>
and similarly for other cases.
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It may seem that this indeterminancy is not a very serious
problem. Indeed Portes (1977) has shown that the three specifications 
presented will always yield the same regime classification and observed 
transactions and so fall into the same equivalance class. However it 
must be remembered that many other specifications that could have been 
used, being compatible with assumptions A1-A3, would not result in the 
same regime classification and observed transactions. Indeed two 
sets of effective demand and supplies (y^, y^, £^ , £®) and 
(y^ , y^, £^, £^) will generate the same regimes and observations
if and only if
The three models defined by GLM, Ito and Portes satisfy 
this requirement. But this will not always be the case and so 
regime classification depends on the (arbitrary) choice of model.
One possible way to overcome this problem of indeterminancy 
is to reinterpret assumption A2 in a less stringent way. Indeed 
Svensson (1981) has shown that Benassy effective trade offers may 
arise as a limit case of a more general concept using stochastic 
perceived rationing schemes. The result however is valid if and 
only if Benassy trade offers car. always be afforded, which is not 
always the case. It seems therefore that to avoid indeterminacy
minU^, £^ ) = min(£$ Î®) and
- Ill -
and arbitrariness requires a complete respecification of the model.
The issue is thus to know whether the assumptions underlying many of 
the existing quantity rationing models can be modified so as to 
allow the derivation of well defined trade offers. One approach 
that has attempted to answer this question has been presented by 
Sneessens (1981) and which we now consider.
4.2iv A disequilibrium rationing model
Sneessens (1981) attempts to replace assumptions A1-A3 by 
an alternative set of assumptions so that the resulting quantity 
constrained model will exhibit- well defined effective trade offers, 
thus avoiding the necessity of imposing further arbitrary restrictions. 
In his alternative formulation Sneessens allows expectations about 
the constraints to be incorrect, abolishing the equilibrium assumption. 
Specifically he proposes the following assumptions:
A4: the rationing schemes satisfy
(a) voluntary exchange
(b) feasibility
(c) market efficiency
A5: (a) consumers always believe they will not be
rationed on the goods market. They perceive the allocation 
procedure on the labour market as non-manipulable and stochastic .
More precisely, the amount of labour they expect to sell obtains 
as
£t = mind®, £^ ) with probability (1 - pr^
with probability pr
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with pr^ strictly positive.
(b) producers perceive both allocative procedures as non- 
manipulable and stochastic:
Yt * min(y®, y®) with probability (l-pr2) 
s= yfc with probability pr2>
£t = min(I^, with probability (1- pr^)
= with probability pr^
where pr2 and pr3 are strictly positive.
A6: trading occurs sequentially, first on the labour 
market, then on the goods market.
By assumption A5(a) it is considered that the rationing 
of goods has been so rare and temporary as not to affect the supply 
of labour. This is partly justified fran the existence of many 
substitutes to any specific commodity. For instance, a consumer 
who is unable to buy his most preferred cigarettes will simply 
switch to another brand. This kind of rationing will not appear 
in aggregate data and will not affect the supply of labour.
Moreover if the economy is considered to be open then any domestic 
shortage may be assumed to be compensated by increased imports. A 
further argument supporting assumption A5(a) is that the relevant 
constraint in the consumer's labour supply is the long run or
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"permanent" constraint and not the short one. If consumers expect 
to be presently rationed in their consumption of goods their supply 
of labour will still remain almost unchanged as long as they 
believe rationing will not persist in the future.
The last assumption mirrors Clower's dual decision 
hypothesis. It's main effect is that when traders meet on the goods 
market they already have an accurate knowledge of the constraint 
prevailing on the labour market. This seems a natural assumption to 
make implying that when producers go to the goods market to sell 
their output, the production process is already taking place so 
that producers have a correct idea of what they can sell. Correspondingly, 
consumers already know their labour income.
It can be shown that assumptions A4-A6 taken together make 
possible the derivation of the following well defined trade offers:
(i) The effective trade offer of consumers are the 
Walrasian supply on the labour market and the Benassy demand on the 
goods market.
(ii) The effective trade offers of producers are the 
Benassy demand on the labour market and the Dreze supply on the goods 
market provided pr2 is sufficiently close to zero.
Following Sneessens (1981) a formal proof is given in 
Appendix 1, but the result is intuitively clear. As consumers 
believe that there is always a positive probability to obtain 
what they want on the labour market, their best strategy is to 
ignore any possible constraint on that market. As they moreover expect 
not to be rationed on the goods market, consumers will supply £*S .
On the contrary if y® is smaller than y*S producers will have to 
account for the fact that it will be almost (pr2 * 0) impossible for
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them to sell more than y®. Accordingly producers will only seek to 
employ the amount of labour required to produce y^. Their optimal 
trade offer is thus the Benassy demand. This implies that actual 
production will be at most as large as y^, depending on whether
producers are rationed or not on the labour market. The supply of 
goods thus accounts for the constraints prevailing (or expected to 
prevail) on both markets. Finally as consumers do not anticipate 
any rationing on the goods market thier demand for goods will be a 
function of the labour constraint only.
By assuming linearity we can write this model as
follows:
where a ^  ^  = 1 ensures that the effective supply of goods is of the
otherwise
s
otherwise
t t
= min,**,
Dreze type.
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It Is this model that forms the basis for the dynamic dis­
equilibrium models developed in subsequent chapters. Whether one 
considers this procedure any less arbitrary than the previous ones 
is somewhat an open question. However the strength of this 
modelling strategy is that assumption A4-A6 can be justified and are 
complete, ensuring the derivation of well-defined trade offers, thus 
avoiding the necessity of imposing further ad hoc restrictions.
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4.3 Open economy quantity constrained models
The models so far examined in this chapter are all closed 
economy models. We shall now study the consequences, for quantity 
constrained models, of assuming that the economy is open, and in 
particular the effects on the number of possible regimes that may 
be observed.
It is convenient to start by considering a small open 
economy. The term "small open economy" is used to describe an 
economy that (i) faces a price of the tradeable good that is fixed 
in foreign currency terms p*, and (ii) can buy or sell as much of 
this good as it wishes at the prevailing world price.
The simplest open economy quantity constrained model is 
that developed by Dixit (1978) in which there is a single tradeable 
commodity. From the assumption that the economy is small the 
foreign net supply curve is perfectly elastic at p*. This 
implies that quantity rationing never occurs in the goods market even 
though it is in sane sense a "fixed price" market from the domestic 
country's point of view. This Specification of the goods market 
serves to make this model considerably simpler than its closed 
economy counterparts. With short run wage rigidity in the labour 
market there are only two disequilibrium regimes that are possible«
Classic3! Unemployment and Repressed Inflation. In particular 
Keynesian Unemployment - caused by a deficiency of demand for domestic 
output - can never occur. Because of this traditional aggregate 
demand management policies have no effect on domestic output or 
employment.
The reason for these classical type results is not because 
Dixit's model only contains a single traded good. Even if this good 
was disaggregated, into, say, importables and exportables, quantity constraints
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in goods markets would still be ruled out by the small economy 
assumption, and there would still be no possibility of either 
Keynesian Unemployment or Underconsumption. However, making the 
fundamental distinction in an"open economy between traded and non- 
traded goods allows the possibility of disequilibrium in the markets 
for domestic output. All the regimes described for the closed 
economy models are possible once tradeable and non-tradeable goods 
are distinguished. (The reason that a good is not traded 
internationally may be due to transportation costs or other 
impediments to international trade. See Prachowny, 1975.) Such a 
model with both tradeable and non-tradeable goods has been presented 
by Neary (1980). The reason why all four regimes are again possible 
is simple. While it is still true that neither domestic firms nor 
consumers face rationing in the traded goods market this is not the 
case in the non-traded goods market. Producers of non-traded goods 
may face a sales constraint because of lack of domestic demand, and 
similarly consumers may be constrained in the amount of the non- 
tradeable good they can buy. In affect there are now three markets, 
one each for labour, tradeable goods and non-tradeable goods. With 
rationing possible on two of these three markets all four regimes may 
be observed.
In the Neary type model only in the non-tradeable goods 
market does the possibility of quantity constraints on supply and 
demand arise. There are, however, important situations where one can 
reasonably expect quantity constraints in the market for tradeable 
goods. Even if the economy produces only a single traded good 
(no non-tradeables) , and is small in the sense that changes in the 
domestic supply have an imperceptable influence on the world price of 
its exportable good, domestic producers or consumers may face rationing
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if the world price is slow to adjust to eliminate world excess supply 
or demand. A good example of such a situation would be a small 
oil exporting nation facing a world price and sales constraint 
imposed by the OPEC oil cartel.
Quantity constraints in tradeable goods markets can also 
arise in situations where the country in question is not large if it 
imposes import quotes coupled with domestic price controls. This may 
result in domestic rationing of the imported goods, yet the country 
might be small in both the importable and exportables markets in the 
sense that it would in the absence of distortionary policies perceive 
perfectly elastic world supply or demand cufves for these products 
at prevailing world prices.
Finally, it is important to consider situations where the 
price of a tradeable good is fixed in terms of the domestic currency 
in the short run. In such cases, the domestic economy typically 
faces a downward sloping export demand curve rather than the perfectly 
elastic demand curve. This combination of a price fixed in a domestic 
currency and a less than perfectly elastic export demand curve has been 
referred to as the large-country assumption.
The large country assumption opens up new possibilities in the 
fixed price model even if the economy produces only a single tradeable 
good. Authors using the large-country assumption typically take a 
somewhat different and mixed approach. Cuddington (1980) for 
example distinguishes between exportables and importables, assuming 
that the economy is small and unrationed in the market for the 
importable good. By admitting the possibility of world excess supply 
or demand of exportables on the other hand, he is able to distinguish 
both Classical and Keynesian Unemployment regimes in a model that does
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not incorporate a non-traded goods sector.
It should be noted that the exportables-importables model is 
very similar to the tradeables non-tradeables model of Neary (1980) .
If one was to assume that the foreign demand for "exportables" in 
Cuddington's model was identically equal to zero, that good would, 
in effect, become the "non tradeable" good in Neary's specification. 
Cuddington's other good, the importable, then becomes the only 
tradeable good and performs the same role as the tradeable good in 
Neary's model. Thus models based on distinguishing between tradeable 
and non-tradeable goods can easily be reworked in an exportables- 
importables context merely by relabelling non-tradeables as exportables 
(and allowing for foreign demand) and tradeables as importables (retaining 
the small country assumption in the latter case).
In Chapter 6 the closed economy disequilibrium model developed 
in Chapter 5 is extended to include international trade. By making use 
of the large country assumption all four regimes of the closed economy, 
two market model are still observed.
4.4 Conclusions
This Chapter has provided the base from which we develop a 
dynamic temporary equilibrium model with quantity rationing in 
subsequent Chapters. Initially we presented Clower*s attack upon 
classical economics, within the context of Walrasian equilibrium, 
and then assessed his dual decision hypothesis. It was argued that 
this hypothesis is an inadequate foundation on which to build a 
"disequilibrium" model. Because of this we then examined both the 
Benassy and Dreze formulations of effective demand and equilibrium.
Again, due to shortcomings related to each, and the more fundamental 
problem of indeterminacy and arbitrariness, it was argued these were 
unacceptable. What is needed is a complete respecification of the 
way disequilibrium is modelled. One such respecification examined 
is presented by Sneessens (1981). In his alternative formulation 
Sneessens replaces the usual assumptions behind rationing models by 
others and in particular allows expectations about constraints to 
be incorrect, abolishing the equilibrium assumption. Sneessens's 
approach overcomes the problem of • indeterminacy and arbitrariness, 
allowing the derivation of well defined effective trade offers 
without having to impose ad hoc restrictions. For this reason Sneessens's 
modelling strategy and assumptions are used as the basis for developing a 
two market model in subsequent Chapters.
Finally, we examined the consequences of introducing international 
trade into a disequilibrium model. The main result here was that by 
making use of the "large country" assumption all four regimes of the 
closed economy two market model are observed. This result is made use of
in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 5
DISEQUILIBRIUM DYNAMICS WITH INVENTORIES AND WAGE AND 
PRICE ADJUSTMENT IN A CLOSED ECONOMY
Sneessens(1981) writes in conclusion to his research, presented 
in the previous Chapter, that it "demonstrates that the quantity rationing 
approach is indeed a useful and workable tool of analysis". He then 
goes on to state that his "disequilibrium reformulation seems also well 
fitted for future developments introducing price changes and inventories", 
and that this would be "an interesting starting point for future research". 
This Chapter takes up these recommendations by developing and analysing 
a dynamic disequilibrium model based on Sneessens's reformulation. The 
model presented here analyses the dynamic behaviour of a closed economy 
where changes in inventories, wages and prices constitute the main 
intertemporal links. Further, because this Chapter represents a 
continuation of research concerned with analysing the properties of 
disequilibrium macroeconomic models that incorporate price adjustment 
and inventories we are able to examine the robustness of previous 
results. In particular the research presented in this Chapter is 
compared with the work of HQnkapohja and Ito (1980), Green and 
Laffont (1981) and Eckalbar (1985). Indeed in Section 5.1 the 
recent theoretical developments in dynamic macroeconomic disequilibrium 
modelling is critically assessed, with particular emphasis being 
placed upon price adjustment and expectations.
The model predominately used in this Chapter is developed and 
contrasted with previous models in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 analyses 
the types of short run and long run equibria that may be observed.
Attention is given to the effects of introducing inventories as buffer 
stocks, and wage and price adjustment into a disequilibrium model.
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In particular it is shown that there is a unique long run equilibrium, 
which is the Walrasian equilibrium. The dynamics of the model are 
analysed in Section 5.4; It is shown that the economy is either 
stable or exhibits a limit cycle, and that the parameter space has a 
significant subset in which limit cycles are certain. This result 
is due to explicit consideration of regime switching and the non­
negativity of inventories. In Section 5.5 the importance of wage and 
price adjustment is considered by employing alternative wage and price 
adjustment mechanisms. Instead of assuming that wages and prices 
adjust imperfectly toward their market clearing values, we allow 
wages to respond to excess demand in the labour market, and prices 
to excess demand in the money market. While the nature and number of 
long run equilibria is unaffected, the dynamics and stability of the 
model is greatly changed, there now being a "saddlepoint" solution, 
with limit cycles impossible. In order to ensure stability the 
structure of the economy is altered so as to allow agents to have 
forward looking expectations, thus allowing the possibility of the 
economy jumping instantaneously on to the stable manifold.
5.1 Critical appraisal of recent theoretical developments in
dynamic macro-disequilibrium modelling
The first generation of disequilibrium macroeconomic models 
such as Barro and Grossman (1971, 1977), Benassy (1975), Dreze (1975) 
Malinvaud (1977) and others were static, and therefore suffered from 
two general defects. First they gave limited insight into what many 
would consider to be major questions to be answered: questions relating 
to the behaviour of variables such as employment, output, inventories, 
wages and prices; the likelihood of an economy being in a particular 
regime; as well as even tougher questions of what data would allow us
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to discriminate between market and non-market paradigms. These may be 
considered model output issues. A second defect concerns the structure 
of the model, an issue of model inputs. With few exceptions inter­
temporal linkages via inventories and expectations were missing.
Perhaps the most common criticism concerns their failure to consider 
price movements. Further there was generally no incorporation of a 
market considered to be market cleaning at all times, for example an 
asset market such as the foreign exchange market.
An early paper which attempted to meet some of these criticisms 
was Honkapohja and Ito (1980) . The aim of their paper was to 
analyse both static and dynamic features of a disequilibrium model 
incorporating inventories as buffer stocks. The closed economy they 
consider consists of an aggregate labour market and an aggregate goods 
market, where apart from exogenous government, two hypothetical economic 
agents operate, one being the representative consumer, who supplies 
labour and demands goods, the other the representative producer who 
supplies goods and demands labour. The model has two stores of value 
money and inventories, which interact together with the flow demands and 
supplies on the labour and goods markets to determine a short run 
equilibrium. The level of employment is determined as the minimum of 
supply and demand for labour. The firms produce the consumption good 
by using labour as the only input. Initial inventories and current 
production make up the current supply of goods. The trading of goods is 
in turn determined as the minimum of supply and demand for goods, while 
their difference determines the initial inventory stock of the following 
period. This serves as the main source of dynamics in the model, as 
wages and prices are assumed fixed for the central sections of their 
paper. The two major concerns of their paper are the effects of 
introducing buffer stocks into a disequilibrium macroeconomic model
- 124 -
and to analyse the resulting dynamics. First, the introduction of 
inventories affects the classification of the short-run states of the 
economy into different regimes. Malinvaud (1977) and Muellbauer and 
Portes (1978) argue that the introduction of inventories into a 
disequilibrium macroeconomic model leads to the regime of Underconsumption, 
in addition to the other three well known regimes. However, these 
authors view inventories as wealth and overlook the role of buffer 
stocks. Honkaphoja and I to observe that inventories as buffer stocks 
can alter spill over effects by eliminating some of the rationing of 
the demand for goods. Consequently the classification criteria and the 
regimes are likely to change. • It turns out that the region of Classical 
Unemployment shrinks and even disappears in certain circumstances.
Second Honkapohja and I to analyse the dynamic behaviour of 
inventories and employment beyond the short run. In simple aggregate 
models such as Metzler (1941) and Lovell (1962) the stability of 
inventory fluctuations necessitates a relatively slow speed of 
adjustment for inventories. These models do not take into account 
the problem of regime switching and the non-negativities of employment 
and inventories. Incorporating these aspects results in significant 
modifications. Honkapohja and Ito show that, assuming fixed wages 
and prices, steady states are in general either in the region of Key­
nesian Unemployment or Repressed Inflation and both possibilities are 
stable for many parameter configurations. Moreover, the non­
negativities of employment and the regime of Underconsumption exert 
stabilizing influences so that otherwise unstable oscillations result 
in limit cycles. Similar results have recently been provided by 
Eckalbar (1985). Again the main intertemporal linkage in Eckalbar's 
disequilibrium macroeconomic model is via inventories, with firms 
trying to maintain a fixed ratio of expected sales to inventory
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stocks. Wages and prices are again assumed to be fixed. The two 
main results of Eckalbar's analysis ¿ire that his model exhibits a 
unique equilibrium that may either entail full employment or unemployment 
of labour, and that when the desired inventory sales ratio is large the 
model produces limit cycles. Here the cycles are generated by regime 
switching, expectations, and explicit stock building considerations.
Virtually all economic models which can yield oscillations 
of constant amplitude, as Honkapohja and Ito, and Eckalbar do, do so 
in only an improbably small subset of the parameter space, generally 
at points on a line, "a knife edge" line. For example see the famous 
papers by Samuelson (1939) and Metzler (1941). Goodwin (1951),
Ichimura (1955) and Torre (1977) give further examples of systems that 
display limit cycles. This might lead one to believe that regular, 
uniform cycles are highly unlikely. Interestingly, for Honkapohja 
and Ito, and Eckalbar's models the parameter space has a significant 
subset in which cycles are certain. This approach of studying 
regime switching within disequilibrium macroeconomic models thus seems 
to offer a possible explanation of inventory cycles.
Though Honkapohja and Ito have attempted to meet some of 
the criticisms of the "first generation" single period disequilibrium 
models, by incorporating an intertemporal link, via inventories, there 
are a number of criticisms that can be made of their model.
Price adjustment
The applicability of Honkapohja and Ito, and Eckalbar's, 
results are limited by their assumption of constant wages and prices. 
Within Section Six of their paper, however, Honkapohja and Ito, 
briefly discuss sane of the modifications to their previous analysis 
resulting from wage and price flexibility. First, the parameters in
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the behavioural functions are dependent on the level of wages and prices. 
Second, the behaviour of optimal inventories may undergo a major change, 
as now there will be a speculative motive for holding inventories. 
Honkapahja and Ito only consider the first of these issues. In order 
to complete the dynamics given wage and price flexibility the evolution 
of real wages over time needs to be determined. Here Honkapohja and 
Ito follow earlier work on disequilibrium dynamics (see Bohm 1978, 
Honkapohja 1979,1980, Ito 1978, 1979 for examples) by postulating 
ad hoc adjustment rules for real wages for each regime. The 
modifications caused by wage and price flexibility are in accordance 
with intuition if the earlier literature on disequilibrium dynamics 
is adhered to and if persistent inflation or deflation is not present 
so that speculative inventory holding plays only a slight role.
However, Honkapohja and Ito do admit that "the postulated wage and 
price adjustment rules do not have strong justifications, so that the 
results must be considered very tentative". They conclude their 
paper by stating that "better theories of price and wage setting with 
inventories are imperative".
An alternative approach to incorporating price adjustment 
within disequilibrium models is used by Green and Laffont (1981).
They assume that prices are fixed at the beginning of the period at the 
level which would be the Walrasian equilibrium if all random factors 
in the economy had their average levels. This they refer to as 
anticipatory pricing. There is thus a tendency toward market clearing, 
but the short run disturbances continually keep it from being achieved. 
Prices move fully to clear markets between periods for the expected value 
of the stocks. This has two somewhat troubling implications of which 
Green and Laffont are aware. First is that the nature of the
equilibrium will be independent across periods. Keynesian Unemployment
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is as likely to follow a period of Repressed Inflation as any other 
regime. One may note that the reasonableness of this feature depends 
on the length of the periods. The second somewhat disturbing 
feature is that prices are completely rigid within a period but 
adjust fully to expected market clearing levels between periods.
Green and Laffont argue that this is but one polar case among a range 
of flexibility assumptions. Such a sharp distinction in the degree 
of price flexibility intra- and inter-period raises a special 
problem. The usual argument is that this is simply descriptive, 
that a sufficiently short period of time is being considered. This 
is less compelling here, since, as already noted, regimes are 
independent across periods. These assumptions are thus seen to be 
incompatible for a disequilibrium regime switching model. One way 
to overcome this incompatibility is to allow prices to adjust only 
slowly towards the market clearing level, thus allowing the 
possibility of serially correlated regimes, while retaining the 
assumption that there is no price adjustment within the period. It 
is not considered that prices respond to excess demand, but rather 
there are explicit reasons why prices do not instantaneously adjust to 
their equilibrium values. This price adjustment process is thus 
broadly consistent with the analysis of Chapter 3.
Expectations
A further criticism of Honkapohja and Ito's analysis is 
their neglect of expectations of future prices and quantity constraints, 
and in particular the simplistic way inventories are included in their 
model. In an optimizing model the firm's demand for inventories must 
depend on the expectations of product demand and input costs in the
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future. As always, the nature of behaviour in Honkapohja and Ito's 
paper, if seen as the result of implicit optimization, reflects the 
assumptions of the model. Thus the simplistic specification of 
inventory behaviour is justified mainly be the assumption of fixed 
wages and prices. In a model where there is persistence of regimes 
the firm will have to consider the probability of various sorts of 
disequilibrium in the future as well as future prices. The first 
depends both on what types of shocks the economy experiences and on 
the dynamic properties of the economy. So, for example, demand for 
inventories this period will be high if the firm anticipates being 
rationed in factor markets next period (or expects factor markets 
to clear at a higher input wage), but will be low if it expects to 
be rationed in its sales of output. In general inventory holding 
cannot be divorced from the nature of price determination and the 
nature of the stochastic processes generating shocks to the economy.
Given these criticisms of previous research into the 
dynamic properties of disequilibrium models, incorporating inventories.
the robustness of their results needs to be examined.
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5.2 The Model (Model 5.1)
The model derived here is an extension of Sneessens's (1981) 
model, derived from the assumptionsA4-A6 of Section 4.2iv. We do not 
present the maximization problems of the agents again, instead we 
simply postulate piecewise linear decision rules that are consistent 
with the model of Section 4.2iv, given certain further assumptions.
All variables are measured in logarithms.
The model has two sectors - the household and the firm - 
and two stores of value - money and inventories. Within the period 
there are random disturbances to supply and demand for labour and 
goods. Money and inventories interact together with the flow demands 
and supplies on the goods and labour markets to determine a short-run 
equilibrium. Wages and prices adjust only gradually toward their 
market clearing levels. Successive short run equilibria are linked 
by changes in inventories, wages and prices.
Inventories are accumulated as the result of an excess of 
output over sales to consumers. It is assumed that such sales of 
output are entirely consumed within each period; the inventories 
are owned exclusively by firms. Similarly money balances are held 
only by households.
For simplicity we assume, following Green and Laffont 
(1981) and Eckalbar (1985), that the firms always pays dividends 
equal to its profits. (It should be mentioned here that this
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formulation does not treat the role of firm's profits and their 
imputation back to the household sector in a consistent fashion. 
Implicitly any money balances accumulated by firms are immediately 
transferred back to the household sector, but these profits are 
not anticipated at all. Under competitive conditions, that is 
with many households, each of whom treats profit income as 
independent of their own actions, this formalisation is consistent 
with a 100% profits tax and a monetary policy designed to keep the 
nominal stock of money constant.)
Because firms wish to maintain some inventories 
part of planned production may be intended for inventory 
accumulation. An increase in inventory shocks is not by itself 
sufficient to indicate that firms could not sell all they wanted 
to. The actual variation in these stocks is a composite of the 
intended and unintended changes.
The wage and price setting process is conceptualised as 
follows. The expected market clearing levels for both wages 
and prices are known at the beginning of each period. Wages and prices 
are then assumed to adjust over time towards these values. Actual
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equilibrium values differ from their expected values because of 
unforeseen random shocks to the economy within the period. The 
conceptualization allows the possibility of serially correlated regimes, 
while modelling random shocks as essentially uncorrelated, and 
retaining the assumption that there is no adjustment of wages and 
prices within the period.
meet on the labour market, where consumers offer their Walrasian supply, 
J^S. We assume that this is a constant, thus:
function of the wage rate, wfc, the price level p^ ., and a spillover 
effect if the households are constrained in the labour market:
with consumption a normal good we have 3 -^ > 0 and 3 2 < °* It is assumed 
that 3Q > 0 and 3 3 K O* Fran assumptions A4-A6 we obtained:
By assumption A6 the household and the firm first
Ôo (5.1)
Household effective demand for goods, yfc, is assumed to be a linear
(5.2)
otherwise
(5.3)
thus in deriving (5.2) we have further assumed that:
tand
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The Walrasian demand for goods depends only on the wage rate and the 
price level, whilst the perceived quantity constraint on the supply 
of labour when the agent arrives on the goods market (¿t) is equal 
to the transacted quantity of labour, this is justified by the 
sequential nature of the model.
Turning to consider the firm, and ignoring inventories for 
the moment, it is initially assumed that labour demand, is 
determined by the firm planning to cover its expected sales, E(y^). 
Output is assumed to be solely a function of labour, y^ = Afc^ . It 
is assumed that the price of the good, p^, is always kept high enough 
relative to the wage, wt# so as to induce a positive output. Therefore
= a ' 1  [E(y^)] (5.4)
Substituting (5.2) into (5.4) and taking the rational expectation 
yields:
■ A 1 <&0 + By«,. + e2Pt) + a'1 e3u t - (5.5)
Again from assumptions A4-A6 we obtained:
-s ws. ,_ -s ws
*t = ^  + °2<yï - yP i£ yt < y’t
(5.6)
It is easily shown that (5.5) is consistent with (5.6). As the firm 
attempts to meet demand then the Walrasian supply of goods must equal 
the Walrasian demand for goods, thus:
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C  * »o + «l»t + »2*t
Further from the production function:
i f  “ t B2Pt)
this is the first term in (5.5).
Substituting for y"® in a2 <y® - y”®) yields a2 (ÿ® - BQ - B ^  - B2Pt). 
-sAs is the perceived sales constraint this equals the expected
demand for goods, which with rational expectations is given as
$o + ^iwt + &2pt + ^3 A^t “ At^  * Thus we obtain a2 ^ t  ” as the
-1 sspillover term, which corresponds to A 33 U t - *t) in (5.5).
As already stated the resulting supply of goods can only be:
s
yt (5.7)
Upon introducing inventories equations (5.4) and (5.7) are modified 
as follows:
‘ t  "  A’ 1[E(y^) + S* - st l ]  (5.8)
and y® - Ait + St_x (5.9)
where is the amount of inventories carried over from the previous
*
period and is the desired level of inventory stock for this period. 
Equation (5.8) states that labour demand is now determined by firms 
calculating the amount of labour required to produce enough output to 
cover both expected sales and the desired inventory level. The
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effective supply of goods is now equal to the production within the 
period plus the beginning of period inventory level.
It is acknowledged that this function is very limited and ignores many 
of the possible determinants of the optimal inventory level. However 
it does have its advantages. First it is extremely easy to work with. 
Other functions for the optimal inventory level were examined, such as 
introducing both current and expected future wages and prices, but 
such modifications greatly increased the complexity of solving the 
model. Second since the desired inventory level is an increasing 
function of expected sales, it is in the spirit of the micro level 
inventory literature, see Schutte (1983). And third, it is at least 
roughly in line with the facts in that the actual stock sales ratio 
has been trendless for the past forty years.
Assuming, again, that firms have rational expectations and 
substituting (5.10) into (5.8) yields.
The transacted amount of labour (employment) is given as the minimum 
of labour demand and supply:
The optimal level of inventories is postulated to be:
(5.10)
** = A' 1  [a + <1 + b)y^ - St l ] (5.11)
lt = 1 ®) (5.12)
Similarly for the goods market we write:
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yt - min(yt/ y®) (5.13)
This last equation differs from Sneessens's equivalent equation which 
states that transacted goods equals the supply of goods. This difference 
is due to the introduction of inventories, now the supply of goods may be 
greater than the demand.
We now consider how inventories, wages and prices change over 
time. Actual inventories are accumulated as the result of an excess 
of output over sales to consumers, thus:
(5.14)
This equation implies that inventories cannot be negative, that is
firms are assumed not to accumulate back orders. Wages and prices
are assumed to be imperfectly flexible adjusting only slowly over time
* * *to their respective market clearing values wfc and pfc. wfc is that value 
of wages that is expected to clear the labour market and ensures that 
actual inventories equals planned inventories. Setting expected 
labour supply equal to expected labour demand yields:
A« 0 = E(y*) + S* - St _ 1
Using (5.10) we get:
(1 + b) E(y^) = A 6q + S , - a
Taking the rational expectation we get:
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rASo + st-i - a l rBo + S2pt '1
. (1 + b) Bx J 1 Bl J
Pt is that value of prices which clears the money market, where to close the 
model the money supply, M^, is exogenously determined and the nominal 
demand for money is a positive fraction of labour supply, c6Q . Therefore, 
we have:
(5.16)
As a first approximation to more complicated processes 
describing the dynamics of wages and prices we assume the following 
partial adjustment equations:
*(wt " Wt-1> 0 < X < 1 (5.17)
Pt = XP (pt " Pt-1) + Pt-l' 0 < Xp < 1  (5.18)
The model as described so far is fully deterministic. In 
order to make the model stochastic we introduce random shocks to the 
demand and supply functions on the goods and labour markets. Thus we 
rewrite these functions respectively as follows:
-d d (5.19)
-s
+ h2t (5.20)
13 7 -
-d d 3
Lt = £t + \  (5*21)
Et = *t + \  <5-22>
where Y^, Y^, L^, denote the resulting stochastic variables, and 
i = 1, ...» 4 represent the unique stochastic disturbance
term corresponding to its respective variable. It is assumed that 
these disturbance terms are independently distributed with the property 
that E(H£) = 0 for all i = 1, ..., 4. Although each of the H^'s 
are independent, due to the interaction of variables within the model 
this is not the case with the disturbance terms relating to the final 
stochastic variables (which take account of these interactions). To 
see this we write these final stochastic variables as follows:
d d 1
,d (d . 3
Lt ■ *t + Et
(5.23)
(5.24)
(5.25)
(5.26)
where upper case letters denote the resulting stochastic variable, 
composed of the deterministic variable (lower case letter) and the 
stochastic disturbance terms e£; i = 1, ...., 4. Due to the structure 
of the model the e^'s are related to the nt's, with the exact 
relationship depending, in general, on whether there is full employment
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or unemployment of labour. For example consider the firm's supply of 
goods. If there is full employment then from (5.9) we may write
Further from equation (5.20) we may rewrite this as:
Yst + n
2
t (5.27)
however this equation only incorporates the disturbance term
2uniquely related to the supply of goods (nfc)> ignoring the disturbance
4to labour supply vnfc). Substituting this disturbance into (5.27) 
we may write the final stochastic equation for the supply of goods as:
Yst + n
2
t
Yst + n
2
t
Thus we note that with full employment of labour
e2t + n
2
t
Alternatively if there is unemployment then the deterministic 
supply of goods is given by
Performing similar operations as previously we derive the final 
stochastic supply of goods as:
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Yst + n
2
t
Hence with unemployment of labour
e2t + «1
2
t
Corresponding relationships may be derived for each of the 
other supply and demand functions on the goods and labour markets. 
Table 5.1 shows the complete set of relationships between the e^'s and 
the nt's.
Table 5.1
Full Employment Unemployment
1
et "
1
*t « < 3 4i . 1B3lnt nt) + nt
2
£t " A\  + nt
, 3 ^ 2 
Ant + nt
3
'l
3
et “ nt
4 4 4
£t nt nt
This completes the specification of the model
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5.3 Short-run and long-run equilibrium
Having described the structure of the model we now examine 
the various types of short run equilibria, and the effects that buffer 
stocks have on these equilibria. It is recalled that in a two market 
disequilibrium model there are in general, excluding boundary conditions, 
four distinct regimes each identified by the relative magnitudes of 
effective demand and supply in each market. Whether all these regimes 
may be observed depends on the structure of the model, including both 
the inherent dynamics and the stochastic processes. For example 
Honkapohja and I to (1980) assume that the only shock to the economy is 
unexpected changes in the demand for goods (in our model this corresponds 
to nj) . As firms are further assumed to attempt to produce enough to 
cover the upper bound of demand fluctuation, if firms are not rationed 
in the labour market, then a stock out is impossible. This means that 
in their model the region of Classical Unemployment disappears. Sneessens 
(1981) and Eckalbar (1985) similarly, have models where goods supply cannot 
be less than demand for goods, and thus the only regimes possible are 
Keynesian Unemployment and Underconsumption. In Sneessens this is because 
the model is deterministic and there are no inventories of finished 
goods. In Eckalbar it is because he assumes that stocks are always 
sufficiently large for firms to be able to meet demand.
Within our model, however, all four regimes may be observed 
depending on the shocks that have disturbed the economy both in the 
present period and in previous periods. This is because all supply 
and demand functions for goods and labour are subject to random shocks, 
stock outs are possible, and wages and prices adjust only slowly 
towards their market clearing values. What then are the effects 
of introducing inventories as buffer stocks into a stochastic 
disequilibrium model? First, as mentioned in Section (5.1) their
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presence allows the possibility of Underconsumption as now the 
production function does not provide a unique relationship between 
transacted labour and supply of output. Second by eliminating seme 
of the rationing of the demand for goods the region of Classical 
Unemployment is reduced. Further, in this model, if there are no 
shocks in the present period then Classical Unemployment is impossible. 
This is proved as follows:
With excess supply in the labour market, supply of output (5.9) may be 
written as
Classical Unemployment is defined as:
2
t
Substituting in for from (5.8) yields
Taking the rational expectation of E(y^) gives us
With excess demand in the goods market we obtain the condition
Using Table 5.1 this condition may be rewritten as:
*
As St is always positive, if there are no shocks in the 
present period (i.e. = 0; i = 1, .... , 4) Classical Unemployment is
impossible. (The reason why Classical Unemployment is impossible in 
Honkapohja and Ito (1980), even allowing for disturbance within the
inventories to their desired level within the period, and is made use 
of in the next section when the dynamics and stability of the economy 
are considered.
Having examined the short-run equilibrium of the economy we 
now analyse the long run dynamic equilibrium. This occurs when 
wages, prices and inventories are equal to their respective long run 
equilibrium values, that is when the following equations hold 
simultaneously:
If any of these equations do not hold then there will be adjustments 
made by either wages, prices and/or inventories, even in the absence
* 1present period is clearly seen here. They assume that Sfc > nt and 
2 3 4nt = nt = \  = O.) This result is due to the firm planning to adjust
wt t
*= V - Aio * St- 1  - a
( 1 + b ^
a + bE (y£)
of disturbances, showing that the economy was not initially in long-run
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equilibrium. By suitable substitution and rearrangement we are able to 
derive the following necessary and sufficient long-run equilibrium 
conditions:
is single valued implying that there is a unique long-run equilibrium. 
Furthermore as the conditions ensure that all markets clear the long- 
run equilibrium of the model can only be the Walrasian equilibrium. A 
change in the money supply only affects the equilibrium values of 
nominal variables, real variables are unaffected in long-run equilibrium. 
This result is contrary to many previous disequilibrium models where 
wages and prices are assumed fixed, for example as in models presented 
by Honkapohja and Ito (1980) and Eckalbar (1985), (see Section 5.1).
Thus the introduction of wage and price adjustment toward their 
expected market clearing values rules out the existence of a long-run 
non-Walrasian equilibrium, hence the results of these previous models 
arenot robust in this respect.
(5.28)
(5.29)
Sfc = a + bA6Q (5.30)
Given a specific value for the money supply, M^,each of these conditions
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5.4 Regime switching and stability
Within this section the dynamic regime switching and stability
properties of the model are examined. The economy is supposed to 
experience random shocks to the supply and demand functions for goods
there are no further disturbances; the resulting dynamics are explored. 
First the regimes are defined with respect to real wage-inventory space. 
Second the dynamics are determined within each of the various regimes. 
Initially, for simplicity, it is assumed that the money market is
continually in equilibrium with the money supply fixed at MS, therefore 
* s
P t  = P t  = M - c 6 q .  Later this assumption is relaxed in order to 
derive general results.
The various short-run equilibrium regimes subsequent to the 
first period may be defined as follows:
Underconsumption (U)
, 4), in the first period, thereafter
From i 6Q < A 1  [E(y^) + - S ]
A6q + 8t - 1  - a < (1 + b) (SQ + 0jW-'t + B2Pt)
w
A6 + S. . - a - (1 + b)0 > o____t- 1 _______________<o 't t
t 01 ( 1 + b) 6,1
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P-»
Aä„ + St- 1 ( 1 + b)ß - <ß. B2)Pt
b)
(wt - Pt)> A«o + Sfc_ 1  - a - (1 + b)80 - (61  + ß2 )(Ms - c6o)
From ii $ + < A <5 t- 1
. )  < A6^ + S tt- 1 - (ßx - ß2)(M - cô0)
Repressed Inflation (RI)
i < ldt
il dyt
From 1 <wt - pt) > A«o + Sfc l - a - (1 + b) ßQ - <ßx + ß2> (MS c6„)
<w. p„) > Ai + - * (B,
-  1A6 -
Keynesian Unemployment (KU)
i »t - < i’
i i  yt  -  yt  < y®
Prom i 6q > A-1[«(y*) + S* - S ^ ]
"  A4o + St-i - » > U  + b)[eo + B1«t + +
As - £^) < 0 then
wt * A40 + St-1 - a - <1+b>8o - e2pt 
63 (1 + b)
<"t - Pt> < M 0 + St.1 - a - <1 + b)B0 - (B3 + B2)(MS - c«o)
From ii 0
+ Bi wt  + B2Pt  + W  l t> < A_1[E(yt> + <  -  s t . 1]
+ St-1 < A4o + st-l
Again as B3U t - < O then
w , < A 6 _  + S. , - 3 - R pt o t-1 o p2^t
<wt  -  pt ) < A io + s w  -  Bq -  (B i + s 2) (Ms -  cS0 )
'1
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As shown in Section (5.3) if there are no shocks to the 
economy within the present period then Classical Unemployment is 
impossible, therefore the three regimes considered above cover all the 
real wage-inventory space. These results are illustrated in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1
Having related the possible regimes to real wage-inventory
space we now consider the dynamics of the economy within this space
for each regime. This involves looking at the adjustment paths
of both the real wage rate and inventories.
As the real wage rate adjusts to correct the discrepancy 
* * *
between (w - p)fc and (w^ - pfc) ■ (w - p)fc when the money market
is in equilibrium, then the switching locus is defined as (w - p)fc =
*
(w - p)t» This locus can be seen from Figure 5.1 to be the boundary 
between the Underconsumption and Keynesian Unemployment regimes.
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Thus the direction of adjustment for the real wage rate may be 
determined with reference to which regime the economy is in; the 
real wage rate is falling in either the Underconsumption or Repressed 
Inflation regimes and rising in the Keynesian Unemployment regime.
These directional movements are represented in Figure 5.2 by the arrows. 
It should be noted here, or rather confessed, that this wage adjustment 
mechanism is counter-intuitive, with real wages rising when there is 
excess supply of labour and falling when there is excess demand. This
Figure 5.2
result arises because of the way the demand for labour has been 
modelled. Instead of deriving an optimal labour demand function it 
was assumed (following Sneessens, 1981 and Eckalbar, 1985) that firms 
attempt to always meet the demand for goods. Given this assumption 
labour demand is found by inverting the production function having 
substituted in for the demand for goods. In consequence, as the
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demand for goods is positively related to the real wage rate, the 
demand for labour also depends positively on the real wage rate.
If there is excess supply in the labour market, in order to restore 
equilibrium, there needs to be a rise in the wage rate so as to 
raise the demand for goods and hence the demand for labour. This is
a special case. In Chapter 6, in response to this result, an open 
economy model is developed where the demand for labour is more 
conventionally assumed, over a certain range, to depend negatively 
on the real wage rate. In that model wage rate dynamics accord 
with intuition. The present closed economy model is maintained for 
a number of reasons: (1) it seems the most obvious extension to a 
number of previous dynamic disequilibrium models developed in the 
literature (Honkapohja and Ito 1980, Green and Laffont 1981 and 
Eckalbar, 1985) and so is useful in testing the robustness of these 
models and the results derived from them; (2) it provides the basis 
for subsequent (open economy) models, where as noted above, the 
dynamics of wage adjustment accords with intuition; (3) many of the 
results concerning the dynamics of' inventories and output, regime 
switching properties, and the possibility of limit cycles, as well as 
the implications for government policy, derived from the present model, 
continue to hold in the open economy models developed in the next 
Chapter. Further due to the less complex nature of this model these 
results are easier to perceive and understand here than in later 
models.
Continuing to develop the dynamics of the present model, 
the adjustment of inventories is more complex than wages, as the 
dynamic process differs for each of the possible regimes. We first
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consider the dynamics for inventories when there is full employment 
s dof labour i.e. for the regimes of Underconsumption and
Repressed Inflation. As there is full employment of labour the end 
of period inventory level is determined by equations (5.1), (5.9) and 
(5.14) as
St - - yt ’ A6o + St- 1  ■ *t
s dFrom this equation if yfc = yfc < yfc then = o. Thus, when the economy 
enters the regime of Repressed Inflation inventories are immediately
reduced to zero as the demand for goods exceeds the available supply.
d sAlternatively in the case of Underconsumption yfc = yfc < yfc, and we 
may write the change in inventories as:
ist 5 St - St-1 - Aäo - 
Substituting in for y^ from (5.2) yields
4St - - 6o ■ ßlwt - e 2Pt (5-31)
setting this equal to zero and rearranging gives us the following 
locus:
The value of this locus equals the intercept term of the Repressed 
Inflation - Underconsumption boundary, which is greater than the intercept 
term for the boundary between the Underconsumption-Keynesian Unemployment
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regimes. From equation (5.31) we derive that 9ASfc/9(w-p)t = -3^ < 0. 
Therefore if (w-p)t is above the locus (ASt ■ o|f-t = yfc = y^) 
then As^ . > O . The directional movements are combined with the 
real wage adjustments in Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3
As already shown when the economy experiences Repressed 
Inflation inventories are reduced to zero. From Figure 5.3 
inventories remain at zero until the real wage rate falls to the value 
of [a6q - 3q - (3 ^ + 6 2 ) (MS “ c6Q)]3^1then the economy enters the 
regime of Underconsumption and inventories are built up, while the 
real wage rate continues to fall.
In order to complete the dynamics of the model we need to 
examine the behaviour of inventories when there is unemployment of
(J q
labour ^ < i.e. the economy is in Keynesian Unemployment. In
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this regime the end of period inventory level is given by:
St  ’ y j - y j - E<y*> ♦ <  - y*
With rational expectations this becomes:
The change in inventories is then given as:
Setting this equal to zero and substituting for from (5.10) gives 
us the locus:
U$ t = °|*t = *t> : a + bE(y^) - = 0
- a + b[eo + B1wfc + B2Pt + 6 3(ftt - **>] (5.32)
As on this locus Sfc = by definition, we may write employment
* t - \  ■ A_1tBo + Biwt + B2pt + B3U t ■ »t’l
«t = Bo + + ^ pt ~ B36o
A - 63
as:
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Substituting this into (5.23) yields
• + b <Bo + Bl"t + « 2 ^  + B3[Bo + BlMt + B2Pt * B36o |L A - 8 , J
- B,«„>
Rearranging this give us
(w-p)t = (A - 6 3) (St _ 1  - a) - (B0 - B3 60) -(Bx + B2 )pt
bAfT ¡T
Therefore the locus (ASt = o|lt = is given by (w - p)t
(A - B3> (S(._ 1  - a) 
bAiL
<Bo - B3 6q) - (B1  + Bj)(M- - ci0) (5.33)
By using the equation
<ASt |it = it) (5.34)
we can determine the directional movements of inventories when the 
economy is in Keynesian Unemployment and off the (ASfc = 0 | “ £^) locus. 
Substituting in for y^ from (5.2) and taking the rational expectation 
yields:
(4St |tt - »*) - a + b[B0 + B1w(; + B2Pt + BjU^ - 6Q) J - St _ 1  (5.35)
From (5.1), (5.2) and (5.11) we get:
- 154 -
(t? ' «o> = A_1[a + <1 + b) <B0 + ßxwt + ß2Pt)]- -
i - a (i + b>ev
Substituting this expression into (5.35) gives us (AStl = it) 
a + b [ßo t B1 wt + ß2pt] - S t l 
[ A'1» + A~X( ^ >  (B0 + V t 1 B2Pfc) - A~1st_1 - 6o I
1 - A - 1  (1+b) ß '
+ bß-
Differentiating with respect to w^ gives
9ASt/3(w - p)t = bßx + bß3A” ( 1 + b)ßx
i - A_:ia+b) b,
= bßx
1 - A'X(1 + b)ß 3
When b = A - ß3 this differential is undefined. Note also that when
i db = A - ß^ the locus (ASfc = O \i^  = ¿t) coincides with the locus
(A(w - p)t = o). We continue by arguing that b can be as close to 
A - ß3 as we choose but not equal to it.
If b < A - ß3 then the (ASt = o|£t = £^ ) locus cuts the
(A(w-p)t = 0) locus from below and 9ASt/9(w - p)fc> O. In this case 
if (w-p)t is above (ASfc = o|£t = £^ ) then inventories are being
accumulated, while if below they are being run down.
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If b > A - 6 3 then the (AS^ . = O = £^) locus cuts the 
63
(A (w - p)fc = 0) locus from above and 3ASfc/3 (w-p)fc < 0. Here if 
(w - p)fc is above (ASfc = O |£t  = S,^) then inventories are falling, 
while if below they are rising.
The complete dynamics of the model for b < A -
are shown in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4
Figure 5.4 shows that there is a unique long-run equilibrium 
at E. This is always the case and can be shown as follows. If we 
set the (A(w - p)fc = 0 ) locus equal to the (ASt = o|£fc = fc®; yfc = y^)
locus we obtain:
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A6q + S , - a - (1 + b) B„ - (Bx + B2> (MS - c6q)
(1 + b) ex
= A60 - B0 - <BX + B2> <mS * c Bo)
SI
<AS0  - a + Sfc_1) = A5q 
(1 + b)
St- 1  = a + bAio = St
* dAs the condition st  ^= st always holds along the (ASfc = 0 |£fc = i,fc)
locus this proves there is a unique long run equilibrium. This
confirms the result found in Section 5.3. However is this unique
long run equilibrium stable? By examining Figure 5.4 we can see that with
b < A - g^ the long run equilibrium, E, is globally stable, although
*3
the actual path to the equilibrium, may be complicated. Indeed the 
economy may initially move away from equilibrium before converging 
upon it. For example if the economy is initially experiencing 
Underconsumption with the real wage rate above its long run equilibrium 
level and inventories near to their equilibrium value, then both 
real wages and inventories will begin to fall before increasing back 
to the long run equilibrium, via. Keynesian Unemployment, with the 
real wage rate undershooting its long run value.
Figure 5.5 illustrates the complete dynamics for the
economy when b > A - g^ .
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From Figure 5.5 it is clear that the dynamic path the economy 
follows is further complicated when b > A-B^ •
Figure 5.5
The directional arrows indicate that in general the
economy will oscillate around the equilibrium, E. However it is not 
clear whether these oscillations will be dampened, explosive or of 
constant amplitude. Assume that the economy is initially at A in 
Figure 5.5, on the boundary between Keynesian Unemployment and 
Underconsumption. The dynamics of the model will take the economy 
into the Underconsumption regime and the solid curve shows the path the 
economy would follow if the regime of Underconsumption were the only
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operative system. By Routh-Hurwitz this path would eventually converge 
upon the long-run equilibrium. (This is shown in Appendix 2.)
At point B though the system of Keynesian Unemployment becomes 
operative. This system may carry the economy back to A, as shown 
by the broken curve, thus forming a limit cycle, beyond the limit 
cycle (the economy is unstable) or within the limit cycle (the economy 
is locally stable) . When b > A - 6  ^ the economy may be either
S3
locally stable or unstable, depending on the parameters of the model. 
From this analysis it may seem that a limit cycle only occurs for an 
improbable small subset of the parameter space (points on a line) .
This,however, is not true, due to the non-negativity of inventories 
and stabilizing influence of the Repressed Inflation regime. If 
the economy is locally unstable with explosive oscillations, then a 
slight deviation from the equilibrium causes the economy to oscillate
away from the equilibrium. Eventually the economy will move into the
s dRepressed Inflation regime. Within this regime, because y^ < y^, 
inventories are reduced to zero, while the real wage rate falls.
The real wage rate continues to fall until it equals the value of 
s
A 6q - + &2^M “ c<^  when the economy switches to the Under-
Bi
consumption regime! Once again the economy will oscillate around the 
equilibrium, until it enters the Repressed Inflation regime, where the 
process is repeated. As the economy continually returns to the boundary 
between Repressed Inflation and Underconsumption with inventories
zero it is clear that the economy exhibits a limit cycle.
Note also that the economy may form a limit cycle even if the 
equilibrium is locally stable. This will be the case if the economy
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experiences Repressed Inflation and the dynamics, although locally 
stable, return the economy to this regime. Therefore for this 
model the parameter space has a significant subset in which cycles 
are certain. The paths of inventories, employment and real wages 
over this cycle are shown in Figure 5.6.
Having examined the behaviour of the economy for when 
b < A - 3^and when b > A - B3 we can now comment on why this
~TT
condition is so important for the stability of the economy. From 
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 it is clear that it is the dynamics within the 
Keynesian Unemployment regime that are crucial in determining the 
dynamic behaviour of the economy as a whole. Further it can be 
shown that the condition b < A - B^cletermines the stability of
this regime within the period, and that it is related to the traditional 
Keynesian demand multiplier condition for stability. To illustrate 
this we examine the multiplier effects of an increase in the demand for 
goods on the labour market.
Within the regime of Keynesian Unemployment we may write
* t  = = A~1 (a  + <1+b>[ Bo + B j« ,. + B2Pt  + B3 U t - 6  Q>] - s t _ j}
Suppose there is an increase in y^, represented by an increase 
in This has the effect of increasing ^  and thus employment, and
this in turn causes y^ to further increase. Whether or not this process 
converges or diverges depends on whether b is greater than or smaller 
than A -3 3
~ * r
From the previous equation we derive that:
a”1 (1 +b) 3 3*
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Setting this equal to unity and rearranging yields the 
condition b ■ ^
3
Similarly when b < A - 33 then 9 £fc< 1, and 
__3
when b > A - B3 then 3£^ /3fct> 1. Thus when b < A - 02 the
successive increases in employment and demand become smaller and 
smaller, with the progression converging. When b> A - 3^
the increments in employment and demand become larger, causing the 
regime to be unstable.
Throughout this section we have, so far, assumed that 
the money supply is constant and that prices are set at their 
equilibrium level. This assumption is now relaxed. With prices 
adjusting according to equation (5.14) when out of equilibrium the 
stability results derived below continue to hold. While prices are
Figure 5.6
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adjusting toward their equilibrium level the real wage rate changes, 
this in turn causes the nominal wage to adjust. However when 
prices eventually converge upon their equilibrium value, which is 
assured, then the analysis and stability results derived above are 
appropriate. Obviously a change In the money supply has short-run 
effects on the path the economy pursues (this is further analysed in 
Chapter 7), but has no effect on the stability of the economy.
This analysis has shown that explicit consideration of 
regime switching and inventory accumulation significantly affects the 
dynamics of a model. In particular, due to the stabilizing 
influence of the Repressed Inflation regime, an otherwise 
explosive model now exhibits a limit cycle. This analysis thus 
confirms the result found by Honkapohja and Ito, and Eckalbar, that 
for a significant subset of the parameter space limit cycles are 
certain. This previously derived result has been shown to be 
robust to the way wage and price adjustment has currently been
introduced into the model.
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5.5 Alternative wage and price adjustment (Model 5.2)
So far in this Chapter we have tested the robustness of
previously derived results by incorporating imperfect wage and 
price adjustment via equations (5.17) and (5.18). The adjustment 
processes implied by these equations were justified in Chapter 3, 
where it was shown that factors such as imperfect information, 
incomprehensive contracting, and "small menu" costs explain why 
wages and prices only adjust slowly toward their market clearing 
values. However this is not the only imperfect price adjustment 
mechanism. The alternative is to assume that wages and prices 
adjust in response to excess demand or excess supply, i.e. 
disequilibrium. Although this process has been argued to be ad hoc 
and incompatible with full rationality of agents, it is nonetheless 
useful to analysis the equilibrium and stability properties of our 
present disequilibrium model under this alternative assumption. 
Accordingly we replace equation (5.17) by the following:
with wages responding positively to excess demand in the labour market. 
Similarly (5.18) is replaced by:
(5.36)
O < A < 1w
(5.37)
O < A < 1 
P
with prices changing in response to excess demand in the money market.
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By replacing equations (5.17) and (5.18) by 
(5.36) and (5.37) respectively we can gain insight into how dependent 
the previously derived results are on our specific assumption of wage 
and price adjustment, and thus how important the specification of wage 
and price adjustment is in general. It is shown that the result 
that the long-run equilibrium is unique and that this is the 
Walrasian equilibrium still holds while the dynamics of the model 
and its stability properties are greatly affected.
Long-run equilibrium
With wages responding in accordance with equation (5.36) 
wages are stationary when the labour market clears, = L^.
Further as labour supply is fixed this gives us a unique condition 
which, ignoring stochastic disturbances, may be written as:
. R{o • a + St- 1  - (Bo + B2Pt) 
wt = (l+b)61
This condition is the same as (5.15). Similarly prices are 
s dstationary when giving us the equilibrium price level as
which is the same as (5.16). Finally the other long-run equilibrium 
condition relating to inventories is also unchanged being written as:
*
* a + bA<5 t o
With the equilibrium conditions for wages, prices and inventories 
unchanged it is clear that there is still a unique long-run equilibrium,
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and that this is the Walrasian equilibrium.
Dynamics
In order to analyse the dynamic properties of this revised
model we again initially assume that the money market is continually
* sin equilibrium, that is pfc = pfc = m - côQ . This is later relaxed 
so as to derive general results. As stated above the equilibrium 
conditions for inventories, wages and prices are still given by 
equations (5.10), (5.15) and (5.16) respectively, thus the 
division of real wage inventory space between the various possible 
short run regimes remains the same as in Section 5.4. Further the 
dynamics of inventories within each regime is unaffected by 
replacing (5.17) by (5.36). However, what does change is the 
dynamic adjustment of wages within the regimes. Now,because wages 
respond positively to excess demand in the labour market,we can 
derive the following conditions.
Aw^ > 0 if ^  > , that is in the regimes of
Repressed Inflation and Underconsumption, and 
d sAwfc < O if that is in the regime of Keynesian
Unemployment.
These directional movements are the opposite of those 
derived for when wages responded to equation (5.17) and adjusted 
toward their market clearing value. Taking this modification into 
account we redraw Figures 5.4 and 5.5 respectively as Figures 
5.7 and 5.8, that is initially for ^ < ^ ^3 and subsequently for
b > A -e3. 3
- 16 5 -
Figure 5.7
Figure 5.8
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By examining Figures 5.7 and 5.8 we see that altering the
wage adjustment process greatly affects the stability of the model.
Now for any given value of b the model has a "saddlepoint" solution,
that is there is a unique convergent path to the steady state
equilibrium at E. All other paths cause the economy to steadily
diverge away from the long-run equilibrium, a limit cycle is no
longer possible. Further as all the state variables are predetermined
the model exhibits saddlepoint instability. In order to overcome this
problem of instability we need to go back and alter the microeconomic
basis of the model by incorporating forward looking expectations, thus
allowing the possibility for the economy to jump on to the stable
manifold, SS. Here we make use of the comments already made in Section
5.1 concerning the role of expectations in determining a firms desired 
*
level of inventory holding, Sfc. It is recalled that in an optimizing 
model firms will vary their demand for inventories in response to changes 
in their expectations of future product demand and input costs. For 
example it is argued here that the demand for inventories will be 
high if firms expect real wages to rise and low if the 
expectation is that real wages will fall. In this particular case we 
would expect the desired stock level to depend positively on the 
expected rate of change in the real wage rate, e [a (w-p) t+^], where 
A(w-p>t + 1  = (w-p) - (w-p)fc. Incorporating this into (5.10) we
rewrite the demand for inventories as:
St = a + bE(y^) + cE[A (w-p) t+J] t c > 0
By assuming rational expectations the dynamics of the
*
model are greatly altered, as now, via changes in Sfc the economy 
can jump on to the stable manifold. Before discussing this however
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the regime switching loci will have been altered by introducing 
future expectations. This is most easily seen by first rewriting 
the desired inventory level as:
Sfc 3 a + bE(y^ ) 
where a 3 a + cE [A ( w - p ) ]
With this formulation we need only consider the effect of cE[A(w-p) 
on a in order to modify the previously derived regime switching loci. 
The following observations may be noted. When the economy is in 
Walrasian equilibrium then E[A(w-p)fc+^ ] * 0, and so a 3 a. Similarly
when E[A(w-p>t+^] >o then a > a and when E[A(w-p)fc+^ ] < 0 then
a < a. The degree to which a differs from a depends on the magnitude 
of E [Mw-p) which in turn depends on how far the economy is
*from equilibrium in the labour market (we are assuming that pfc 3 p . 
From these observations the phase diagrams may be redrawn by noting the 
effects of changes of a on the regime switching loci. Figure 5.9 
shows the resulting phase diagram for when b < A - A similar
3
diagram could be drawn for b > A - .
Figure 5.9 ^3
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Now the stable manifold is non-linear with a point of 
inflection at the Walrasian equilibrium reflecting the fact that
E[A(w-p)fc+1] becomes larger the further away the economy is from
d s *the locus. More importantly is that Sfc, and hence
wages are no longer predetermined. Stability requires that the agents
are not myopic but forward looking so as to ensure that the economy
is always be on the stable manifold, SS, converging toward
equilibrium. The process is as follows: Producers determine their
desired inventory holding with reference to the entire future real
wage adjustment path, and being rational they choose that level of
* *
that ensures stability. This involves choosing Sfc, which affects
the firms demand for labour, such that the real wage rate jumps on to
the stable manifold. Thus if the economy is initially off the stable 
*
manifold Sfc, and hence wages, will instantaneously adjust ensuring that 
the economy is on SS. The economy is now stable.
*
What are the consequences of relaxing the assumption pfc = pfc?
With prices responding to excess demand in the money market then
convergence of the price level to its equilibrium value is assured,
and the above analysis is little affected. Now if the economy is out
*of equilibrium then producers again choose so that the economy is
*stable. This they do by setting at a level such that when prices 
do reach their equilibrium level the economy is on the stable manifold 
converging toward Walrasian equilibrium. This process is illustrated
in Figure 5.10, where it is assumed that b < A -6  ^ and that the
63
*economy is initially at A with pfc > pfc.
- 169 -
Figure 5.10
Given the inherent dynamics of the model at A the wage rate will
fall and so will the price level (hence the movement of the real wage
rate is ambiguous) while the stock of inventories will also be reduced.
In Figure 5.10 we have assumed that at A the price effect dominates
the wage effect and so the real wage rate increases, causing the
economy to diverge away from equilibrium at E. In order for the
economy not to pursue this divergent path the wage rate needs to
initially fall, so that the economy moves to B. At B the price fall
still dominates the wage effect, so the real wage increases. As 
★
the price level approaches p^ so the wage effect dominates and the
real wage rate begins to fall. Point B, and hence the initial jump
*
in W , is chosen so that when pfc = pfc the economy is on SS, the stable 
manifold. In Figure 5.10 the economy jumps from A to B then moves
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along the path from B to C before converging along the stable manifold 
to E. The economy remains stable even when we relax the assumption 
that the money market is continually in equilibrium.
This section has been concerned to examine the consequences 
of modifying the wage and price adjustment processes on the existence 
and nature of long run equilibrium and stability. The analysis has 
illustrated the importance of wage and price adjustment. Although 
the considered modifications had no effect on the type and number of 
possible long-run equilibria, they were shown to have major 
consequences for the dynamic adjustment and stability of the model.
The developed model was only shown to be stable if the microeconomic 
basis was altered to allow agents to have forward looking expectations, 
otherwise it exhibited saddlepoint instability. This section has 
therefore underlined the importance of developing and testing various 
wage and price adjustment mechanisms, with the robustness of 
previously derived results concerning the possibility of limit cycles 
dependant upon the chosen specification of wage and price adjustment.
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5.6 Conclusions
This chapter represents a continuation of previous 
research concerned with analysing the properties of disequilibrium 
macroeconomic models that incorporate inventories as buffer stocks. 
Specifically the robustness of previous results, derived fran fixed 
wage and price models, were examined by introducing imperfect wage 
and price adjustment. Initially an extension of Green and Laffont's 
(1981) "anticipatory pricing" was used to represent wage and price 
adjustment, with wages and prices assumed to move toward their 
expected market clearing levels over time. Justifications for such 
imperfect wage and price adjustment include imperfect information 
and learning, contract theory, and the presence of costs of changing 
individual prices. This approach allows the possibility of 
serially correlated regimes, while retaining the assumption that 
there is no wage or price movement within the.period.
It was shown that for the model presented in Section 5.2, 
unlike those of Honkapohja and Ito (1980) and Eckalbar (1985), each 
of the four distinct regimes of Underconsumption, Repressed Inflation, 
Classical Unemployment and Keynesian Unemployment could be observed 
as the short-run equilibrium. Which regime is actually observed 
depends on the shocks the economy has experienced in both past and 
present periods. All regimes may be observed because all the supply 
and demand functions for goods and labour are subject to random 
disturbances, inventories may be reduced to zero, and wages and prices 
only adjust imperfectly. The main insights of this chapter, however, 
are related to the existence, nature and stability of the long-run 
equilibrium.
It is proven that there is a unique long-run equilibrium 
and that this is the Walrasian equilibrium, with all markets clearing.
This result is contrary to that derived by Honkapohja and Ito (1980) 
and Eckalbar (1985). For example, although Eckalbar's model 
exhibits a unique equilibrium, it is not, in general the Walrasian, 
and entails either full employment or unemployment of labour. Thus 
introducing wage and price adjustment toward their market clearing 
values rules out the existence of a long-run non-Walrasian 
equilibrium. However, such wage and price adjustment alters little 
the dynamics of the model, and specifically the stability of the 
long-run equilibrium. For simple aggregate models such as Metzler 
(1941) and Lovell (1962) the stability of the model is assured 
given that desired inventories are relatively small. However with 
a large demand for desired inventories (large b) the model is 
unstable, with these early models not taking into consideration 
either possible regime switching nor the non-negative of inventories. 
With these considerations this chapter has shqwn that for b > A 
the economy may be either stable or exhibit a limit cycle, ^3 
and that limit cycles are certain for a significant subset of the 
parameter space. For b < A - • the economy is stable. These
results confirm those found by Honkapohja and Ito, and Eckalbar.
Much remains to be done before we can pretend an explanation of 
inventory and trade cycles, but the approach followed here of 
studying regime switching within a disequilibrium framework seems 
promising. One area that justifies further research concerns the 
wage and price mechanism, as results are sensitive to which of the 
alternative processes is adopted. Thus as shown in Section 5.5 
when wages and prices respond to excess demand the dynamics and stability 
of the model are greatly altered, it being necessary to introduce 
forward looking expectations to ensure stability, otherwise the 
model exhibits saddlepoint instability. Under this specification

- 17 4 -
CHAPTER 6
DISEQUILIBRIUM OPEN ECONOMY MODELS WITH INVENTORIES AND 
PRICE ADJUSTMENT
This chapter extends the partial adjustment closed economy 
model developed in the previous chapter by introducing international 
trade. Firms are now allowed to export their output as well as 
supply domestic consumers and households consume foreign goods. 
International capital mobility ensures that the exchange rate and 
domestic interest rate jump instantaneously to their market clearing 
values. Wages and prices, however, are assumed to be predetermined 
at any moment in time, adjusting only slowly toward their equilibrium 
levels.
The open economy models developed here are used to test 
the robustness of results derived for the closed economy model.
It is shown that, in general, the results concerning the nature of 
equilibrium and stability continue to hold in the open economy models. 
In particular the only long-run equilibrium is the Walrasian one 
and limit cycles are still certain for a significant subset of the 
parameter space. This chapter is also useful in that it extends 
previous work on exchange rate determination.
Recent experience with floating exchange rates has generated 
considerable interest in the economic forces that determine the 
behaviour of exchange rates. Perhaps the most striking feature of 
recent exchange rate behaviour is the large, apparently random, 
changes in exchange rates that regularly occur over short intervals 
of time. This behaviour is difficult to reconcile with the notion
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that exchange rates adjust to slowly evolving changes in fundamental 
economic conditions. This exchange rate behaviour contrasts with 
goods prices which are autocorrelated. (For a summary of empirical 
regularities see Frenkel, 1981 and Mussa, 1979.) As a result 
exchange rate innovationstend to be associated with shocks to 
relative prices, implying deviations from purchasing power parity.
The different behaviour of the price level and the exchange rate can 
be explained in terms of models, like Dornbusch (1976), that recognize 
the possibility of sluggish price adjustment in the goods market.
In such an economy the exchange rate behaves as an asset price, 
adjusting instantaneously to "news". The different speeds of 
adjustment between the goods and asset markets implies that sustained 
shocks to the exchange rate will result in persistent changes in 
relative prices. An issue that deserves further study is the path 
that the goods price pursues. This path ultimately underlies the 
evolution of the exchange rate. This chapter does this within a 
disequilibrium framework by presenting models where wage, price, 
inventory, employment and exchange rate dynamics are integrated. The 
models also extend previous work on exchange rate determination by 
explicitly considering the rationing on both the goods and labour 
markets. In extended versions of the "basic" open economy model the 
regime switching dynamics of the goods and labour markets spillr-over 
to affect the exchange rate. This leads to the exchange rate exhibiting 
even greater deviations from its long-run equilibrium than previous 
models, such as Dornbusch (1976) and Flood and Hodrick (1983) predict.
It is even possible for the exchange rate to exhibit a limit cycle.
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In order to highlight the innovative features of our models, 
concerning exchange rate dynamics, in Section 6.1 we review earlier 
work on exchange rates, focusing on the role of sticky domestic 
goods prices and inventory accumulation in the Dornbusch,and Flood 
and Hodrick models. In Section 6.2 the "basic" open economy 
disequilibrium model is presented. The equilibrium, regime switching 
and stability properties of this model are also examined and compared 
with the closed economy results in this section.
Although the "basic" open economy model (model 6 1) is 
useful for analying the robustness of results derived from the partial 
adjustment closed economy model, and for aiding understanding of later 
results, there are two main criticisms that can be made of it. First 
it yields no new insights into exchange rate dynamics, with the path 
the exchange rate follows being the same as.that predicted by Dornbusch's 
(1976) model. Second a major problem concerning the dynamics of this 
model is that the resulting wage adjustment is counter intuitive, 
rising when there is excess supply of labour and falling when there is 
excess demand. In response to these criticisms two further models 
are developed. In the first (model 6,2) an alternative demand for 
money equation is employed so that the money market is no longer 
insulated from the goods and labour markets. As a consequence the 
dynamic path of the exchange rate is now more complex than that 
predicted by either Dornbusch's model or by Flood and Hodrick'■s model,
In the second extended open economy model the labour demand function is 
respecified such that the firms Walrasian demand for labour depends 
negatively on the real wage rate. With this modification wage 
dynamics are no longer counter intuitive and many of the previously 
derived results continue to hold, at least for certain parameterizations,
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Conclusions to the Chapter are presented in Section 6.5.
6.1 Price adjustment and the exchange rate
Modelsof exchange rate dynamics with sticky prices, as 
characterised by Dornbusch (1976), are direct descendents of the open 
economy IS-LM models developed by Fleming (1962) and Mundell (1968).
The Mundell-Fleming approach begins with a Keynesian economy 
characterised by rigid domestic prices and demand determined output; 
that economy is made open by introducing international trade and 
capital movements. Shocks to the goods and asset markets lead to 
once-and-for-all adjustments of the exchange rate rather than to a 
dynamic process of macroeconomic adjustment. These equilibrating 
exchange rate movements are in fact terms of trade changes which 
are maintained indefinitely even when the initial shock is 
monetary.
The static Mundell-Fleming model of exchange rate determination 
proved inadequate as an analytical tool in the inflationary environment 
of the 1970's. The dynamic Mundell-Fleming models, developed 
primarily by Dornbusch (1976) and Mussa (1977, 1982), extended the 
earlier framework in two important respects. First, while retaining 
the assumption that the nominal price of domestic output is fixed 
(i.e. predetermined) at any moment in time the dynamic models 
allow that price to adjust over time in response to deviations between 
aggregate demand and the full-employment level of output. Now a 
monetary expansion, for example, induces not only a temporary rise 
in output and a fall in the terms : of trade, but also an inflationary 
process in which the initial expansionary impact is dissipated and 
purchasing-power parity is restored. Second, the dynamic models
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endow market participants with rational expectations of exchange rate 
and price movements.
Both key features of these models: instantaneous asset 
market clearing and perfect short-run output price rigidity, are 
surely, extreme characterizations of actual market adjustment. 
Nonetheless, these polar extremes yield an analytically tractable 
model that highlights neatly the dynamic implications of different 
adjustment speeds between markets. The most celebrated implication 
of this type of model is Dornbusch's (1976) finding that when the 
price of domestic goods is sticky, the exchange rate may overshoot 
its eventual level in the short run response to a permanent change 
in the money supply. This result is now analysed drawing on the 
analytical framework developed by Dornbusch (1976), and 
in order to highlight the key points, the model has been simplified 
by suppressing many of the inconsequential details.
6.1 Sticky domestic prices and overshocking
It is assumed that the economy faces a given price of 
foreign output and a given world rate of interest, that domestically 
produced goods differ from foreign goods, and that the supply of 
output is fixed.
Let the demand for real balances depend on real income, Y, 
and on the rate of interest, and let the logarithm of the demand be 
linear in the logarithm of income, y, and the rate of interest, i. 
Equilibrium in the money market obtains when
m - p  = 0 y ^ b 1i (6 ,1 )
where m and p denote, respectively, the logarithms of the nominal
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quantity of money and the price level. Thus the equilibrium rate of 
interest can be written as:
i = b0y - b(m - p) (6 .2 )
The demand for domestic output, D, is composed of domestic 
demand and foreign demand. This demand can be expressed as the 
sum of total domestic absorption (domestic demand for domestic and 
foreign goods) and the excess of exports over imports (the trade 
balance surplus) . Absorption is assumed to be dependent on real 
income, while the trade balance is assumed to depend on the relative 
price of domestic and foreign goods. Total demand for domestic 
output can therefore be written as:
D = A(Y) + T(EP*/P) (6.3)
where A denotes domestic absorption, T denotes the balance of trade,
E the exchange rate (the price of foreign exchange in terms of 
domestic currency), P* the foreign price level (in terms of the foreign 
currency), and P the price of domestic output. For convenience, units 
are defined so as to equate the foreign price level to unity; therefore 
the trade balance may be viewed as depending on the real exchange rate, 
E/P.
Long-run equilibrium obtains when the demand for domestic 
output equals the fixed supply, that is when D = Y, In order to abstract 
from long run accumulation of foreign assets, it is assumed that in the 
long run the trade balance is zero. This assumption, made for
convenience, only implies that absorption equals the given level of
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output, A(Y) = Y. Proceeding with the log-linear specification, the 
trade balance is written as:
T * 5(e - p) (6.4)
where e and p are the logarithms of E and P respectively. Substituting 
(6.4) into (6.3) and recalling that A(Y) = Y, the demand for output is:
D = Y + 6 (e - p) (6.5)
The percentage change in the price level, p, is assumed to be 
proportional to excess demand (D - Y);
p = tt (D - Y) (6 *6)
where tt measures the speed of adjustment in the goods market, 
Substituting (6,5) into (6 .6) yields
p = a(e - p) (6.7)
where a = n6
At each moment in time, the price level is given, and 
its evolution is described by (6.7). The coefficient o is the 
product of two factors: n, the speed of price adjustment in the 
goods market and 6, the sensitivity of the balance of trade to the 
real exchange rate.
Equilibrium in the wcild asset market attains when the 
difference between the rates of interest on domestic and foreign
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securities, which are identical in all respects except for the 
currency of denomination, just equals the expected rate of change in 
the exchange rate. For example, when the domestic currency is 
expected to depreciate at the percentage rate n the long run equilibrium 
requires that:
i = i* + n (6 .8)
where i* denotes the rate of interest on assets denominated in 
foreign currency. It is assumed that expectations concerning the 
percentage rate of depreciation depend on the relationship between 
the equilibrium long run exchange rate E and the current rate E. 
Expressed logarithmically:
H = 6 (e - e) ; 0 >0 (6.9)
where e is the logarithm of E, and 0 denotes the expectations 
adjustment coefficient, the determinants of which, given rational 
expectations, are analysed below. Equation (6.9) states that when 
the long run value, e, exceeds the current value, e, individuals 
expect a depreciation of the currency toward e, that is the expected 
depreciation, n» is positive.
The equilibrium that is described in equation (6 ,8) is attained 
through the mechanism of arbitrage effected by the international mobility 
of capital. Dornbusch (1976) assumes that there is perfect capital 
mobility, thus the asset market clears instantaneously and the interest 
parity condition, equation (6 .8), holds continuously.
We are now able to analyse the equilibrium exchange rate 
and the relationship between the exchange rate, the price level and
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the speed of adjustment in the goods market. In the long run, 
given the quantity of money, the exchange rate equals its long run 
value and i = i*. Substituting i* for i in equation (6.1), the 
condition for money market equilibrium, the long run price level 
can be expressed as:
p = m + b_1 i* - tty (6 .1 0 )
To obtain the relationship between p and e it is noted that in the 
long run excess demand for goods is zero and therefore p = 0. It 
follows from (6 .8) that:
e = p (6 .1 1 )
As may be seen from (6.10) and (6.11), the system satisfies the 
homogeneity postulate; a given change in the money supply results in 
an equiproportionate change in the long run equilibrium price level 
and the exchange rate.
From (6.1), (6 .8) and (6.9) the money market is in 
equilibrium when:
bfify - b(m - p) - i* - (e «- e) = 0  
Using equation (6.10) this may be rewritten as
b(p - p) - 6 (e - e) = 0
Therefore
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e = e + e(p - p) (6 .1 2 )
where e = - (b/0) < 0
Equation (6.12) relates the equilibrium exchange rate to its 
long run value and to the discrepancy between current and long run 
prices. This is a reduced form relationship that holds at each 
moment in time. It should be noted that the price level and the 
exchange rate are inversely related, since e = -(b/0) < 0. It is 
indeed because they are inversely related that the exchange rate 
overshoots its long run equilibrium before converging toward it, in 
response to a change in the money supply. To examine this consider 
the effect of a monetary expansion. The relationship between 
the exchange rate and the price level is characterised in Figure 6.1
Figure 6.1
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In this figure the p = O schedule shows the combination of exchange 
rates and price levels for which there is no excess demand for 
domestic output. The schedule plots equation (6 .8) and its slope 
is unity. The equilibrium relationship between the price level and 
the exchange rate (which must hold at each moment in time) is 
summarised by equation (6.12) and is plotted as the QQ schedule. The 
slope of this line is £ \  and is negative.
To analyse the effects of a monetary expansion, consider 
an initial long-run equilibrium at point A, with pQ and eQ as the 
corresponding price level and exchange rate. Through point A passes 
a QQ line (not drawn) that corresponds to the initial quantity of 
money. A rise in the money supply raises the long run equilibrium 
combination from point A to point C. The initial QQ schedule moves 
to the right to the position shown in Figure 6.1. Upon the change in 
the money supply, the price level is given at its initial value pQ . 
Equilibrium in the money market requires that the exchange rate jump 
immediately to e^, and the short run equilibrium is attained at point 
B, with the exchange rate overshooting its long run value. As the 
price level increases towards its long run equilibrium the exchange 
rate falls back. The economy thus converges along the QQ schedule 
toward the long run equilibrium at C.
The impact effect of the monetary change can be analysed 
in terms of equation (6.12). By the homogeneity postulate dm = de = 
dp and thus, given the price level the short run elasticity of the 
exchange rate with respect to the money supply is:
de/dm ■ 1 - c - 1 + b/e (6.13)
and is greater than unity. It may be noted that the extent of over-
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shooting depends on the magnitude of 0 - the speed of adjustment 
of expectations, the determinants of which are analysed below. As 
is clear from (6.13), other things being equal, the short run 
elasticity gets closer to unity as the value of 6 increases, thereby 
reducing the extent to which the current exchange rate differs from 
its long run value. It is also evident that as long as 0 is not 
negative its magnitude is irrelevant for determining whether the 
exchange rate overshoots, and therefore, the analysis is consistent 
with a variety of assumptions concerning the formation of expectations. 
Dornbusch (1976) showed that in a model of perfect foresight the 
coefficient 0 cannot be chosen arbitrarily, but rather that it must 
be consistent with the structure of the entire model. Using (6.11) 
in (6.7) the rate of inflation may be expressed as:
The relationship between the equilibrium exchange rate and the price 
level that is described by (6.12) must always be satisfied. Therefore, 
given the long run values of e and p changes in the exchange rate and in 
the price level must be related such that:
o ct{(e - e) - (p - p)} (6.14)
and using (6 .1 2 ) this may be rewritten as:
P = a(l ~ 1/e) (e - e) (6.15)
oe (6.16)
Substituting (6.14) for p yield-
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i = o(l -e) (e - e) (6.17)
Equation (6.17) describes the actual change in the exchange rate, while 
equation (6.9) describes the expected change. It is clear that under 
perfect foresight, consistency requires that the two be equal and 
therefore:
9 = a(l - c) (6.18)
Substituting for e from (6.12) results in 
0 = a + ab/0
from which it follows that the coefficient of expectations can be 
obtained by solving the quadratic equation
2
0 -  a© -  ab = 0 (6 .1 9 )
From (6.19) the solution for 0 (obtained by taking the positive 
root) is:
0 - 1/2 [o + (a2 + 4ob)1/2 ] (6.20)
which expresses the coefficient of expectation as a function of the 
various parameters of the model, which in turn affect the extent the 
exchange rate overshoots its long run equilibrium.
So far in this section we have analysed the dynamics of 
exchange rates within a rational expectations model in which commodity 
prices adjust slowly, based on a simplified version of the model due to
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Dornbusch (1976). The effects of a once-and-for-all unanticipated 
change in the money supply have been analysed. A large number of 
extensions of the basic Dornbusch model have appeared in the 
literature over the last few years. For example the analysis can 
be extended to examine the effects of other parametric changes such 
as changes in output, the foreign price level, and the foreign 
interest rate. Similarly Wilson (1979) and Gray and Turnovsky (1979) 
have examined the effects of an anticipated future change in the 
supply of money or in another parameter. Thus, it can be shown that 
an anticipated future rise in the money supply induces an immediate 
adjustment of the exchange rate, which jumps, for example, to point D 
in Figure 6.1. The extent of the jump in the exchange rate is 
smaller than the change that would have taken place had the money 
supply been expected to rise at the present. Following the initial 
jump in e both the exchange rate and prices proceed to rise gradually, 
and their path converges to the new QQ schedule (corresponding to 
the new quantity of money) at the point in time at which the rise in 
the money supply actually occurs. Thereafter, the convergence 
proceeds along the new QQ schedule toward the new long run equilibrium. 
In this case, with perfect capital mobility, the path of prices will be 
monotonic, while the path of the exchange rate will exhibit a turning 
point, that is e will initially rise and then decline.
Other extensions to Dornbusch's basic model include Mussa 
(1982) who presents a stochastic presentation of the framework and 
Niehers (1977) and Frenkel and Rodriguez (1982) who study similar 
models in which some asset markets adjust slowly.
Despite the large number of extensions of the basic Dornbusch 
model, little has been done to examine the consequences of introducing 
finished goods inventories into a model of exchange rate determination.
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One noteable exception is a recent paper by Flood and Hodrick (1983). 
Their analysis is now considered.
6.1ii Inventories and exchange rates
Flood and Hodrick (1983) developed their model to match 
Dornbusch's with respect to initial effects of real and monetary 
disturbances. The dynamics of the Dornbusch model, though, result 
from slow price adjustment, while Flood and Hodrick's dynamics result 
from slow inventory adjustment. This divergence implies quite 
different adjustment paths for exchange rates and relative prices 
following initial impact effects. For example, a permanent increase 
in the money supply still causes the exchange rate initially to over­
shoot its long run value, but then, in contrast to Dornbusch's 
model, the exchange rate subsequently undershoots its long run value 
before approaching it from below, rather than directly from above. 
Consequently the dynamics of their model imply even greater gyrations 
of exchange rates than those implied by Dornbusch's model.
In Flood and Hodrick's model goods prices are set at the 
beginning of the period, prior to the revelation of actual values 
of the underlying disturbances. Thus prices are sticky in the 
sense that they do not respond as quickly to disturbances as they 
would if they were based on full information. Unexpectedly high 
demand is met at the pre-set prices with an increase in output and 
a fall in inventories of final goods held by firms. Because the 
demand for money in their model depends on expenditure, either a 
negative demand disturbance or a positive money supply disturbance will 
result in excess supply in the money market. In response to an 
unexpected increase in the money supply firms will be led to the
rational but mistaken inference that there has been a decrease in the 
demand for domestic goods, since they are assumed to only observe the 
equilibrating asset price response to the excess supply. Firms 
therefore lower their relative price below what be optimal with full 
information. As the ejqpected fall in demand for goods fails to 
materialize, the actual quantity demanded at the lower terms of trade 
is greater than firms anticipated. Firms respond by increasing output 
and reducing inventories. Output thus responds to unperceived 
monetary changes. As usual the fall in terms of trade occurs 
partly through a rise in the exchange rate. However the fall in 
inventories eventually causes an increase in the equilibrium terms 
of trade as firms rebuild their stocks; this increase occurs partly 
through a fall in the exchange rate. Thus after its initial rise 
at the time of the monetary expansion the exchange rate falls below 
its new long run equilibrium level and then rises monotanically to 
that level. In the Flood-Hodrick set up the persistent real 
effects of monetary shocks reflect the intrinsic dynamics of 
the model implied by the inventory adjustment process, causing greater 
deviations of the exchange rate from its long run value, than compared 
with a Dornbusch type model without inventories.
Within the Flood-Hodrick model persistence of output and 
exchange rate deviations from their long run values is due to 
inventories adjusting only slowly toward their long run equilibrium. 
Goods prices, however, are only away from their market clearing level 
within the period that the economy experiences an unexpected shock.
This is contrary to Dornbusch's assumption that prices adjust slowly 
over time. The model to be presented in Section 6.2 returns again 
to this assumption by assuming that prices only partially adjust toward
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their equilibrium values within any one period. The model differs 
from Dornbusch's by allowing firms to hold inventories. It is 
assumed that firms desire to restore inventories to their short-run 
equilibrium value within the period, and will only be prevented from 
doing so if they are rationed in the labour market. Thus our model 
reverses the speed of adjustment of prices and inventories, as compared 
with Flood and Hodrick's model. Our model also extends previous 
studies on exchange rate determination by explicitly considering 
rationing on both the goods and labour markets. In the extended 
model of Section 6.4 the disequilibrium on these markets disturb the 
money and foreign exchange markets with the result that the exchange 
rate exhibits even greater deviations from its long run level following 
a shock than earlier models predict. Indeed it is even possible, 
within that model, that the exchange rate form a limit cycle.
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6.2 The Model (Model 6.1)
6.2i Introduction
This section presents an extension of the closed economy 
disequilibrium model developed in the previous chapter by introducing 
international trade. Now firms export their output as well as 
supply domestic consumers and households consume foreign goods. 
International capital mobility ensures that the money market is 
continually in equilibrium with the exchange rate and domestic 
interest rate allowed to jump instantaneously to their market 
clearing levels. Wages and prices, however, are assumed to be 
predetermined at any moment in time, adjusting only slowly toward 
their equilibrium values.
As with the closed economy model the assumptions employed 
by Sneessens (1981) are used to derive the following effective trade 
offers. The effective trade offers of consumers are the Walrasian 
supply on the labour market and the Benassy demand on the goods market. 
The effective trade offers of producers are the Benassy demands on the 
labour market and the Dreze supply on the goods market. In describing 
the model we do not formulate the maximization problems of the agents 
in the model, but simply postulate piecewise linear behaviour functions. 
They should be regarded as plausible outcomes of expected profit 
and utility maximization. In order to make the model tractable we 
impose a linear structure on the demand and supply functions. All 
variables are measured in logarithms.
6.2ii Mathematical specification
Consider an economy that consumes two distinct goods: 
domestic goods (which may be exported) and imported goods. The 
general price level, p^ ., is a weighted average of the domestic money
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price of these two goods:
d fPt - opt + (l-o)(et + pfc) | O < o <1 ( 6 . 21 )
where p^ is the price of the domestic good (in terms of domestic 
currency), p^ is the price of the foreign good (in terms of foreign
currency), efc is the exchange rate defined as the price of a unit of 
foreign currency in terms of domestic money, and a is the elasticity of the 
general price level with respect to the domestic output price (a is 
assumed to be a constant). The relative price of domestic goods in 
terms of imported goods is:
demand and foreign demand. Given that conditions in foreign 
countries are unchanged, demand for domestic goods is assumed to 
depend on the relative price of domestic goods to imported goods, 
qfc, the domestic real wage rate and a spill-over effect from the 
domestic labour market if there is unemployment. This demand 
function is assumed to be of the form:
supply. The 6's are constant coefficients, it being assumed that
between imports and exports we are able to adopt the "large country
( 6 . 22)
Demand for domestic goods, yfc, is composed of domestic
(6.23)
where wfc is the nominal wage rate, employment and the labour
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assumption" as used by Cuddington (1980), the economy faces a downward 
sloping export demand curve, i.e. the demand for exports is less than 
perfectly elastic. In the market for imports the economy is assumed 
to be small and unrational, but we admit the possibility of world 
excess supply or demand for the exportable good. With this 
assumption we allow the possibility of disequilibrium in the goods 
market without having to include non-traded goods (though the 
present model can be easily reworked into a tradeables-non-tradeables 
framework). For greater discussion of the "large country assumption 
see Section 4.3.
Turning to the labour market it is assumed that firms attempt 
to meet expected demand, E(y^), and cover their desired inventory 
level, S*. Labour demand is determined by inverting the 
production function. With the production function Qfc = A£fc, where 
Qt is output, then labour demand, is written as:
= A_1 [E(y^> + SJ - St l] (6.24)
where is the beginning of period inventory level. It is
assumed that the desired inventory level is dependent on the expected 
demand for goods and is written as:
SJ = a + bE(y^) ; a, b > 0 (6.25)
Substituting (6.25) into (6.24) yields:
* £ - A*1 [a + U+b)E(yJ?> - St_x] (6.26)
The Walrasian supply of labour is assumed to be constant, thus:
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t 6o (6.27)
The transacted quantity of labour is the minimum of labour supply 
and demand
*t - min <l£, 1®) (6.28)
The supply of domestic goods, y®, is the quantity of goods domestic 
firms have available for sale, and consists of present period 
production and the beginning of period inventory level, thus:
y
s
t (6.29)
As in the labour market the transacted quantity of goods, yfc, is the 
minimum of supply and demand.
yt = min(yfc, yfc) (6.30)
The beginning of period inventory level is given by the excess of 
supply of goods over sales in the previous period, hence:
(6.31)
In the money market, equilibrium requires that the demand 
to hold domestic money equal the stock of domestic money available 
to be held; that is
t - k ®, n > o* + Pt + ni£ (6.32)
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d swhere Mfc is the nominal money demand, Mfc, the nominal money supply, 
i^ is the domestic interest rate, and k is assumed to be constant.
Another requirement of assets market equilibrium is implied by the 
assumption that domestic securities, with forward cover are perfect 
substitutes for securities that pay the (exogenously given) world 
nominal interest rate, i^. Hence the domestic nominal interest rate 
is linked to the world nominal interest rate through the interest 
parity condition:
4  - + *t <6-33)
where is the percentage forward premium on foreign exchange 
which is assumed to equal the expected rate of change in the exchange 
rate. This equilibrium is attained through the mechanism of 
arbitrage effected by the international mobility of capital. (The 
possibility that the forward premium is influenced by a risk premium 
is ignored. For discussion on this issue of risk premium see 
Kouri, 1976 and Stockman, 1978).
It is assumed that expectations concerning the percentage 
rate of depreciation depends upon the relationship between the equilibrium 
long-run exchange rate, efc and the current rate efc. Hence:
0t = 0(®t " et) * 6 > 0 (6.34)
where 0 denotes the expectations adjustment coefficient. Equation 
(6.34) states that when the long-run value efc exceeds the current 
value e^ individuals expect a depreciation of the currency toward e^, 
that is the expected depreciation, 0^, is positive. Due to spatial
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arbitrage it is assumed that in the long run the law of one price 
holds, there being no tariffs or transport costs. Thus the long-run 
exchange rate, efc, is determined in accordance with the purchasing 
power doctrine, offsetting differences in national price levels:
The strategic assumption of the model is that asset markets clear 
continuously whilst wages and prices adjust only slowly over time, 
admitting the possibility of disequilibrium in the goods and labour 
markets. With the asset markets clearing continuously both the money 
market equilibrium (6.32) and the interest parity condition (6.33) 
hold at all times due to the equilibrating movements in the domestic 
interest rate and the exchange rate.
f
e t (6.35)
In the long run, given the quantity of money, the exchange
rate equals its long-run value and i^ = i^. Substituting i^ for 
difc into equation (6.32) and equation (6.21) for pfc the value for the 
long run price level of domestic goods is expressed as:
p£ -[*•“ - k + ni* - (1 -o> <ït + p*)]o_1
Noting equation (6.35) this may be rewritten as:
(6.36)
The actual price of domestic goods, p^, is assumed to adjust over 
time toward this long run value, according to the equation:
(6.37)
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where is the partial adjustment coefficient for domestic prices.
Similarly wages are assumed to adjust over time toward that 
level that would simultaneously clear both the goods and labour 
markets, hence
(6.38)
where A is the partial adjustment coefficient for wages, and w* the w t
equilibrium wage rate. By equating (6.27) with (6.26) we get:
A6q = a + (1 + b)E(yj|) -
Taking the rational expectation of E(y^) from equation (6.23) 
and rearranging yields the equilibrium wage rate:
_ A6P - a * St-1 -[6o  + 6lpt * B3lpt ■ (6-39)
t (l+b)61 Bi
To close the model we need to determine the instantaneous exchange 
rate, efc.
In the short run the price of domestic goods is predetermined 
and thus the current exchange rate deviates from its long run value 
whenever p^ ft p^, so as to clear the money market. Equilibrium in 
the money market is given as:
“ k + + (1 - o) (efc + p^ ) - ni* - n8(et - et>
Substituting in for et from (6.35) and rearranging yields the current 
exchange rate
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■ [
(l + ne) <M® - k + ^  - op^
]-
f (6.40)ne + (1 - o )
The model as described so far is fully deterministic. As with 
Model 5.1 in order to make this model stochastic we introduce 
random shocks to the demand and supply functions on the goods and 
labour markets. Thus we rewrite these functions respectively as 
follows:
where upper case letters denote the resulting stochastic variable, 
composed of the sum of the deterministic variable (lower case letter)
that these disturbance terms are independently distributed with the
The model described above has three broad markets, an asset
market, a goods market and a labour market. The asset market is 
kept continually in equilibrium due to international capital mobility 
causing the exchange rate and domestic interest rate to instantaneously 
adjust to their market clearing levels. By distinguishing between
(6.41)
s (6.42)
(6.43)
(6.44)
and the stochastic disturbance term, e*, i = 1 , 4 .  It is assumed
property that E(e*) = 0 for all i = 1 4
6.2ii Equilibrium and dynamics
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exportable and importable goods and adopting the "large country 
assumption" we admit the possibility of excess supply or demand for 
exportables, due to imperfect wage and price adjustment. With the 
labour market also able to experience disequilibrium there are, as with 
the closed economy model, four short run equilibrium regimes, each 
identified by the relative magnitude of effective demand and supply 
for domestic goods and labour. Whether all of these regimes may be 
observed depends on the stochastic structure of the model with respect 
to the inherent dynamics and the stochastic processes. Because all 
the supply and demand functions for labour and domestic goods are 
subject to random shocks, inventories can be reduced to zero, and 
wages and prices adjust only imperfectly each of the four regimes 
may be observed, conditional on the disturbances that the economy 
has experienced in present and past periods.
domestic prices and inventories need to be at their long-run values, 
as given by equations (6.39), (6.36) and (6.25) respectively. By 
appropriate substitution these long-run equilibrium values may be 
written as:
For the economy to be in long-run equilibrium then wages.
(6.46)
(6,45)
S. = a + bAÔt <o (6.47)
As with the closed economy model these conditions are, 
given the value of the money supply, M®, single valued, thus there is
only one long run equilibrium. Furthermore, as these conditions entail
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market clearing in ail markets,this unique equilibrian is the Walrasian 
one. Also fran these equilibrium conditions we see that this model 
satisfies the homogeneity postulate; a given change in the money 
supply results in an equiproportionate change in the long-run equilibrium 
values of nominal variable, real variables remain unchanged.
properties of this model we follow the general methodology employed 
in Section 5.4. First the dynamics of the model are explored under 
the restrictive assumption that the domestic price level is at its
analyse the consequences of relaxing this assumption and allow prices 
to be out of equilibrium.
its long-run equilibrium value implies that the exchange rate and the 
domestic interest rate are also in long-run equilibrium with e^. = efc
In order to examine the regime switching and stability
long-run equilibrium level, p^ = p^ = M® - k + i^. Second we
By initially assuming that the domestic price level is at
and i£ = i* respectively. With these variables in equilibrium the 
complexity of the model is reduced and may be written as follows:
- A*’1[a+ (1+b)E( Y^) - St l] +
Lt = min(Lj), L®)
Y* =t
2
t
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. . s d. Y t * min(Yt , Y t>
St - Yt
where - Bq+ 8 3^  * BQ + P? * <®t * pf> 
and pt = op^ + ( 1 - o ) (efc + p*)
The structure of this model is identical to that of the closed economy 
*
model when pfc = pfc. Therefore the general results obtained in 
Section 5.4, derived under this assumption continue to hold true 
for this model. In particular this open economy model is either 
stable or exhibits a limit cycle, and the parameter space has a 
significant subset in which limit cycles are certain.
We now consider the consequences of*allowing domestic prices 
to be out of equilibrium. Although the short-run dynamics of the 
model are affected, due to price and exchange rate movements, and 
the resulting effects on other variables, the long-run dynamic results 
previously derived still hold true. This is because the equilibrium 
value for the domestic price level (as well as for the exchange rate
and the domestic interest rate) is unaffected by movements in the
dgoods and labour markets, and therefore will e/entually converge 
upon its long-run value in accordance with (6.37). In the long-run 
the condition that p^ = p^ always holds and hence the results derived 
under this restriction are valid for the long run. The economy is 
either stable or exhibits a limit cycle, with both these possibilities 
occuring for a significant subset of the parameter space. The 
short run dynamics of this model are further explored in Chapter 7 
when the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy in both the short-
and long-run is assessed.
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In conclusion the results derived for the closed economy 
model relating to equilibrium, both short-run and long-run, and 
stability continue to hold true, and are therefore robust to the 
introduction of international trade, as undertaken in this section.
It should be restated here, however,that two main criticisms can be 
made against this model. First it yields no new insight into 
exchange rate dynamics, with the path the exchange rate follows being 
the same as that predicted by Dornbusch's (1976) model. Second a 
major problem concerning the dynamics of the model is that the 
resulting wage adjustment is counter intuitive, rising when there is 
excess supply in the labour market and falling when there is excess 
demand. In response to these criticisms we present two extended 
models, the first deals with the former criticism (and aids understanding 
of the final model) whilst the second extended model meets both of
these criticisms.
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6.3 An alternative demand for money equation (Model 6,2)
As previously stated one of the main reasons for developing 
the open economy models of this Chapter was to gain further insight 
into exchange rate determination. The way the model has been 
presented so far, however, has yielded no new insights into exchange 
rate dynamics, with the path the exchange rate follows being the same 
as that predicted by Dornhusch's (1976) model. This is because the 
money market is insultated from the goods and labour markets.
Although adjustments in the money market affect the goods and 
labour markets, there is no corresponding feedback, and hence the 
exchange rate is unaffected by disequilibrium regime switching and 
inventory movements. If this assumption that the goods and labour 
markets have no influence on the money market is relaxed then price 
and exchange rate adjustments are further complicated.
There are many ways in which the goods and labour markets 
may be thought to affect the money market. Here it is assumed that 
due to transaction purposes the demand for domestic money is linearly 
dependent on the expected demand for domestic goods. Thus the 
condition for equilibrium in the money market now becomes:
=  ko +  P t  + kjEiyj!) + = M® (6.48)
By introducing this specification for the demand for money 
the model becomes much more complex. Now the dynamics within the 
goods and labour markets spill-over to affect the money market. With 
the exchange rate instantaneously adjusting so as to clear the money 
market, by incorporating E(y^) into the demand for money the dynamic 
path of the exchange rate is aiiected. For example suppose the
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econoray is initially out of Walrasian equilibrium then the economy will 
in general oscillate around full employment either converging toward 
it or forming a limit cycle. Given these oscillations in employment, 
and also the demand for domestic goods, with imperfect price adjustment, 
the demand for money and the exchange rate will also oscillate around 
their long-run equilibrium values. The dynamic path of the exchange 
rate is now more complex than that implied by the Dornbusch model.
The dynamics of our model also significantly differ from Flood and 
Hodrick's (1983) model; there an increase in the money stock causes 
the exchange rate to again initially overshoot its long-run value, 
but then it subsequently undershoots this level and approaches from 
below rather than directly from above. It is evident that the 
dynamics of our model imply even greater gyrations of the exchange 
rate than those implied by Dornbusch's model or Flood and Hodrick's 
model. Exchange rate oscillation in our model is the result of 
interaction between the money market and regime switching on the 
goods and labour markets, caused by imperfect wage and price adjustment 
and inventory movements. These results are further confirmed in Chapter 
7 when we analyse the effectiveness of government economic policy.
By developing this integrated disequilibrium model of wage, 
price, inventory and exchange rate determination we have gained 
further insight into the dynamic path of domestic prices which 
underlies the evolution of the exchange rate. This has led to the 
exchange rate exhibiting greater deviations from its long-run 
equilibrium than previous models predict. It is even possible for 
the exchange rate to exhibit a limit cycle.
Because of the resulting complexity of the model when 
equation (6.32) is replaced by '6.48) in order to further examine the
- 20 5 -
dynamics, stability, and also the effectiveness of government policy 
in the next Chapter, when the economy is out of Walrosian equilibrium, 
it is necessary to use computer based numerical simulation techniques.
Numerical simulation
Hie reason why simulation techniques are needed to further 
analyse the dynamics of the present "extended” model is due to the 
limitations of traditional comparative static methods. First, 
comparative static results are often indeterminate in sign, 
therefore implications are rather inconclusive even at the qualitative 
level. Second, with the demand for money equation given as in 
equation (6.48) stability analysis becomes extremely complicated, if 
not an intractable exercise, due to the feedbacks from the goods 
and labour markets to the money market. Thife is further complicated 
due to the basic disequilibrium nature of the model. In principle, 
in order to prove stability, one needs not only to prove that 
adjustment within each regime is stable, but also that the dynamic 
process must be stable as the economy moves from one regime to 
another. This introduces problems due to the non-differentiability 
and discontinuity of the differential equations describing the 
adjustment process at the boundaries between regimes. Third, 
these traditional methods tell us relatively little about the time 
profile of adjustment paths. Indeed it may be argued that the 
two extreme equilibria usually analysed are themselves of limited 
economic interest. Hie instantaneous equilibrium is too short in 
that it allows insufficient time for relative feedbacks to occur; 
the steady state equilibrium is often too long, in that it takes a 
prolonged time to be reached. Yet it is precisely the nature of the 
intermediate transaction that many feel is of prime interest and the
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traditional methods provide little insight into this aspect of 
the adjustment process.
In using simulation methods we follow the pioneering work 
of Nguyen and Turnousky (1979, 1983), Camilleri et al., (1984), and 
Whittaker et al., (1986). In these papers simulation techniques 
have been used to supplement the traditional comparative static 
methods to investigate the behaviour of dynamic macroeconomic 
models. Thus simulation methods have proved useful in providing 
additional information on the dynamics of a model. In particular, 
some of the indeterminacies of the comparative statics can be 
eliminated or at least reduced with sane confidence; more definite 
indications of the stability or otherwise of the system can be 
obtained; the time path of adjustments can be traced out thereby 
providing further insights into the transitional paths and how much 
time is required for an equilibrium to be reached.
In order to simulate the dynamic behaviour of the model we 
need to construct in a consistent manner a set of plausible parameter 
values from various empirical and statistical sources. An alternative 
approach was to estimate the model before simulating it. However 
estimation of a disequilibrium rational expectations model of the 
size and complexity considered here would obviously require separate 
and prolonged treatment. Our concern has been to examine the 
dynamic behaviour of an essentially theoretical model, and the 
adopted simulation approach should be viewed as an aid to the analysis. 
In constructing our basic parameter set we have where possible taken 
the parameter values used by Whittaker et al., (1986) which in turn 
were taken from a version of the Treasury macroeconomic model 
(Treasury, 1980) . In some case the form of their model equations
was incompatible with our own model and so we resorted to "informed
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guesswork". In this process various empirical and statistical sources 
were consulted, and the values chosen are as realistic as such 
casual empiricism allows. They are not necessarily chosen from 
empirical studies of disequilibrium models, nor any other particular 
assumption in our model. The results obtained are subjected to sensitivity 
analysis by considering alternative parameter sets in an attempt to 
consider how specific to a given parameterisation our results maybe, 
and hence to make our conclusions more general. It is recognized, 
however, that sensitivity analysis cannot prove in any sense that the 
chosen parameter values are "true" values, nor that the conclusions 
derived are completely general.
For all parameter sets the steady state output is scaled 
at 1000 units. Initial wages and the domestic price level are set 
at unity, the initial foreign price level is equal to one half, 
implying that the exchange rate also initially equals one half. The 
initial value for the economic aggregates in the basic set were selected 
by considering their corresponding proportions relative to national 
income implied by official statistics. Government expenditure is 
assumed to comprise of 40% and imports 25% of national income. The 
ratio of the money supply to national income in the basic set is 
assumed to be 1 0 %. The basic parameter set together with each 
parameters' plausible range is given in Table 6.1.
An implicit constant term is adjusted in the equation where 
necessary to ensure that the equations are compatible with initial 
Walrasian equilibrium. Further it is assumed that inventories 
in Walrasian equilibrium comprise of 1% of national output. Therefore 
the constant term a in equation (6.25) is determined by the equation:
a = (0 . 0 1  - b)y (6.49)
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Table 6.1 Parameter values for the open economy model
Parameter Equation "High" "Basic" "Low"
6i (6.23) 1.0 0.9 0 . 8
6 2 (6.23) 0.9 0.5 0.0
B3 (6.23) -0.5 - 0.4 -0 . 2
A (6.24) 1.0 0 . 8 0.4
b (6.25) 1.0 0.9 0 . 8
ki (6.48) 0.5 0 . 2 0.05
n (6.48) -0 . 8 -0.5 -0.3
Our numerical analysis of stability involves disturbing 
the model from Walrasian equilibrium and observing the resulting 
dynamics of the economy. To begin this is done with all parameters 
set at their basic values. Subsequently we attempt to mark out the 
stable parameter space by putting one parameter at a time to its 
value at either end of this range, while keeping all the other 
parameters at their basic values. These experiements are undertaken 
under the alternative assumptions that first Xp = 0 . 8  and Xw = 0.4, 
second Xp = 0.4 and Xw = 0.2, and also whether the economy is open 
or closed. (When the economy is closed then o ■ 1, $3 = 0 and n = 0.) 
Results are presented in Table 6.2.
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Table 6.2 Stability under alternative parameter sets 
(s = stable, L = Limit cycle)
Parameters varied 
from basic set
Xp = 0.8, \w = 0.4 XP = 0.4, Xw = 0.2
Open Closed Open Closed
None = Basic set s s s s
8r - High s s s s
- Low s s s s
02 - High s s L L
- Low s s s s
8, - High s s s s
- Low s s s s
A - High s s s s
- Low s s L L
b - High s s s s
- Low s s s s
kx - High L s L s
- Low s s s s
H - High s s s s
- Low s s s s
- ? 1 0 -
From Table 6.2 it is seen that in many cases the models 
are stable, there being only six accurances of either model exhibiting 
a limit cycle, from a total of sixty experiments. However it is 
instructive to note when these limit cycles occur.
First, five limit cycles occur when Xp = 0.4 and Xw = 0.2, 
whilst only one of the limit cycles occurs when Xp = 0.8 and Xw = 0.4. 
This indicates that as the adjustment coefficient for. wages and 
prices increase the economy is more likely to be stable. This 
accords with intuition.
Second when Xp = 0.4 and Xw = 0.2 the economy exhibits a 
limit cycle if 3^ is high and A is low. Indeed with Xp = 0.4 and
Xw =0.2, the economy exhibits a limit cycle when b > p2. in
B2Chapter 5 it was shown, under the assumption that = 0, that when 
this condition was met the economy would oscillate around its long 
run equilibrium, either converging toward it or forming a limit cycle. 
The observations in Table 6.2 confirm that this condition is still 
important for determining the stability of the economy when kj> 0 .
Third when k^ equals 0.5 then the open economy model 
exhibits a limit cycle while the closed economy remains stable (other 
parameters are set at their basic values). From this observation 
it appears that, in general, introducing both the demand for (domestic) 
goods into the demand for money equation and making the economy open 
leads to the economy being less stable, increasing the probability that 
the dynamics of the model will produce a limit cycle.
From the observations in Table 6.2, therefore, it may be 
argued that the critical determinants of stability are whether the 
economy is open or closed, whether b is less than or greater than
1*A -8 2» and the values of Xp, Xw and k. Importantly the result that
for a significant subset of the parameter space limit cycles are 
certain continues to hold true for both the open and closed models 
when the demand for money depends upon the demand for goods.
- 2 1 2 -
6.4 An alternative demand for labour equations (Model 6.3)
In the previous section we extended the "basic" 
open economy model by incorporating the expected demand for domestic 
goods into the demand for money equation. This implied that the 
money market, and hence the exchange rate, was no longer isolated 
from the goods and labour market dynamics. This caused the exchange 
rate to exhibit greater deviation from its long-run equilibrium than 
previous models predict. It is even possible for the exchange rate 
dynamic to form a limit cycle. Thus model 6.2 met the first 
criticism levelled against the basic open economy model. However 
the second criticism made against that model still applies, that is 
the resultant wage dynamic is counter intuitive. As stated in Chapter 
5 this problem arises because of the way the demand for labour has 
been modelled. Instead of deriving an optimal labour demand function 
it has been assumed (following Sneessens, 1981, and Eckalbar, 1985) 
that firms attempt to always meet the demand for goods. Given this 
assumption labour demand is found by inverting the production 
function having substituted in for the demand for goods. In 
consequence, as the demand for goods is positively related to the 
real wage rate, the demand for labour also depends positively on the 
real wage rate. If there is excess supply in the labour market, 
in order to restore equilibrium, there needs to be a rise in the wage 
rate so as to raise the demand for goods and hence the demand for 
labour. This is a special case. In this section we examine the 
consequences of more conventionally assuming that the demand for 
labour, over a certain range, depends negatively on the real wage
rate.
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With the production function exhibiting diminishing returns 
the firms Walrasian demand for labour will depend negatively on the 
real wage rate. Thus we may write this Walrasian demand as:
iWt = A_1[*o • zl (wt ■ Pt>l
How is this demand for labour modified when the economy is out of 
Walrasian equilibrium? From Section 4.2iv it is recalled that given 
the underlying assumptions of the present disequilibrium rationing 
model the effective trade offers of producers on the labour market 
are of the Bënassy type (see Sneessens, 1981, for a formal proof 
of this). If the constrained goods supply, due to insufficient demand, 
y^, is less than y ^  producers will have to account for the fact that 
it will be almost impossible for them to sell more than y®.
Accordingly producers will only seek to employ the amount of labour
_s —s ws d — ]_ rrequired to produce yfc. Thus when yfc < yfc then 4^ = A [E(yfc) +
S* " st • (In deriving this demand function we have continued to
assume that firms attempt to maintain a desired inventory level
of S*, ^ being the present inventory level carried over from
~s > ws d -Ifthe previous period.) Alternatively when yfc - yfc then 4fc = A [
zo - 2l (wt - V  + S‘ - St-J'
Incorporating these modifications into the existing open
economy model we may rewrite the model as follows:
Pt * + (1 - a)(et + p^)i 0 < a <1
d . . f.
qt = Pt - <et + Pt>
yt _ Bo + Bl (wt - pt> + 82 U t - *t> + 63qt
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yt = min(y^, y®)
r  = 6t O
*t ■ A'1[zo - zl(wt - pt> + Sî - St-13
iff zo - z1(wt - pt> - y^
" A_1[8o + ßl(wt - pt> + ß2U t - lt> + ß3qt + Sî * St-1]
iff zo - z1 (wt - pt) > yt
it = min(ft, )
d d sMt - k + pt + nit - Mt
0t = (et - et)
d , , d* d d
pt ” V Pt - pt-l> + pt-l
St - a + bE(y°)
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It is clear that in the above model, as the demand for labour 
is no longer uniquely related to the demand for goods, that when the 
wage rate is at its Walrasian equilibrium level this does not ensure 
that both the goods and labour markets clear simultaneously. It is 
now necessary to allow the price level to adjust (via changes in the 
domestic price level) so as to clear the goods market. As the goods 
market is influenced by labour market dynamics, which in turn influences 
the money market, inorder to study the dynamic and stability properties 
of this model we need to simultaneously consider inventory, wage, price, 
and exchange rate movements. As with Model 6.2 given the resulting 
complexity of this model analysis requires the use of computer based 
numerical simulation techniques.
In setting up the computer based model the following dynamic 
assumptions were employed. Wages were assumed to partially adjust each 
period to that level that would clear the labour market. If the firm 
expects to be unconstrained in the goods market then wages adjust towards 
the level where
*
o
Alternatively if producers expect to be constrained in the goods
market then w* is determined so that
A6o
'i
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Similarly domestic prices are assumed to partially adjust 
toward that level which would clear the goods market with neither 
consumers nor producers rationed in that market. If there is full 
employment of labour the resulting equilibrium domestic price level 
satisfies the following equation
Bo + V wt ' Pt> + B3qt - A5o + St-1 + Si
Alternatively if there is unemployment of labour then p^ is determined 
so that:
z o -  z l ( wt  -  pt > = eQ + e1 (wt  -  P t ) + e2 ( f t  -  + B3qt
Finally the exchange rate is assumed to adjust instantaneously 
to clear the money market. The long-run equilibrium exchange rate, 
efc, is determined so that when both wages and prices are simultaneously 
at their Walrasian equilibrium levels then the money market also 
clears with efc = e^, that is i^ = i^. Thus efc is determined from 
the following equation:
= k + PJ + ni*
d sgiven that
This completes the specification of this extended model. In 
order to implement the numerical simulation technique a plausible 
parameter value for needs to be adopted. Instead of employing 
a unique value for we have chosen two values z^ = 0.8 and z^ = 0.4
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to cover a broad range of acceptable values. All other parameter 
values are set at their basic set values (see Table 6.1) unless 
otherwise stated. As with the previous model, inorder to assess 
the sensitivity of the model to a particular parameterization we vary 
the values of the other parameter values one at a time in accordance 
with Table 6.1. The results of this stability analysis are given 
in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3 Stability under alternative parameter sets 
(S = stable; L = Limit cycle; U = Unstable)
Parameters varied 
from basic set
Xp = 0.8 Xw = 0.4 Xp = 0.4 Xw = 0.2
zx = 0.8 = 0.4 zL = 0.8 z^ = 0.4
None S S U S
» i  * High S S U S
- Low S S U S
«2 - High S S U S
- Low U U U S
63 - High S S U S
- Low U L U U
A High U S U S
- Low L S U S
b High S S U s
- Low S S U s
n High S S u s
- Low S S u s
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As can be seen frcm Table 6.3 depending on the parameter 
values the model is either stable, unstable or exhibits a limit 
cycle. It is noteworthy that limit cycles are still certain for 
a significant subset of the parameter space, showing that this result 
derived earlier is robust to the current changes in the way labour 
demand is modelled. It is also the case that the dynamic adjustment 
path of the exchange rate, within this model, following a once and for 
all disturbance to the economy is often more complex than that 
predicted by earlier models. In particular when the economy exhibits 
a limit cycle the exchange rate dynamic also forms a limit cycle.
These gyrations, as with the previous model, are due to the interaction 
between the money market and regime switching on the goods and labour 
markets, cuased by imperfect wage and price adjustment and inventory 
movements.
A difference between this present model and earlier models 
is now that the economy may continually diverge away from equilibrium.
In previous models the economy was prevented frcm exploding by inventory 
stock outs causing the economy to form a limit cycle. In this 
model it is possible under certain parameterizations for the economy 
to explode with inventories, wages and prices ever increasing. These 
instances of instability are a cause for concern. It should be noted, 
however, that if the parameters are such that the economy will explode 
agents will modify their behaviour to avoid this occurring. For 
example if agents attempted to set prices in accordance with their 
long-run Walrasian values instead of their short-run market clearing 
values then the instances of explosive instability would disappear 
for the range of parameter values used in Table 6.1, with the economy 
now being either stable or exhibiting a limit cycle.
How do these modifications to the way labour demand is 
modelled affect specifically the dynamics of the wage rate? As 
the Walrasian labour demand function is negatively related to the 
real wage rate, wage adjustment to clear the labour market is no 
longer counter intuitive when the economy is near equilibrium.
Now when there is unemployment of labour wages fall and when there 
is full employment wages either remain constant or rise. This is 
confirmed by Figure 6.2, where the dynamic paths of wages, prices, 
exchange rate and employment are shown following a once and for 
all reduction in the money supply of 10%. (Parameter values are 
set at their basic values with Xp = 0.8; Xw - z^ = 0.4) . Following 
the reduction in the money supply at the beginning of the first period 
employment immediately falls before gradually rising back to its 
full employment level (indexed at unity). Wages, on the other hand, 
fall continuously toward their new Walrasian equilibrium level 
(also indexed at unity) . Thus by allowing Walrasian labour demand 
to depend negatively on the real wage rate, wage dynamics are no 
longer counter intuitive, whilst many of the previous results
derived from earlier models continue to hold.
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6.5 Conclusions
In this Chapter we have presented three open economy 
disequilibrium models incorporating imperfect wage and price 
adjustment and inventories with the aim of testing the robustness of 
results derived for the closed economy, to provide further insight 
into exchange rate dynamics and to meet criticisms made of earlier 
models. In general results derived for the closed economy continue to 
apply within these open economy models. In particular the only long- 
run equilibrium is the Walrasian one and limit cycles are still certain 
for a significant subset of the parameter space.
This Chapter has extended previous research on exchange rate 
determination by examining exchange rate dynamics within an explicit 
disequilibrium model. In extended versions of the "basic" open 
economy model the exchange rate is influenced by regime switching 
on the goods and labour markets and inventory fluctuations, causing 
the exchange rate to exhibit greater deviations from its long-run 
equilibrium than previous models have predicted. This research has 
thus gone some way further in explaining the recent experience of large 
fluctuations in exchange rates over short intervals of time.
Finally in Model 6.3 by allowing firm's notional demand 
to depend negatively on the real wage rate, the resulting wage 
dynamic is no longer counter intuitive when the economy is near Walrasian 
equilibrium. In this respect this final model is an improvement over 
previous models, but the cost of this improvement is an increased level 
of complexity, with each market now interdependant and wage adjustment 
alone no longer able to clear both the goods and labour markets 
simultaneously. Given the complexity of Model 6.3 the earlier models, 
although criticized because of their counter-intuitive wage dynamics# 
are seen to be useful in aiding understanding of results that persist
in this final model.
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CHAPTER 7
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY
One of the main motivations behind the research undertaken 
for this thesis was the author's belief that many of the New Classical 
macroeconomic policy conclusions are unrealistic, being derived 
from the false assumption that all wages and prices are perfectly 
flexible. In previous Chapters we have developed alternative 
models to the continual market clearing Walrasian models by allowing 
wages and prices to adjust imperfectly. In particular in the last 
two Chapters we have presented and analysed five dynamic disequilibrium 
models with quantity constraintsf two closed economy models and three 
open economy models. For each of these models we assumed only 
two representative agents, consumers and firms, we have not as yet 
incorporated a public sector. In this Chapter this omission is 
rectified by showing that a government sector can be introduced into 
the existing models in a consistent fashion. This is done primarily 
so that we can analyse the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy 
to influence certain economic variables. It is demonstrated that 
within our disequilibrium models not all the New Classical policy 
conclusions are valid.
In Section 7.1 we introduce the public sector into the 
existing disequilibrium models. Also in this Section we show that 
within our models the government is, in general, unable to 
influence the long-run Walrasian equilibrium values of real variables. 
The government can only affect nominal variables in the long-run.
This is a New Classical policy conclusion. In Section 7.2, however, 
we investigate the dynamic short-run consequences of fiscal and
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monetary policy and show that contrary to New Classical results the 
government can systematically control the path of real variables.
This result is demonstrated for the partial adjustment closed 
economy model (Model 5.1) and for the three open economy models.
This result is not dependent upon the government having superior 
information in comparison with other agents, nor on the necessity of 
misleading other agents, nor on assuming the formation of non-rational 
expectations, but rather is the direct result of introducing 
imperfect price adjustment and allowing for the consequent quantity 
adjustments. It is also shown that the government can use its 
policy effectiveness to achieve certain economic objectives. For 
example the government can, if it has perfect information and perfect 
control of its policy variables,eliminate unemployment in every time 
period. The corollary of this statement is that the government, by 
incorrect policy formulation, may cause unemployment and undue 
output fluctuation. These results are obviously very keynesian 
and contrary to New Classical results.
By way of comparison to these results, and again to further 
assess the importance of wage adjustment we analyse the effectiveness 
of government policy within the model presented in Section 5.5 
(Model 5.2). There instead of assuming that wages and prices adjust 
toward their market clearing level it was assumed they respond to 
excess demand in their relevant market. This alternative wage and 
price adjustment process was shown to greatly influence the dynamics 
and stability of the model, there now being a saddlepoint solution.
It is recalled that in order to ensure stability the structure of the 
model was further changed allowing agents to have forward looking 
expectations so that the economy could jump instantaneously on to the 
stable manifold. These adaptions to the model influence the
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effectiveness of government policy. This is examined in Section 7.3 
Conclusions to the Chapter are given in Section 7.4.
7.1 Long-run consequences of government policy
It is assumed that the government has two direct influences 
on the economy. The government consumes goods, Gfc, thus affecting 
the demand for goods, (in the open economy models it is assumed for 
simplicity that the government only buys domestic goods) , and it 
determines the stock of money in each time period, M^. From these 
two influences we may distinguish between fiscal and monetary policy. 
Fiscal policy is where the government solely changes its expenditure 
on domestic goods, financed by borrowing from abroad, leaving the 
money supply unaltered. (This method of financing a budget deficit 
is merely used to simplify the model, and thus the long-run 
implications for foreign debt accumulation are* not considered.) 
Monetary policy is where the government changes the money supply 
mediated by a temporary change in public expenditure.
What are the immediate and direct consequences of these
policies?
As already noted the immediate consequence of fiscal 
policy is to alter demand for domestic goods. For example if the 
government increases its own expenditure, y^ also increases 
represented as a change in Bo. Thus:
Ay^  = ABo = AGt
The immediate and direct consequence of monetary policy is 
to change the stock of money in the economy and also to change the
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demand for domestic goods, as there is a temporary change in public
A change in the money supply always has a direct positive effect on 
the demand for domestic goods. We can state therefore that the 
direct affect of both fiscal and monetary policy is to change the 
demand for domestic goods, with monetary policy also affecting the 
stock of money in the economy.
also has the immediate, though indirect, affect of changing the exchange 
rate, with the exchange rate moving instantaneously to clear the 
money market. This change in the exchange .rate further affects 
the demands for goods. These affects are considered in the next 
section, when the short-run dynamic consequences of government policy 
are examined. Before this we analyse the long-run (equilibrium) 
affects of government policy. These affects may be stated very 
briefly. In both the closed and open economy models output is 
constrained by the labour supply and equilibrium entails full 
employment, thus neither fiscal nor monetary policy can affect 
equilibrium output. Indeed the government has no influence on the 
equilibrium values of any real variables, (except for the real wage 
rate in the closed economy models) , and can only effect the
expenditure . Thus we may write:
Aßo = t
For the open economy models a change in the money supply
equilibrium values of nominal variables. For example, for the
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open economy models we may note that from (6.35), (6.36) and 
(6.39) that:
AM® - Ap* - Ait - A^ = Ait
thus the economy satisfies the homogeneity postulate; a given change 
in the money supply (monetary policy) results in an equiproportionate 
change in the long-run equilibrium price level, exchange rate and 
wage rate, leaving all real variables unaffected. Considering only i 
equilibrium states our results are the same as derived from New Classical 
models; the government can in general, affect only nominal variables 
not real variables, and the only long-run equilibrium for the economy 
is Walrasian. Whilst the latter conclusion is true for the 
disequilibrium models developed in this thesis, the former is not 
universally true. New Classical macroeconomics states that 
systematic government policy is ineffective not only in the long 
run but also in the short run. Contrary to this result government 
policy in these disequilibrium models is able to have important 
short run effects on economic variables and thus the path the 
economy pursues over time. This result is true even though 
expectations have been assumed to be rational, and does not depend 
on the government misleading other agents, but specifically results 
from not assuming perfect price flexibility. We now consider these 
dynamic affects of fiscal and monetary policy respectively.
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7.2 Dynamic consequences of government policy
7. 2i Fiscal policy
In the previous section it was shown that the immediate 
consequence of a change in fiscal policy is to change the demand for 
(domestic) goods, this is represented as a change in 6q. In assessing 
the short run effectiveness of fiscal policy we first examine the 
results of changing 3q for the partial adjustment closed economy model.
It is recalled that this model is characterised by three 
regime switching loci in real wage-inventory space. These loci are 
reproduced here for convenience:
(A (w-p) t « o): (*-p)t
a4o + st-i - • - <1 + M  80 
8 1 ( 1 + b)
<6, + B,> (M -  c i  ) 
1 2  o ■
ft«o ' 6o ' <61 + *2* (“S " cS o’ 
(ASt  -  0 | l t  = y fc -  y^ ) : (w -  p ) t  -  6^
(ft - 6,) (S, * a) - (6o - B3So>
(ASt  = 0 | « t t) ! <w-p)t bflB,
Differentiating each of these loci by gives us the 
same value of - Consider an increase in government spending
which raises the demand for goods
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by the amount A8Q > O. As < O then all three regime switching
loci shift downward by ^ 0/3 ,^ while their slopes remain unaffected 
These affects are shown in Figure 7.1, where we have assumed that
Figure 7.1
Figure 7.1 shows that as the demand for goods increases 
so the Walrasian equilibrium falls vertically from E to E', leaving 
all long-run (equilibrium) real quantities unchanged. To consider 
the dynamic consequences of this policy it is assumed the economy 
is initially in Walrasian equilibrium at E. Following the 
expansion in demand the economy enters the regime of Underconsumption,
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or if the increase in demand is great enough Repressed Inflation.
A However theThese results remain the same if b >
consequent dynamics depend on the stability of the economy, and hence
A ” 8whether b is less than or greater than p 3. From Figure 5.4
A - 8 ^3when b < p 3 both the real wage rate and inventories will begin
to fall and the economy will move into the regime of Keynesian Unemployment
i
before converging to the new equilibrium at E . From Figure 5.5
if b >A__%  then the economy will oscillate around the new
B3
equilibrium either converging upon it or forming a limit cycle 
around it. In this case all the disturbed economic variables 
oscillate around their new equilibrium levels with either dampened 
amplitude or form a limit cycle. Thus although government fiscal 
policy cannot affect equilibrium real quantities except for the real 
wage rate it can influence the path these variables pursue over time.
This conclusion is also valid for the "basic" open economy models.
For the "basic" open economy model fiscal policy only affects 
the goods and the labour markets, with the price level and exchange 
rate remaining at their long-run equilibrium levels. Thus the 
effects of fiscal policy are the same as for Model 5.1. Although 
the government is able to influence the dynamic path of real variables 
in both these models, the desirability of any particular fiscal 
policy depends on where the economy is. If the economy is away 
from equilibrium, say experiencing Keynesian Unemployment, then the 
government, through appropriate fiscal policy can hasten the return 
to full employment and Walrasian equilibrium. Indeed if the 
government has perfect knowledge regarding the structure of the 
economy, the stochastic shocks that disturb the economy, and also 
perfect control of public expenditure and taxation, then by altering
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dyfc it can continually ensure full employment. This optimal path for 
government spending will differ according to whether the 
economy is closed or open. For the closed economy model we may derive 
this optimal control path for fiscal policy by setting labour supply 
equal to its demand. Thus from equation (5.1), (5.11), (5.25) and 
(5.26) we get:
+ e* = A_1[ a + (1 + b)E(y^) - S ] +
Substituting in the rational expectation of from (5.2) yields:
V Et “ A_1 [a + (1+b) (6o + 6lWt + B2Pt> • St-1] + Et
where 3 ^  is the variable determined by fiscal policy in order to 
maintain full employment of labour. Taking the change in variables, 
substituting AGfc forA8Qt and rearranging gives us
A G „ * «0  + AEt - 4Et> - 3 + ASt l _ (BjAwt + 82Apt ) (7.7)
(lib)
The corresponding "optimal" path for government expenditure for
the "basic" open economy is:
AG. = A(So + BE£ - AEt> ’ 3 + ASt-l _ [B1 (Awt - Apt) + B3qt] (7.8)
(1+b)
For the open economy model the government's fiscal policy needs to 
respond to the terms of trade in order to ensure full employment.
Thus, although the effects of fiscal policy are the same, the "optimal” 
path for government expenditure (and taxation) differs between these 
closed and open economy models.
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The main conclusions regarding the effectiveness of fiscal 
policy have already been derived from models 5.1 and 6.1. Although 
fiscal policy cannot in general, affect the Walrasian equilibrium values of 
real variables, it can have important and beneficial affects on 
the path these variables pursue. In particular, through "optimal" 
use of fiscal policy the government can, under certain conditions, 
maintain full employment at all times, by following appropriate 
demand management rules. These conclusions remain valid for the 
extended open economy models (Models 6,2 and 6.3). To illustrate 
the effectiveness of fiscal policy within these models we initially 
present four policy simulations derived from the numerical techniques 
developed in Chapter 6. For each simulation the economy was set in 
Walrasian equilibrium and then subjected to a policy shock at the 
beginning of the first period. Further it i6 assumed that 
Ap = 0.4, Xw = 0.2 and (for model 6.3) = 0.4, all other parameters
are set at their basic values as given in Table 6.1. Figure 7.2 
shows the resulting dynamic path of the economy following a 0.2% 
increase in public expenditure and taxation for Model 6.2, while 
Figure 7.3 shows the response to a 0.2% reduction in this policy 
variable - Figures 7.4 and 7.5 show the corresponding simulations 
for model 6.3.
All four simulations show that in the long-run the exchange 
rate, wage rate, domestic price level and employment level converge 
upon their new Walrasian equilibrium values (all indexed at unity) .
In the short-run, however these variables deviate from their Walrasian 
values. In these two models the money market and foreign exchange 
market are interdependent with the goods and labour markets. The 
resulting interaction between those markets cause the dynamic
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consequences of fiscal policy to be more complex than previous models.
For example now the domestic price level and exchange rate also vary 
in response to the change in fiscal policy.
For Model 6.2, under the chosen parameterization, variables 
oscillate around their Walrasian equilibrium values with decreasing 
amplitude. The initial effect of the expansionary fiscal policy 
in this model is to cause the economy to enter the regime of 
Underconsumption. With wages and prices fixed at their previous Walrasian 
levels the exchange rate falls instantaneously to clear the money market. 
After the first period wages and prices adjust until the economy 
converges to equilibrium. Within this adjustment period employment 
is unaffected and inventory stocks remain positive (not shown), 
hence the economy remains in the regime of Underconsumption. For the 
contractionary fiscal policy the initial reduction in demand for 
domestic goods causes the economy to experience Keynesian Unemployment. 
Employment falls further before returning to its full employment 
level upon which the economy enters and remains in the regime of 
Underconsumption, until it converges to equilibrium. Thus as may 
have been expected a contractionary fiscal policy causes unemployment 
to rise temporarily before the economy returns to Walrasian equilibrium. 
Finally it can be noted in Figures 7.2 and 7.3 that wage adjustment 
is often counter-intuitive for model 6.2, rising when there excess 
supply of labour and falling when there is excess demand.
On considering Figures 7.4 and 7.5 it can first be noted 
that for Model 6.3 wages now adjust in accordance with intuition.
This confirms the analysis of Section 6,4. It is further observed 
that the variables no longer exhibit such oscillating behaviour as 
for Model 6.2. This is due to L.he choice of parameter values 
rather than to the basic structure of the model. Oscillations occur
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for different parameterizations, and indeed as shown in Table 6,3, 
limit cycles are possible. Following the expansionary fiscal 
policy the economy initially experiences Underconsumption,
Subsequent to this wages and prices rise while the exchange rate falls 
to maintain equilibrium in the money market. This adjustment leads 
the economy to enter the regime of Keynesian Unemployment. Upon the 
occurance of unemployment wages and prices begin to fall toward their 
new Walrasian levels, and the exchange rate rises to its long-run 
value. The economy remains in Keynesian Unemployment until it has 
converged upon Walrasian equilibrium. The dynamic adjustment path 
following the contractionary fiscal shock is similar to that observed 
for the expansion in demand, except here the economy immediately 
enters the regime of Keynesian Unemployment. Wages and prices thus 
continually fall toward their long run values, and the exchange rate 
and employment continually rise subsequent to the first period.
In contrast to Model 6.2 both a contractionary and an 
expansionary fiscal policy cause the economy described by Model 6.3 
to experience unemployment either immediately following or subsequent 
to policy implementation. Again it is clear that fiscal policy can 
influence the dynamic path of real variables in the short-run.
These policy simulations have confirmed our earlier results 
that while the government cannot, through fiscal policy, influence the 
long run equilibrium values of real variables, (apart from the real 
wage rate), it can greatly affect the short-run dynamic path of such 
variables. Due to this effectiveness of policy the government is able 
to offset certain undesirable economic states caused by disturbances 
to the economy. In particular in these disequilibrium models with 
consistent quantity adjustments the government can, with fine-tuning 
policies, ensure continual full employment. This is obviously contrary 
to the New Classicial Macroeconomic policy conclusions. We now turn 
our attention to the effectiveness of monetary policy in the short-run.
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7.2ii Monetary policy
The two immediate and direct effects of monetary policy are 
on the money supply and on the demand for domestic goods. Obviously 
a once and for all change in the money supply causes a permanent 
change in the money supply, while the change in demand for domestic 
goods, resulting from the change in public expenditure's only 
temporary. To assess the effectiveness of monetary policy we initially 
examine some of the consequences of a specific policy on the "basic" 
closed and open economy models.
Consider the policy where the government increases once and 
for all the money supply at the beginning of the first period by AMS 
and distributes this increase by increasing its own expenditure 
in the first period. If we assume that the economy is
initially in Walrasian equilibrium, what are seme of the 
consequences of this policy within the partial adjustment closed 
economy models?
With wages and prices set at their previous Walrasian levels 
in the first period the increased demand for goods will cause the 
economy to enter the regime of either Underconsumption or Repressed 
Inflation, depending on the size of A0Q, inventories will be reduced, 
but the economy will remain in full employment. Subsequent to this 
period wages and prices will adjust. The price level will gradually 
increase until equilibrium is restored in the money market. Due to 
the dynamic interaction of wages, prices and inventories the adjustment
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process in the goods and labour markets will be typically complex. 
However from the analyse of Chapter 5 we know that eventually the 
economy will either converge upon its new Walrasian equilibrium, with 
real variables unaffected, or cycle around it.
the "basic" open economy model? With the economy initially in 
Walrasian equilibrium the changed money supply results in an 
instantaneous jump in the exchange rate so as to equate the demand 
for money to its supply. From (6.40) the instantaneous change in the 
exchange rate is equal to:
As (1 + n0) > n9 + (1 - o) then efc overshoots its long-run equilibrium 
value (Aefc = AMS) , the degree of overshooting is given by:
Again subsequent to the initial period the domestic price level 
coverges toward its new equilibrium level, where the money market 
clears with the exchange rate also being at its long run equilibrium 
level, and hence the foreign and domestic interest rates are equated. 
Therefore, in response to the supposed policy, the price level rises 
gradually towards its long run level, while the exchange rate initially 
overshoots its long run value before converging toward it. These 
results are qualitatively the same as the Dornbusch (1976) model. 
However within our model we can also analyse the consequences on the
What are the consequences of the above monetary policy for
(7.10)
- 241 -
goods and labour markets. As already shown the direct and immediate 
affect of monetary policy within the goods market is to change the 
level of demand. There are, however, for this open economy model 
two further indirect consequences on the demand for domestic goods, 
resulting from the change in the exchange rate. Using (6.21), (6.22) 
and (6.23) we may write the effect of an exchange rate movement on
of trade, q^, and the general price level, p^ _ affecting the real wage 
rate. Combining equations (7.9) and (7.11) the total affect on
we get the result that any of the four possible regimes may be 
observed in this period, depending on the size of the monetary change 
and parameter values. Given this ambiguity it is clear that the 
subsequent dynamic behaviour of the goods and labour markets is too 
complex to be analysed using traditional comparative statics.
Ayj! = -[e3 + Bj/l - o)]ûefc (7.11)
Exchange rate movements effect y^ through both changes in the terms
y^ in the first period is:
[ 6 3  + B1(l - o)J(i + ne)AMs
n© + (1 — a)
where for the supposed policy A8Q = . The qualitative affect of
the monetary policy on y^ in the first period is now ambiguous, and
However from the observations already made concerning these
two "basic" economies we can state the important policy conclusion that 
monetary policy is effective, in that it can influence the dynamic 
path of real variables in the short-run. Again as with fiscal
policy, this effectiveness may be used so as to achieve certain 
economic objectives. In particular the government can by monetary 
policy affect the level of employment, due to the direct and (for 
the open economy models) indirect effects on the demand for domestic 
goods.
In order to examine further the short-run consequences of 
monetary policy we return to the computer and analyse numerically 
various policies within the extended open economy models. For each 
simulation it is assumed that the economy is initially in Walrasian 
equilibrium and that the changed money supply is distributed solely 
by the government altering its own expenditure in the first period.
It is again assumed that X^  = 0.4, Aw = 0.2 and (for Model 6.3)
= 0.4, all other parameters are set at their basic values.
Figure 7. 6 shows the resulting dynamic path of* the economy following 
an expansion in the money supply of 5% for Model 6.2, while Figure 
7. 7 shows the dynamic response to a 5% contraction in the money 
supply. Figure 7. 8 and 7.9 show the corresponding simualtions 
for Model 6.3.
As with the policy simulations for fiscal policy it is seen 
that both models are stable with all variables converging to their new 
equilibrium levels. Considering first the simulations undertaken 
for Model 6.2 each variable, in general, oscillates with dampened 
amplitude around their long-run values. In particular the 
oscillations of the exchange rate confirm the analyse of Section 6.3 
that for this model the dynamic path of the exchange rate, in response 
to a monetary shock, is more complex than that predicted either 
by Dornbusch's (1976) or by Flood and Hodricks (1983) model.
As wages and prices are fixed in the first period at their previous
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Walrasian levels, when the money supply is increased by 5% the 
exchange rate overshoots its higher long-run value while the goods 
and labour markets are characterised by Repressed Inflation, inventories 
being reduced to zero. In subsequent periods wages and prices adjust 
and the economy moves through various regimes. Interestingly, 
because of the complex dynamic processes the economy experiences two 
prolonged periods of keynesian Unemployment following this expansionary 
policy. Unemployment is observed in 11 future periods, reaching a 
peak of 6.16% of the work force. For the contractionary policy, in 
the same model, the economy initially experiences Classical Unemployment 
followed in the second period by Keynesian Unemployment. The economy 
then returns to full employment before entering a longer, though less 
severe spell of keynesian Unemployment. Surprisingly, although 
unemployment is immediately experienced in response to a reduction in 
the money supply, the occurances of unemployment are less severe, 
and of shorter duration, than when the money supply is increased by 
the same magnitude. Thus Figure 7.8 shows there are 7 periods of 
observed unenployment, reaching a peak of only 2.59% of the labour 
supply.
We now consider the dynamic path of the economy for these 
policy shocks within Model 6.3. As before the exchange rate initially 
overshoots its long-run level following an expansionary monetary 
policy, with the economy experiencing Repressed Inflation. The 
economy then enters the regime of Underconsumption as wages and 
prices rise and the exchange rate falls, eventually undershooting 
its long-run value. These adjustments cause the economy to experience 
Keynesian Unemployment. Upon entering this regime wages and prices 
fall and the exchange rate rises to converge upon their Walrasian 
equilibrium values. It can be noted that the path the exchange
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rate follows within Figure 7.8 is qualitatively the same as predicted 
by Flood and Hodrick's model. This however is dependent on the 
parameter values of the model, with different parameter values the 
dynamic path of the economy will differ. Finally Figure 7.9 is 
qualitatively the same as Figure 6.2 both showing the response 
of Model 6.3 to a reduction in the money supply. Unemployment 
is continually observed until the economy returns to Walrasian 
equilibrium. Wages and prices continually fall and the exchange 
rate rises to their respective long-run market clearing values.
In conclusion this section has analysed the short-run 
dynamic effects of both fiscal and monetary policy. The central 
result, for the models considered, is that while systematic 
government policy cannot influence the long-run values of real 
variables other than the real wage rate it does have significant 
effects on the short-run dynamic path of such variables. This is 
contrary to New Classicial policy conclusions. With this effectiveness 
of fiscal and monetary policy the government is able to achieve 
certain economic objectives. In particular if the government 
has perfect information and perfect control of its policy variables 
then it can eliminate unemployment, by offsetting the random 
disturbances affecting the economy. Alternatively by pursuing 
mistaken policy recommendations the government may be the cause of 
unemployment and loss of output.
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7.3 Alternative wage and price adjustment
In Section 5.5 the partial adjustment closed economy model 
was modified by assuming that wages and prices respond positively 
to excess demand in the labour and money markets respectively.
In order to compare with previous results, and also to gain further 
insight into the importance of wage and price adjustment, this 
section analyses the effectiveness of government policy with this 
alternative model. By postulating that wages and prices respond to 
disequilibrium it was shown that Model 5.2 exhibited "saddlepoint 
instability" . Stability required that agents are not myopic but 
forward looking so the economy can jump on to the stable manifold. 
This was achieved by altering how firms' determined their desired 
inventory level. Because agents are now forward looking, it is 
necessary, in analysing the effectiveness of government policy, to 
distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated policy changes.
As before we assess first the effectiveness of fiscal policy and 
then of monetary policy.
We begin by showing the surprising result that for Model 
5.2 fiscal policy is unable to affect real variables, other than the 
real wage rate, both in the short and long run, if it is unanticipated. 
Unanticipated fiscal policy only affects the real wage rate, leaving 
the dynamic path of other real variables unaffected. This 
result is due to two basic properties of this model. First, as 
already stated, the model exhibits a "saddlepoint solution". Second, 
changes in fiscal policy only induce vertical shifts in the regime 
switching loci. This second property has already been demonstrated 
in Section 7.2i for the partial adjustment closed economy imodel.
That proof applies equal for this model as none of the equations 
representing the regime loci are affected by changes to the wage and
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price adjustment mechanisms. To illustrate that unanticipated 
policy is ineffective we initially assume that the money market 
continually in equilibrium. This assumption implies that the 
economy must always be on the stable manifold converging toward 
equilibrium. The effects of an unanticipated fiscal expansion 
shown in Figure 7.10 where it is assumed that b < A " ^3
B,
fiscal
is
are
Figure 7.10
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Initially the economy is characterised by the solid regime 
switching loci and by the stable manifold SS, with Walrasian 
equilibrium at E. Suppose the economy is at A experiencing Keynesian 
Unemployment, with both wages and inventories falling. Further 
suppose that in response to the observed unemployment the 
government expands fiscal policy. Due to this incipient increase 
in demand for goods all three loci shift down by the same amount to 
the positions now shown by the dashed regime switching loci. 
Consequently the long-run equilibrium and stable manifold also 
shift down to E' and S'S' respectively. Finally as the economy 
must always be on the stable manifold it jumps from A to A' . It 
is clear that none of the real variables, except the real wage rate 
is affected. The economy remains in the regime of Keynesian 
Unemployment and inventories are unchanged. The only consequence of 
the expansionary fiscal policy is to shift consumption from the 
private to the public sector, facilitated by the fall in the real wage 
rate. The government is unable to exercise demand management via. 
unanticipated fiscal policy, because any change in policy is completely 
offset by a change in the wage rate. Private consumption is completely 
crowded out by increased public expenditure. This result remains valid 
even if b is greater than p3 or if the assumption that the money
market is continually in equilibrium is relaxed. What is the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy if it is anticipated? Again for 
illustrative purposes we suppose the same initial conditions as 
shown in Figure 7.io. These are reproduced in Figure 7.11.
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Figure 7.n
It is assumed agents now anticipate an expansionary fiscal policy 
in the future. When the change in fiscal policy is implemented the 
long-run equilibrium and stable manifold will shift down to E' and S'S' 
respectively. As this policy is anticipated agents will act in a 
way to ensure the economy is on S'S' when the policy is actually 
implemented. In order to achieve this aim the wage rate initially 
falls causing the economy to be on an "explosive" path that will 
coincide with the stable manifold S'S' when the policy is undertaken. 
Thus in Figure 7.11 the economy instantaneously jumps from A to A ’ 
and then due to the inherent dynamics of the economy moves to B. When 
the economy reaches B the fiscal policy, if correctly anticipated, will
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be enacted and hence the economy will converge along S'S' to E'. From
the diagram it is clear that fiscal policy is now able to effect
the dynamic path of real variables other than the wage rate, such as
employment and inventories. Anticipated fiscal policy is effective
in the short-run. Again this result is unaffected by assuming that
b > A - ^3 or by relaxing the assumption that the money market is 
B3—
continually in equilibrium. Note that anticipated fiscal policy is 
effective because prior to the policy change the economy jumps on to 
an otherwise unstable path, along which the dynamic adjustment of 
real variables is different to what it would have been without the 
expected policy change. It is for this same reason that monetary 
policy, anticipated or unanticipated, is effective. The validity 
of this statement is demonstrated by the use of a simple argument.
It is recalled from Section 5.5 that when the money market is out of 
equilibrium the economy will be off the stable manifold, derived 
under the assumption that the money market clears. The actual 
path followed is the one that causes the economy to be on this stable 
manifold when the money market does clear. Assume the money market 
is initially in equilibrium, and the economy is on this stable 
manifold. Now given a change in monetary policy, or an anticipated 
policy change, the economy will, via an instantaneous wage adjustment, 
jump on to an "unstable" path. Once again the dynamic path of real 
variables will be different than they would have been without the 
policy, and so both anticipated and unanticipated monetary policy is 
effective. Given this effectiveness, monetary policy may be used 
to help achieve certain economic objectives, such as reducing 
unemploymen t.
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The alternative assumption of allowing wages and prices 
to respond to disequilibrium rather than allowing them to adjust 
imperfectly toward their market clearing levels was shown in 
Section 5.5 to greatly alter the dynamics and stability of the 
model. This section has analysed its consequences for government 
policy. Due to the forward looking expectation formation of agents 
the distinction between anticipated and unanticipated policy change 
becomes important. In particular only anticipated fiscal policy is 
effective in influencing real variables in the short-run.
Unanticipated fiscal policy is ineffective, causing only a once 
and for all change in the real wage rate and the distribution of 
resources between the public and private sectors. It is 
interesting to note that these results for fiscal policy reverse 
those typically derived from New Classical models, where it is 
unanticipated policy that is effective, anticipated policy being 
ineffective (see, for example Sargent and Wallace, 1975). The 
New Classical policy conclusion from such results is that government 
policy should be set in accordance with policy rules, so as to avoid 
unnecessary random disturbances from equilibrium. Within the present 
disequilibrium model the government by allowing fiscal policy to 
follow a known policy rule can influence the dynamic path of real 
variables and so have desirable consequences. Here the policy 
prescription that fiscal policy be conducted in accordance with a 
known policy rule is not to avoid the destabilizing consequences 
of government policy, but rather so that fiscal policy can be 
effective in stabilizing the economy. The establishing of a 
policy rule has positive effects. However it should not be thought 
that the policy prescription from the present model for fiscal policy 
is identical to that derived from New Classical models. New Classical
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macroeconomists argue that to limit the destabilizing effects of 
government policy the policy rule should be simple. Within the 
present model in order for the government to maximize the beneficial 
effects of fiscal policy its policy rule will typically be complex. 
Turning to monetary policy, it was shown that both anticipated and 
unanticipated changes in monetary policy were effective.
This section has further highlighted the importance of the 
wage adjustment process, and the need to develop and test competing 
theories. However more importantly it has shown that even though 
the dynamics and stability of the model are greatly altered upon the 
introduction of this alternative wage and price adjustment 
mechanism, the main policy conclusion remains valid. Government 
policy, both fiscal and monetary, is effective, now under certain 
conditions of implementation, in influencing real variables in the
short-run.
7.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we incorporated a public sector into the 
previously developed disequilibrium models so as to primarily assess 
the effectiveness of government policy, and to compare these results 
with New Classicial policy prescriptions. In Section 7.1 it was shown 
that the public sector can be introduced in a consistent way, and that 
it is possible to distinguish between fiscal and monetary policy.
Also in this section we considered the long-run equilibrium consequences 
of government policy. These results are the same as those derived from 
New Classical models. The government is in general unable to 
influence real variables in the long run, only nominal variables.
This result is due to the fact that for all the disequilibrium 
models developed there is no long run non-Walrasian equilibrium.
With there being only one long run equilibrium and that being the 
Walrasian equilibrium then the New Classical long-run policy 
conclusion remains valid.
It was upon considering the dynamic short run effects of 
government policy that our conclusions differed from New Classical 
results. In Section 7.2 it was shown that for the main disequilibrium 
models developed in previous Chapters government policy, both fiscal 
and monetary is effective in altering the dynamic path of real 
variables. As already stated this result does not depend on the 
government having superior information, nor on the formation of non- 
rational expectations, but rather on allowing in a consistent way 
for imperfect wage and price adjustment and the consequent quantity 
adjustments. With this effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy, 
the government is able to achieve certain economic objectives*
Indeed if the government has perfect information and perfect control
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of its policy variables it can eliminate unemployment by offsetting 
the disturbances affecting the economy. Alternatively, because 
policy is effective, the government, by implementing mistaken 
policy recommendations may actually be the cause of unemployment and 
loss of output.
In many situations once the economy is disturbed from 
equilibrium, say by a government policy shock, then economic 
variables will oscillate around their Walrasian values, either with 
decreasing amplitude or forming a limit cycle around them. These 
oscillations are the result of the complex interaction between the 
various markets and explicit regime switching caused by imperfect 
wage adjustment and inventory movements. In particular for the 
extended open economy models it is often the case that the exchange 
rate once disturbed oscillates around its initial Walrasian value. 
This observation is qualitatively different from both the Dornbusch 
(1976) model and Flood and Hodrick's (1983) model, with our models 
allowing the possibility of even greater gyrations for the exchange 
rate compared to these previous models.
Finally the effectiveness of government policy was 
explored within the model presented in Section 5.5, where the wage 
rate and price level adjust in response to disequilibrium in the 
labour and goods markets respectively. Here the distinction 
between anticipated and unanticipated policy changes are important. 
It was shown that only anticipated fiscal policy is effective while 
both anticipated and unanticipated monetary policy is effective.
In final conclusion the analysis of government policy 
within this Chapter has provided alternative policy conclusions to 
those derived from New Classical models. Within the dynamic
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disequilibrium models developed in this thesis government policy 
may be usefully employed to achieve desirable short-run economic 
objectives concerning the dynamic path of real variables such as
employment and output.
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS
We have aimed, in this thesis, to extend recent macroeconomic 
models in which imperfect price flexibility gives rise to disequilibrium 
quantity constraints and dynamic adjustment. It represents a 
continuation of current research to provide an acceptable alternative 
to New Classical macroeconomics, and is used to assess the robustness 
of results derived from both previous New Classical and disequilibrium 
models. The New Classical synthesis is "equilibrium economics" 
it being assumed that markets always clear, any possible disequilibrium 
is elimianted by instantaneous price adjustment. It is this authors 
belief, however, that there are compelling reasons to suppose that not 
all prices adjust instantaneously to clear markets. Due to its 
equilibrium methodology the New Classical synthesis is unsuitable to 
study the resulting disequilibrium situations, and gives very limited 
insight into what happens during this "transitional phase". The 
analysis of the dynamic response to disequilibrium is carried out 
only in terms of price adjustments, completely ignoring any quantity 
adjustments. By contrast disequilibrium macroeconomics is concerned, 
in principle, with the dynamic responses of an economy to 
disequilibrium by way of both price and quantity adjustments. Having 
stated this, the first generation of disequilibrium models, as 
developed by Barro and Grossman (1971, 1986), Benassy (1974) and 
Dreze (1975), Malinvaud (1977) and others, were only single period 
models were it was assumed that prices were fixed, and other 
intertemporal linkages, such as inventories and expectations, were 
ignored. Only recently have authors began to develop dynamic 
disequilibrium models, incorporating price adjustment and other inter­
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temporal linkages. This thesis has, in particular, aimed to further 
this line of research.
Section 8.1 summarises the argument and findings of 
previous Chapters and offers a final assessment of the research 
presented in this thesis. Finally some suggestions for future 
research are discussed in Section 8.2.
8 .li Summary of preceeding Chapters
In Chapter 2 we critically examined both the rational 
expectation hypothesis and its conjunction with the continuous 
market clearing assumption - giving rise to New Classical economics.
In Section 2.1 it was argued that the rational expectations hypothesis 
has some important short-comings, the attempted correction of which 
was beyond the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless the hypothesis is 
a useful theoretical abstraction, and was employed in subsequent 
Chapters of this thesis. This has had the advantage that when 
incorporated into a disequilibrium framework we can clearly see 
the consequences of abandoning the assumption of perfect price 
flexibility. It was further argued in Chapter 2, with reference to 
developed contract-based macroeconomic models, and also McCallum's 
(1977, 1978) arguments, that New Classical results are crucially 
dependent upon the assumption of perfect price flexibility. It 
was shown that when less than perfect price adjustment is modelled 
consistently the New Classical policy conclusions in genral, and the 
Lucas-Sargent Proposition (LSP) specifically, are no longer valid.
The analysis of Chapter 2 forced us to conclude that the assumption 
of imperfect price adjustment cannot be merely appended on to an 
otherwise market clearing model. Imperfect price flexibility, via 
resulting disequilibrium,gives rise to quantity constraints and
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and adjustments; these need to be taken into account if 
disequilibrium is to be modelled consistently. However before 
presuming that a disequilibrium framework with quantity adjustments 
and rationing is appropriate it is first necessary to determine 
if and why prices are less than perfectly flexible. This issue was 
considered in Chapter 3. In this Chapter recent work on wage and 
price adjustment was both critically assessed and extended, so as to 
provide an economic basis for disequilibrium theory. Here a broad 
approach to wage and price adjustment was adopted. Instead of 
concentrating on one particular theory to the exclusion of others, 
this chapter examined each of the main theories recently advanced to 
explain wage and price adjustment, clearly stating where theories are 
mutually exclusive and where they complement each other.
As well as providing a general overview of price and 
wage adjustment and disequilibrium, Chapter 3 also presented 
advances and extensions to previous theories. The main contribution
here was on the effects of "small-menu" costs. By relaxing restrictive 
assumptions it was shown that previously derived results are not 
robust. For example, by incorporating the (s,S) policy rule for 
price adjustment into a model where there are discrete shocks to the 
system, it was shown that disequilibrium persists in the aggregate, 
and that monetary policy is non-neutral.
In Section 3.1 the assumption of perfectly flexible prices 
ensuring continual equilibrium was found to be unsatisfactory, it 
not being derived from maximising behaviour, nor indicating how 
the economy moves from one equilibrium to another. What is needed 
is a theory of how prices are formulated by agents and how these plans 
are revised in the light of new information. There are two alternative 
theories of imperfect price adjustment. The first states that prices
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respond to disequilibrium, with equilibrium being the limit of this 
process assuming stability. In Section 3.2 this process was found 
to be ad hoc and incompatible with full rationality of agents.
The second theory states that disequilibrium occurs because prices 
for some reason(s) do not instantaneously adjust to their equilibrium 
values. Within Sections 3.3 three broad reasons for why prices may 
adjust imperfectly were analysed : imperfect information and the 
learning process, multi-period wage and price contracts with 
incomprehensive indexation, and the presence of "small-menu” costs.
It was shown that each of these considerations is sufficient to 
explain individual price stickiness. In Section 3.4 we aggregated 
over individual prices, taking seperately into account each of these 
three given reasons for imperfect price adjustment. Again, with 
plausible assumptions, imperfect price adjustment and disequilibrium 
persist. It was thus concluded that rational economic behaviour 
is capable of providing an adequate basis for disequilibrium theory.
Having found that disequilibrium theory is an appropriate 
area for economic analysis Chapter 4 critically examined some of the 
first generation disequilibrium models. This was done so as to lay 
a proper base for developing the subsequent dynamic rationing models. 
It was Clower (1965) who first argued that classical economics was 
unable to provide useful insight into disequilibrium states.
Clower's attack on classical economics was presented in Section 4.1 
within the context of Walrasian equilibrium. Clower's proposed 
modelling strategy for studying disequilibrium, the "dual decision 
hypothesis" was also presented. It was argued that while Clower's 
critique of classical economics is valid, the dual decision hypothesis 
is an unsatisfactory basis for disequilibrium economics. In more
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rigorous attempts to model temporary equilibrium with quantity 
adjustment one of two main formulations of effective demand have 
generally been employed, one is associated with Benassy (1975, 1976), 
the other with Dreze (1975). In Section 4.2 it was shown that 
each of these formulations have major short-comings specific to 
each. However a more fundamental criticism is that there is a 
multiplicity of effective trade offer definitions. This leads to 
the problems of indeterminacy and arbitrariness. Due to these 
problems it was argued that a complete respecification of the way 
disequilibrium is modelled is needed. At the end of Section 4.2 
the work by Sneessens (1981) was presented, which attempts to 
provide just such a respecification. In his alternative formulation 
Sneessens replaces the usual assumptions behind quantity rationing 
models, and in particular, allows expectations about possible 
constraints to be wrong, abolishing the so-called "equilibrium 
assumption". Sneessens's approach overcomes the problems of 
indeterminacy and arbitrariness, by allowing the derivation of well 
defined effective trade offers without the need to impose ad hoc 
restrictions. It is for this reason that Sneessens'smodelling 
strategy and basic underlying assumptions were employed to develop 
the dynamic disequilibrium models of later chapters. Specifically 
the effective supply and demand functions derived from Sneessens's 
assumptions were used.
Finally in Chapter 4 we examined the consequences of 
introducing international trade into a disequilibrium framework.
The main result here was that by making use of the "large-country" 
assumption, that a country has a tradeable good whose price is fixed 
and faces a downward sloping export demand curve, all four regimes 
previously derived for the closed economy two-market model are still
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observed. This result is contrary to many earlier open economy 
disequilibrium models and is made use of in Chapter 6 .
In Chapter 5 two closed economy dynamic disequilibrium 
models were developed and analysed, with intertemporal linkages 
being established via wage, price and inventory adjustments. This 
Chapter represents a continuation of previous research concerned with 
examining the consequences of introducing inventories as buffer stocks 
into disequilibrium macroeconomic models. Within this Chapter we 
were able to assess the robustness of previous results derived from 
fixed wage and price models, such as Honkapohja and I to (1980) and 
Eckalbar (1985), by introducing wage and price adjustment. Initially 
an extension of Green and Laffont's (1981) "anticipatory pricing" was 
used to represent wage and price adjustment, with wages and prices 
assumed to move toward their expected market clearing values over 
time. This adjustment mechanism was justified by the analysis 
undertaken in Chapter 3, and is a first approximation to the complicated 
processes derived from imperfect information and learning, contract 
theory, and the presence of costs of changing individual prices.
This approach allows the possibility of serially correlated regimes, 
while retaining the assumption that there is no wage or price adjustment 
within the period.
It was shown that for the model presented in Section 5.2, 
unlike those of Honkapohja and Ito (1980), Sneessens (1981) and 
Eckalbar (1985), each of the four distinct regimes of Underconsumption, 
Repressed Inflation, Classical Unemployment and Keynesian Unemployment 
could be observed as the short-run equilibrium. Which regime is 
actually observed is dependent on the shocks the economy has experienced 
in both past and present periods. All regimes may be observed
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because all supply and demand functions for goods and labour are 
subject to random disturbances, inventories may be reduced to 
zero, and wages and prices adjust imperfectly. The main insights 
of this Chapter, however, relate to the existence, nature and 
stability of the long-run equilibrium.
It was proven that there is a unique long-run equilibrium 
which is the Walrasian equilibrium. This is contrary to the results 
derived by Honkapohja and Ito (1980) and Eckalbar (1985). Introducing 
wage and price adjustment excludes the possibility of a non-Walrasian 
long-run equilibrium. However, such wage and price adjustment alters 
little the dynamics of the model, and specifically the stability of the 
long run equilibrium. Model 5.1 is either stable or exhibits a limit 
cycle, with limit cycles being certain for a significant subset of the 
parameter space. These stability results confirm those found by 
Honkapohja and Ito, and Eckalbar, and reinforce the belief that 
studying regime switching within a disequilibrium framework is a useful 
approach to further understanding inventory and trade cycles.
In Section 5.5 the importance of wage and price adjustment 
was explored by allowing wages and prices to adjust in response to 
excess demand, or supply, in the labour and money markets respectively. 
It was shown that these modifications to the model greatly alter its 
stability, though not the number nor nature of possible long-run 
equilibrium. Now the model initially exhibits saddlepoint instability. 
To overcome this problem the microeconomic basis was further 
modified so that agends had forward-looking expectations, allowing 
the economy to jump on to the stable manifold. Within this 
model limit cycles are not possible under any parameterization.
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In Chapter 6 the partial adjustment closed economy model 
of Chapter 5 was extended so as to include international trade.
In the three models developed in this Chapter firms are allowed to 
export their output as well as supply domestic consumers, and 
households consume foreign goods. International capital mobility 
ensures that the money market is continually in equilibrium with the 
exchange rate jumping instantaneously to its market clearing value.
Wages and prices, however, are still assumed to adjust only 
imperfectly toward their market clearing values. The resulting open 
economy models were used to test the robustness of results derived 
for the closed economy model. It was shown that, in general, the 
results concerning the nature and stability of equilibrium remain valid 
for the open economy models. The only long-run equilibrium possible is 
the Walrasian equilibrium and limit cycles are still certain for a 
significant subset of the parameter space. In two extensions of 
the "basic" open economy model we gained further insights into exchange 
rate determination. In these two models the foreign exchange market 
and money market were no longer isolated from the goods and labour 
markets. This was first achieved by allowing the demand for money 
to depend on consumers' demand for goods, and second by respecifying 
the firms' labour demand function. Due to these alterations the 
exchange rate is influenced by both labour and goods market dynamics. 
This led to the exchange rate exhibiting greater deviations from its 
long run equilibrium than previous models, such as Dornbusch (1976) and 
Flood and Hodrick (1983), predict. It is even possible for the exchange 
rate to exhibit a limit cycle. These models thus aid our understanding 
of the recently observed large fluctuations of the exchange rate over 
short intervals of time. A final benefit of the second extended open 
economy model is that wages are no longer-counter intuitive, a
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criticism made against the earlier partial adjustment models.
In Chapter 7 we incorporated a public sector into the 
previously developed disequilibrium framework, with the aim of assessing 
the effectiveness of government policy. In Section 7.1 it was shown 
that the public sector can be introduced in a consistent way, and 
that we can distinguish between fiscal and monetary policy. It was 
found that government is unable to influence, in general, real variables 
in the long run only nominal variables. This is a New Classical policy 
conclusion and follows from the fact that for all the disequilibrium 
models developed there are no non-Walrasian long-run equilibria. When 
considering the dynamic short-run effects of government policy, however, 
our results differ from the New Classical policy conclusions. In 
Section 7.2 it was shown that for the partial adjustment disequilibrium 
models developed in the previous Chapters, both fiscal and monetary 
policy are effective in altering the dynamic path of real variables.
This result is not dependent upon the government having superior 
information in comparison with other agents, nor on the necessity of 
misleading other agents, nor on assuming the formation of non-rational 
expectations, but is rather the direct consequence of introducing 
imperfect price and wage adjustment and allowing for the consequent 
quantity adjustments. As fiscal and monetary policy are effective 
the government is able to achieve certain economic objectives.
Indeed, if the government has perfect information and control of its 
policy variables, then it can eliminate unemployment by offsetting 
the disturbances affecting the economy. Alternatively the government 
by implementing mistaken policy conclusions may be the cause of 
unemployment and loss of output.
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Finally in Section 7.3 the short-run effectiveness of 
government policy was explored in Model 5.2 where the wage rate 
and price level adjust in response to disequilibrium in the labour 
and goods markets respectively. Here the distinction between 
anticipated and unanticipated policy changes is important, it being 
shown that unanticipated fiscal policy is uneffective in both the 
short-run and the long-run. This concludes our summary of 
preceeding chapters.
8.1ii A final assessment
In this thesis we have presented original and significant 
research on both the foundations of dynamic disequilibrium macro­
economics and on the implications of such a modelling strategy. 
Chapters 2 to 4 concentrated largely upon the development of a rational 
basis for quantity constrained models, while in Chapters 5 to 7 we 
developed and analysed specific disequilibrium models.
It has been argued here that disequilibrium economics is 
a superior alternative to the New Classical synthesis, and is capable 
of yielding qualitatively different results. New Classical economics 
is based upon the two assumptions that agents form their 
expectations rationally (as defined by Muth, 1961), and that all 
markets continually clear. However, it has been argued this second 
assumption, that prices adjust instantaneously to their market clearing 
values, is unsatisfactory, it not being derived from maximizing 
behaviour but instead assumed to be self-evident. Furthermore 
the usual defense made for this assumption, that it is the limit of 
a trial and error process in which prices adjust in response to 
excess demand, was shown to be ad hoc and incompatible with the full
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rationality of agents. In contrast disequilibrium economics can be 
derived from the rational economic behaviour of agents. Various 
reasons were given as to why individual wages and prices may adjust 
imperfectly, and these go to the root of why disequilibrium exists.
It was also shown that such disequilibrium persists over aggregation.
A significant advance here was the work presented on the implications 
of "small menu" costs. In response to costs of changing prices 
firms will adopt the (s,S) policy rule of price adjustment. By 
introducing discrete shocks in the equilibrium price level disequilibrium 
persists in the aggregate and monetary policy is non-neutral.
Imperfect price adjustment gives rise to quantity constraints 
and these need to be taken into consideration if disequilibrium is to be 
modelled consistently. Various modelling strategies were discussed and 
criticised in Chapter 4. Chapters 5 to 6 employed the chosen modelling 
strategy(based on Sneessens, 1981) to develop dynamic closed and open 
economy models. Intertemporal linkages were established via wage, 
price and inventory adjustments. Although much work still needs to 
be done these models were shown to be able to help our understanding of 
certain economic phenomenon such as trade and inventory cycles. The 
dynamic models were also used to test the robustness of previously 
derived results and provide new results. Significant insights were 
gained into the possibility of long-run non-Walrasian equilibria, 
the existence of limit cycles and the behaviour of the exchange rate 
within regime switching models. Finally we have analysed the 
effectiveness of government policy in the various disequilibrium 
models. It being shown that not all the New Classical policy 
conclusions remain valid when prices adjust imperfectly and quantity 
adjustments are modelled in a consistent way.
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From the analyse of this thesis it is clear that disequilibrium 
economics is both a valid and fruitful area for future research. Indeed 
this thesis has not only provided a number of important advances over 
earlier research, relating to the foundations and implications of 
disequilibrium, but it has also highlighted the need for further 
research in specific areas. Some of these issues are discussed in the
next section.
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8. 2 Suggestions for future research
The study of dynamic disequilibrium economics is still young.
As related in the previous section this thesis has presented a number 
of advances, but it has also highlighted that much still remains to 
be done. In this section we outline a programme for further 
research. The five areas we consider are: price adjustment; the 
demand for inventories; the formation of expectations; multi-country 
disequilibrium models; and empirical estimation and hypothesis testing. 
Although each of these areas are discussed separately many of them overlap 
with each other.
One area in need of further research is that of price 
adjustment. Despite many recent contributions to this subject, 
including the analysis of Chapter 3 in this thesis, there is, as yet, 
no generally accepted choice-theoretic basis for the assumption of 
slow price adjustment in macroeconomic models. (This also applies 
to the opposite extreme of instantaneous price adjustment.) The 
important task of determining - empirically as well as theoretically - 
whether and why prices are fixed br sticky in the short-run remains. 
Further the specific reasons proposed for why prices adjust 
imperfectly need to be incorporated in a more consistent and thorough­
going fashion into dynamic disequilibrium models. For example with 
the main disequilibrium models developed in this thesis it was assumed 
that wages and prices adjusted only partially toward their market 
clearing values. This should be seen as only a first approximation 
to the more complicated adjustment processes generated when factors 
such as imperfect information, learning and "small-menu" cost are 
explicitly incorporated into dynamic quantity constrained models.
The importance of such future research was underlined in Chapters 
5 and 7 of this thesis, where it was shown that alternative wage and
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price adjustment mechanism can greatly alter the properties of such 
models.
Related to this issue of price adjustment is how the demand 
for inventories is to be modelled and also how expectations are 
formulated. The treatment of adjustment dynamics as the economy 
moves through a sequence of temporary equilibria over time would benefit 
from a more thorough investigation of expectation formation. In 
general, the disequilibrium dynamics for quantity constrained models 
have embodied extremely myopic behaviour on the part of economic 
agents. In particular, the adjustment paths that prices follow often 
have no effect on agents' current decisions. This is reflected in 
the simplistic way the demand for inventories has been modelled in 
the partial adjustment models of this thesis. As previously stated 
in an optimizing model the firm's demand for inventories must depend 
on their expectations of product demand and input costs in the future.
In a model where there is persistence of regimes the firm will have 
to consider the probability of various sorts of disequilibrium in 
the future, as well as future prices. The first depends on both 
what types of shocks the economy will undergo and on how price movements 
might eliminate disequilibrium. In general inventory holding cannot 
be divorced from the nature of price determination and the nature of 
the stochastic processes generating shocks to the economy. If the 
assumption of rational expectations (or rational constraint 
expectations) is to be used the solving of the resulting dynamic 
model will be more difficult than a standard dynamic model. Ih 
dynamic rational expectation models, in which expectations of future 
values of endogenous variables appear, seme endogenous variables do 
not have natural initial conditions. Thus, in the absence of other 
conditions or restrictions on these variables, these models may
- 27 3 -
admit an infinity of solutions. Finding "the" solution then requires 
the use of additional conditions, these are usually in the form of 
transversality conditions. There now exists a sizeable literature 
on the solution of linear rational expectation models containing 
future expectations of the endogenous variables with different 
solution techniques adopted by different authors. In a forthcoming 
book Pesaran has defined five categories of solution techniques: 
the method of undetermined coefficients, the operator or z-transform 
method, the forward recursive substitution method, the martingale 
method, and the martingale difference method. The problem with 
these solutions techniques is that they are all ad hoc, and though 
each may generate a unique solution, they may not yield the same 
unique solution, thus we still have the problem of choosing one 
solution from many. The reason such difficulties arise is because 
the model used is not derived from a dynamic optimization problem.
If the model were to be derived from an optimization problem 
transversality conditions would be part of the characterisation of the 
solution. If agents have infinite planning horizons the resulting 
transversality conditions from the dynamic optimization provide 
the conditions needed for the determination of a unique non-explosive 
solution. It is clear that when incorporating future expectations of 
endogenous variables explicit dynamic optimization is required.
In Chapter 2 two further shortcomings of the rational 
expectations hypothesis were noted and deserve further analysis.
The first concerns the question of how agents learn about their 
economic environment. For agents to hold expectations that 
exhibit the error orthogonality property they need to know the structure 
of the economy. If individualshave imperfect information relating 
to either the structural specification of the economy or some
- 27 4-
parameter value then a learning procedure is required. There have 
been numerous approaches to this problem but as yet there has been little 
or no analysis of how agents learn within an explicit disequilibrium 
framework. The possibility and implications of such learning seems 
worthy of study. The second shortcoming concerned the role of 
differential information. It is implicitly assumed in rational 
expectation models that agents expect other agents to hold the 
same view of the economic environment as they do. There seems 
a need to develop more general models in which there is sufficient 
disaggregation to allow different groups to have different information 
and form different expectations. Where differential information is 
likely to be important we would expect such disaggregation to lead 
to more realistic models.
The next area suggested suitable for research is that of 
open economy macroeconomics. Virtually all published work on 
open economy disequilibrium theory, as well as work presented in 
this thesis, have dealt with a single economy in an international 
environment. The difficult task of extending these models to 
two or more open economies in general disequilibrium has just begun 
(for exanple Dixit and Norman, 1980 and Lori and Sheen, 1982).
The interaction between a number of fixrprice economies, which may 
be in different disequilibrium regimes, is undoubtedly important.
It will force us to pay much more attention to the specification of 
reasonable (world wide) rationing rules, which necessarily play a 
role in resolving market imbalance when prices in world markets 
fail to adjust instantaneously.
The final area suggested for future research is the empirical 
estimation and testing of disequilibrium models. The first empirical
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study in this direction was that by Fair and Jaffee (1972). Subsequently
the estimation technique for markets in disequilibrium, subject to the
"min" condition, has been developed; see for example Maddala and
Nelson (1974), Quandt (1978a), Laffont and Montfort (1979), and
Quandt (1982). All models in this general class share the following
characteristics. First they contain inequalities as essential ingredients,
since the "min" condition Qt = min(Dt,St) could be rewritten as
"Qt = if * St and Qfc = if Dfc > S^". Second some agents
whose behaviour the model purports to represent are usually "off
their behaviour curve". Thus some endogenous variables in the model
are not observed but latent. This creates a strong family
resemblance between disequilibrium models and other latent variable
models such as the switching regression model, the probit model or
the tobit model. The principal econometric features are;
(1 ) estimation is most frequently by maximum likelihood, although 
in special cases two-stage least squares methods are available;
(2 ) in models where sample separation is unknown the likelihood 
functions tend to be unbounded in parameter space; (3) the likelihood 
functions contain integrals of density functions, with the multiplicity 
of the integrals depending on the number of observed endogenous 
variables; thus in a disequilibrium model with two interrelated 
markets double integrals occur in the likelihood function. A number 
of applications have already been carried out, mainly for models
with a single market, see Ouandt (1982). It would seem useful, 
therefore, to try to fit a two market quantity rationing model to 
UK data. This type of exercise may be able to provide a test of 
the market and non-market clearing hypothesis, and may help to 
quantify the issues at stake in the macroeconomic debate. Several 
attempts of this kind have already been carried out for the
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Netherlands by Kooiman and Kloek (1980, 1981) for Belgium by Sneessens 
(1983), and for France by Vilares (1981) using annual data, and also 
for France by Artus, Laroque and Michel (1984) using quarterly data.
Many tests have been suggested for the "disequilibrating 
hypothesis", that is to test whether the data has been generated 
by an equilibrium model or a disequilibrium model. Quandt (1978b) 
discussed several tests and concluded that there does not exist a 
uniformly best procedure for testing the hypothesis that a market 
is in equilibrium against the alternative that it is not. A good 
starting point, however, for all tests of disequilibrium is to ask 
the basic question: What causes the disequilibrium? In the case of 
a partial adjustment model, such as Model 5.1 of this thesis, then 
the disequilibrium is clearly due to imperfect adjustment of wages and 
prices to their market clearing levels. In this case the proper test 
for the equilibrium versus disequilibrium hypothesis is to test 
whether or not Xw = 1 and X^ = 1 in the partial adjustment equations 
(equations 5.17 and 5.18 respectively for Model 5.1).
There was considerable discussion in Quandt's study on the 
question of nested or non-nested hypotheses. Quandt argued that very 
often the hypothesis of equilibrium versus disequilibrium is non­
nested; that is the parameter set under the null hypothesis that 
the model is an equilibrium model is not a subset of the parameter 
set for the disequilibrium model. The problem in these cases may 
be that there is no adequate explanation of why disequilibrium exists 
in the first place. For example Quandt considered the following 
price adjustment equation:
( 8 . 1 )
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that is prices change in response to excess supply or excess demand. 
The limit of the likelihood function of the disequilibrium model as 
y -► * is not the likelihood function for the equilibrium model. The 
problem is that this price adjustment equation tells us nothing about 
what causes disequilibrium. If we view (8.1) as a forecast equation, 
then the disequilibrium is due to imperfect forecasts of the market 
equilibrating price. In this case it is clear that as y -*■ 00, we do 
not get perfect forecasts. What we need in order to have a nested 
model is a forecasting equation that for some limiting values of 
the parameters yields perfect forecasts at the market equilibrium 
prices. In conclusion, tests for disequilibrium should be based on 
a discussion of what causes disequilibrium. Once again this 
highlights the need for further research on price adjustment. The 
test will then be a test of a nested hypothesis, and what the 
appropriate test is will be obvious from a statement of the 
problem.
It is hoped that this thesis will be useful not only for 
the advances it has presented, but that it will also facilitate 
future research in the related areas - only some of which have been 
alluded to above - where work remains to be done.
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APPENDIX 1
Proof that assumptions A4-A6 of Chapter 4 imply that:
(i) the effective trade offer of consumers are the Walrasian supply 
on the labour market and the Bênassy demand on the goods market and
(ii) the effective trade offers of producers are the Bênassy 
demand on the labour market and the Drèze supply on the goods market 
provided prj is sufficiently close to zero.
The proof is taken from Sneessens (1981) and follows the 
one used by Bênassy (1977) to prove his Proposition 5. It makes 
use of the backward dynamic programming technique utilized in 
intertemporal optimization problems.
(i) We first consider the behaviour of consumers on the 
goods market. The amount of work they will he able to perform is 
already known to be i_t. As consumers do not expect to be rationed 
on the goods market, their optimal demand for goods obtains as:
Max 0(yf, 1., M )yd t t t
s.t. Mt - ♦ wtlt - pty^
where wfc is the wage rate in period t, pfc the price of the representative 
good in period t and is the quantity of money carried over at the end 
of period t. We assume that the utility function, Ur is strictly 
concave and strictly increasing in each argument. The utility of 
money appears indirectly, through the amount of future consumption 
it represents.
This maximization problem defines y^ as a Bênassy effective 
demand, equal to the Walrasian demand when = £^S. Let us define
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the utility function:
v <*t'Bt> = Maà °^yt' *t' *V 
yt
where + wt^t’ °f a transaction l^
on the labour market provided an optimal trade offer is next made
on the goods market. The optimal labour supply obtains as 
(assuming < f^S)
Max (1 - pr.)V(Xf, m ) + pr.V(Jtf, m ) s l t t l t t
\
As appears only in the second term, its optimal value obtains 
alternatively as:
Max V(i,t,mt> = Max[MaxU(yfc, l®, Mfc)]
l a
s
t
The optimal labour supply is thus the Walrasian one.
(ii) The amount of labour a firm wishes to hire is determined 
by expected profit maximization
M a |  it  = (1 - pr2) (l-pr3) {ptminCy®,F (mln(ï^, t^ ) )] 
‘t
-[wtmin i*. 1*]}
+ (1 - pr2)pr3ip^min[y® ,F (£^ ) ] - wtl£}
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+ pr2 (l-pr3)(ptF[min(ll^ , t )^ ] - tyninlji^, ) 
+ pr2pr3{ptF(d^) - wtK^}
s.t. the technological constraint = F(£^)f 
where F is assumed to be concave and strictly increasing in
Futia (1975) has shown that this has the same solution as:
Mjd "t = <1-Pr2)Ptnln
+ pr2ptF(*t> ' wtlt
If y® is larger than the Walrasian supply of goods, the optimal labour 
wddemand is obviously . in the opposite case, the firm will at
least want to produce y^. its demand for labour can accordingly be
written as:
The optimal value of d will maximize the increase in profits expected 
from producing more than y®.
Max
d pr2ptF^P"1 <Ft’ + d ^  - "td
s.t. d O
- 2 8 1 -
The first order conditions are 
Pr2Ptft - Wt * 0 
d(pr2ptft ” "t1 " 0
where is the derivative of F at [f  ^(y^ ) + dj. Clearly, if ft is 
bounded, pr2 close to zero implies (Pr2ptft ” Wt^  ne9at*ve and d 
equal to zero. Thus, to summarize, provided pr^ is sufficiently 
close to zero, the effective demand for labour can be written:
£d = F 1[min(y®, y”S)]
After labour contracts have been made, the production process takes 
place. When producers meet consumers on the goods market, their 
supply of goods can only be
y* -  F ( t t )
As pr^ is strictly positive, offering more than the quantity actually 
produced implies that the firm might be unable to honour their trade 
offer. As is the minimum of supply and demand, and because 
already takes account of the constraint prevailing on the goods 
market, the supply of goods is a function of the constraints prevailing 
(or expected to prevail) on both markets. For pr^ sufficiently close 
to zero, it corresponds to the Dreze concept obtained from:
Max ptF( <^ ) - w 
s.t. FIlJ) - ÿ® and fd 5
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APPENDIX 2
For the regime of Underconsumption the changes in wfc (the 
*
same for (w-p)fc when pfc = pfc) and are given by 
Awt * Xw (w* - wt>
■ »„ '.;A5o + St - a \ ■ / eo + S2pt V
\ (1+b) B1 / i ». |
ASt = Aio - (Be + + B2Pt)
This system can be written in matrix notation as
‘ 4«t ‘ = A wt
- ASt . ,st .
-A*. A../(1+b) 8w w' ,P1
- B,
and B = Xw [a «o - a - (1+b) <BQ + B2P^)]/(l+b)B1
A6o - 6o ‘ B/ t
By Routh-Hurwitz this system is locally stable as
Tr (A) - -Aw < 0
and I A! = Xw/(l+b) > O
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